CVE-2016-4998 oob reads when processing IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt (rhbz 1349886 1350316)

2 files changed, 532 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/CVE-2016-4998.patch b/CVE-2016-4998.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..758cc6404
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CVE-2016-4998.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,525 @@
+From bdf533de6968e9686df777dc178486f600c6e617 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2016 18:02:49 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] netfilter: x_tables: validate e->target_offset early
+
+We should check that e->target_offset is sane before
+mark_source_chains gets called since it will fetch the target entry
+for loop detection.
+
+Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 17 ++++++++---------
+ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c  | 17 ++++++++---------
+ net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 17 ++++++++---------
+ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+index bf08192..830bbe8 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+@@ -474,14 +474,12 @@ next:
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+
+-static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name)
++static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e)
+ {
+ 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
+
+-	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp)) {
+-		duprintf("arp_tables: arp check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
++	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+-	}
+
+ 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) > e->next_offset)
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+@@ -522,10 +520,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size)
+ 	struct xt_target *target;
+ 	int ret;
+
+-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
+-	if (ret)
+-		return ret;
+-
+ 	e->counters.pcnt = xt_percpu_counter_alloc();
+ 	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(e->counters.pcnt))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+@@ -576,6 +570,7 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
+ 					     unsigned int valid_hooks)
+ {
+ 	unsigned int h;
++	int err;
+
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
+ 	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) {
+@@ -590,6 +585,10 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+
++	err = check_entry(e);
++	if (err)
++		return err;
++
+ 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
+ 	for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
+ 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
+@@ -1246,7 +1245,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
+ 	}
+
+ 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
+-	ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e, name);
++	ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return ret;
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+index e53f8d6..1d72a3c 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+@@ -569,14 +569,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
+ }
+
+ static int
+-check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name)
++check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e)
+ {
+ 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
+
+-	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip)) {
+-		duprintf("ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
++	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+-	}
+
+ 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
+ 	    e->next_offset)
+@@ -666,10 +664,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
+ 	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
+ 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
+
+-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
+-	if (ret)
+-		return ret;
+-
+ 	e->counters.pcnt = xt_percpu_counter_alloc();
+ 	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(e->counters.pcnt))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+@@ -741,6 +735,7 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
+ 			   unsigned int valid_hooks)
+ {
+ 	unsigned int h;
++	int err;
+
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
+ 	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) {
+@@ -755,6 +750,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+
++	err = check_entry(e);
++	if (err)
++		return err;
++
+ 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
+ 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
+ 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
+@@ -1506,7 +1505,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
+ 	}
+
+ 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
+-	ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e, name);
++	ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return ret;
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+index 84f9baf..26a5ad1 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+@@ -581,14 +581,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
+ }
+
+ static int
+-check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e, const char *name)
++check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
+ {
+ 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
+
+-	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6)) {
+-		duprintf("ip_tables: ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
++	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+-	}
+
+ 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
+ 	    e->next_offset)
+@@ -679,10 +677,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
+ 	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
+ 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
+
+-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
+-	if (ret)
+-		return ret;
+-
+ 	e->counters.pcnt = xt_percpu_counter_alloc();
+ 	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(e->counters.pcnt))
+ 		return -ENOMEM;
+@@ -753,6 +747,7 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
+ 			   unsigned int valid_hooks)
+ {
+ 	unsigned int h;
++	int err;
+
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
+ 	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
+@@ -767,6 +762,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+
++	err = check_entry(e);
++	if (err)
++		return err;
++
+ 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
+ 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
+ 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
+@@ -1518,7 +1517,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
+ 	}
+
+ 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
+-	ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e, name);
++	ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e);
+ 	if (ret)
+ 		return ret;
+
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
+From 6e94e0cfb0887e4013b3b930fa6ab1fe6bb6ba91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2016 18:02:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers
+ remaining blob size
+
+Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
+
+Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 6 ++++--
+ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c  | 6 ++++--
+ net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 6 ++++--
+ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+index 830bbe8..51d4fe5 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+@@ -573,7 +573,8 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
+ 	int err;
+
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+@@ -1232,7 +1233,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
+
+ 	duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_arpt_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+index 1d72a3c..fb7694e 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+@@ -738,7 +738,8 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
+ 	int err;
+
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+@@ -1492,7 +1493,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
+
+ 	duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ipt_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+index 26a5ad1..b248528f 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+@@ -750,7 +750,8 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
+ 	int err;
+
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+@@ -1504,7 +1505,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
+
+ 	duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
+ 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
+-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
++	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
++	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
+ 		duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 	}
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
+From 54d83fc74aa9ec72794373cb47432c5f7fb1a309 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2016 18:02:52 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
+
+Ben Hawkes says:
+
+ In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
+ is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
+ next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
+ counter value at the supplied offset.
+
+Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
+the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
+an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
+
+However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
+It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
+
+However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
+(no -m args).
+
+The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
+passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
+mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
+proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
+
+Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
+
+Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 18 +++++++++---------
+ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c  | 23 +++++++++++------------
+ net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 23 +++++++++++------------
+ 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+index 51d4fe5..a1bb5e7 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+@@ -359,11 +359,12 @@ unsigned int arpt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ }
+
+ /* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
+-static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_arp *arp)
++static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_entry *e)
+ {
+ 	static const struct arpt_arp uncond;
+
+-	return memcmp(arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
++	return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) &&
++	       memcmp(&e->arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if
+@@ -402,11 +403,10 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
+ 				|= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS));
+
+ 			/* Unconditional return/END. */
+-			if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) &&
++			if ((unconditional(e) &&
+ 			     (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
+ 				     XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
+-			     t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->arp)) ||
+-			    visited) {
++			     t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
+ 				unsigned int oldpos, size;
+
+ 				if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
+@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct arpt_entry *e)
+ 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
+ 	unsigned int verdict;
+
+-	if (!unconditional(&e->arp))
++	if (!unconditional(e))
+ 		return false;
+ 	t = arpt_get_target_c(e);
+ 	if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
+@@ -598,9 +598,9 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
+ 			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
+ 		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
+ 			if (!check_underflow(e)) {
+-				pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
+-				       "use the STANDARD target with "
+-				       "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
++				pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
++					 "use the STANDARD target with "
++					 "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
+ 				return -EINVAL;
+ 			}
+ 			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+index fb7694e..89b5d95 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+@@ -168,11 +168,12 @@ get_entry(const void *base, unsigned int offset)
+
+ /* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
+ /* Mildly perf critical (only if packet tracing is on) */
+-static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_ip *ip)
++static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_entry *e)
+ {
+ 	static const struct ipt_ip uncond;
+
+-	return memcmp(ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
++	return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
++	       memcmp(&e->ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
+ #undef FWINV
+ }
+
+@@ -229,11 +230,10 @@ get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ipt_entry *s, const struct ipt_entry *e,
+ 	} else if (s == e) {
+ 		(*rulenum)++;
+
+-		if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
++		if (unconditional(s) &&
+ 		    strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
+ 			   XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
+-		   t->verdict < 0 &&
+-		   unconditional(&s->ip)) {
++		   t->verdict < 0) {
+ 			/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
+ 			*comment = *chainname == hookname
+ 				? comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
+@@ -476,11 +476,10 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
+ 			e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS));
+
+ 			/* Unconditional return/END. */
+-			if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
++			if ((unconditional(e) &&
+ 			     (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
+ 				     XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
+-			     t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->ip)) ||
+-			    visited) {
++			     t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
+ 				unsigned int oldpos, size;
+
+ 				if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
+@@ -715,7 +714,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct ipt_entry *e)
+ 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
+ 	unsigned int verdict;
+
+-	if (!unconditional(&e->ip))
++	if (!unconditional(e))
+ 		return false;
+ 	t = ipt_get_target_c(e);
+ 	if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
+@@ -763,9 +762,9 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
+ 			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
+ 		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
+ 			if (!check_underflow(e)) {
+-				pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
+-				       "use the STANDARD target with "
+-				       "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
++				pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
++					 "use the STANDARD target with "
++					 "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
+ 				return -EINVAL;
+ 			}
+ 			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
+diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+index b248528f..541b59f 100644
+--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+@@ -198,11 +198,12 @@ get_entry(const void *base, unsigned int offset)
+
+ /* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
+ /* Mildly perf critical (only if packet tracing is on) */
+-static inline bool unconditional(const struct ip6t_ip6 *ipv6)
++static inline bool unconditional(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
+ {
+ 	static const struct ip6t_ip6 uncond;
+
+-	return memcmp(ipv6, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
++	return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
++	       memcmp(&e->ipv6, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
+ }
+
+ static inline const struct xt_entry_target *
+@@ -258,11 +259,10 @@ get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ip6t_entry *s, const struct ip6t_entry *e,
+ 	} else if (s == e) {
+ 		(*rulenum)++;
+
+-		if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
++		if (unconditional(s) &&
+ 		    strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
+ 			   XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
+-		    t->verdict < 0 &&
+-		    unconditional(&s->ipv6)) {
++		    t->verdict < 0) {
+ 			/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
+ 			*comment = *chainname == hookname
+ 				? comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
+@@ -488,11 +488,10 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
+ 			e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS));
+
+ 			/* Unconditional return/END. */
+-			if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
++			if ((unconditional(e) &&
+ 			     (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
+ 				     XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
+-			     t->verdict < 0 &&
+-			     unconditional(&e->ipv6)) || visited) {
++			     t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
+ 				unsigned int oldpos, size;
+
+ 				if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
+@@ -727,7 +726,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
+ 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
+ 	unsigned int verdict;
+
+-	if (!unconditional(&e->ipv6))
++	if (!unconditional(e))
+ 		return false;
+ 	t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
+ 	if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
+@@ -775,9 +774,9 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
+ 			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
+ 		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
+ 			if (!check_underflow(e)) {
+-				pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
+-				       "use the STANDARD target with "
+-				       "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
++				pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
++					 "use the STANDARD target with "
++					 "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
+ 				return -EINVAL;
+ 			}
+ 			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
+-- 
+2.7.4
+
diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec
index 970981484..99343d59b 100644
--- a/kernel.spec
+++ b/kernel.spec
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
 # For non-released -rc kernels, this will be appended after the rcX and
 # gitX tags, so a 3 here would become part of release "0.rcX.gitX.3"
 #
-%global baserelease 200
+%global baserelease 201
 %global fedora_build %{baserelease}
 
 # base_sublevel is the kernel version we're starting with and patching
@@ -670,6 +670,9 @@ Patch727: KEYS-potential-uninitialized-variable.patch
 #rhbz 1338025
 Patch728: hp-wmi-fix-wifi-cannot-be-hard-unblock.patch
 
+#CVE-2016-4998 rhbz 1349886 1350316
+Patch729: CVE-2016-4998.patch
+
 # END OF PATCH DEFINITIONS
 
 %endif
@@ -2187,6 +2190,9 @@ fi
 #
 # 
 %changelog
+* Mon Jun 27 2016 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org> 4.5.7-201
+- CVE-2016-4998 oob reads when processing IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE setsockopt (rhbz 1349886 1350316)
+
 * Wed Jun 15 2016 Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>
 - hp-wmi: fix wifi cannot be hard-unblock (rhbz 1338025)