Linux v4.18.11

4 files changed, 5 insertions, 337 deletions

diff --git a/CVE-2018-14633.patch b/CVE-2018-14633.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 731903bdb..000000000
--- a/CVE-2018-14633.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,242 +0,0 @@
-From 1816494330a83f2a064499d8ed2797045641f92c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun, 9 Sep 2018 04:09:26 +0000
-Subject: scsi: target: iscsi: Use hex2bin instead of a re-implementation
-
-This change has the following effects, in order of descreasing importance:
-
-1) Prevent a stack buffer overflow
-
-2) Do not append an unnecessary NULL to an anyway binary buffer, which
-   is writing one byte past client_digest when caller is:
-   chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r));
-
-The latter was found by KASAN (see below) when input value hes expected size
-(32 hex chars), and further analysis revealed a stack buffer overflow can
-happen when network-received value is longer, allowing an unauthenticated
-remote attacker to smash up to 17 bytes after destination buffer (16 bytes
-attacker-controlled and one null).  As switching to hex2bin requires
-specifying destination buffer length, and does not internally append any null,
-it solves both issues.
-
-This addresses CVE-2018-14633.
-
-Beyond this:
-
-- Validate received value length and check hex2bin accepted the input, to log
-  this rejection reason instead of just failing authentication.
-
-- Only log received CHAP_R and CHAP_C values once they passed sanity checks.
-
-==================================================================
-BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
-Write of size 1 at addr ffff8801090ef7c8 by task kworker/0:0/1021
-
-CPU: 0 PID: 1021 Comm: kworker/0:0 Tainted: G           O      4.17.8kasan.sess.connops+ #2
-Hardware name: To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./Aptio CRB, BIOS 5.6.5 05/19/2014
-Workqueue: events iscsi_target_do_login_rx [iscsi_target_mod]
-Call Trace:
- dump_stack+0x71/0xac
- print_address_description+0x65/0x22e
- ? chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
- kasan_report.cold.6+0x241/0x2fd
- chap_string_to_hex+0x32/0x60 [iscsi_target_mod]
- chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x2cb/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod]
- ? chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex.constprop.5+0x50/0x50 [iscsi_target_mod]
- ? ftrace_caller_op_ptr+0xe/0xe
- ? __orc_find+0x6f/0xc0
- ? unwind_next_frame+0x231/0x850
- ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
- ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
- ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
- ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
- ? deref_stack_reg+0xd0/0xd0
- ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
- ? is_module_text_address+0xa/0x11
- ? kernel_text_address+0x4c/0x110
- ? __save_stack_trace+0x82/0x100
- ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
- ? save_stack+0x8c/0xb0
- ? 0xffffffffc1660000
- ? iscsi_target_do_login+0x155/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod]
- ? iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
- ? process_one_work+0x35c/0x640
- ? worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0
- ? kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
- ? ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
- ? iscsi_update_param_value+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod]
- ? iscsit_release_cmd+0x170/0x170 [iscsi_target_mod]
- chap_main_loop+0x172/0x570 [iscsi_target_mod]
- ? chap_server_compute_md5.isra.2+0x860/0x860 [iscsi_target_mod]
- ? rx_data+0xd6/0x120 [iscsi_target_mod]
- ? iscsit_print_session_params+0xd0/0xd0 [iscsi_target_mod]
- ? cyc2ns_read_begin.part.2+0x90/0x90
- ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x25/0x50
- ? memcmp+0x45/0x70
- iscsi_target_do_login+0x875/0x8d0 [iscsi_target_mod]
- ? iscsi_target_check_first_request.isra.5+0x1a0/0x1a0 [iscsi_target_mod]
- ? del_timer+0xe0/0xe0
- ? memset+0x1f/0x40
- ? flush_sigqueue+0x29/0xd0
- iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x3bc/0x4c0 [iscsi_target_mod]
- ? iscsi_target_nego_release+0x80/0x80 [iscsi_target_mod]
- ? iscsi_target_restore_sock_callbacks+0x130/0x130 [iscsi_target_mod]
- process_one_work+0x35c/0x640
- worker_thread+0x66/0x5d0
- ? flush_rcu_work+0x40/0x40
- kthread+0x1a0/0x1c0
- ? kthread_bind+0x30/0x30
- ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
-
-The buggy address belongs to the page:
-page:ffffea0004243bc0 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0
-flags: 0x17fffc000000000()
-raw: 017fffc000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff
-raw: ffffea0004243c20 ffffea0004243ba0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
-page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
-
-Memory state around the buggy address:
- ffff8801090ef680: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 01 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
- ffff8801090ef700: f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
->ffff8801090ef780: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
-                                              ^
- ffff8801090ef800: 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 02 f2 f2 f2 f2
- ffff8801090ef880: f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00
-==================================================================
-
-Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
----
- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 30 ++++++++++++++----------------
- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
-index 9518ffd8b8ba..6c3b4c022894 100644
---- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
-+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
-@@ -26,18 +26,6 @@
- #include "iscsi_target_nego.h"
- #include "iscsi_target_auth.h"
- 
--static int chap_string_to_hex(unsigned char *dst, unsigned char *src, int len)
--{
--	int j = DIV_ROUND_UP(len, 2), rc;
--
--	rc = hex2bin(dst, src, j);
--	if (rc < 0)
--		pr_debug("CHAP string contains non hex digit symbols\n");
--
--	dst[j] = '\0';
--	return j;
--}
--
- static void chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(char *dst, char *src, int src_len)
- {
- 	int i;
-@@ -248,9 +236,16 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5(
- 		pr_err("Could not find CHAP_R.\n");
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	if (strlen(chap_r) != MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE * 2) {
-+		pr_err("Malformed CHAP_R\n");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (hex2bin(client_digest, chap_r, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE) < 0) {
-+		pr_err("Malformed CHAP_R\n");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 
- 	pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_R=%s\n", chap_r);
--	chap_string_to_hex(client_digest, chap_r, strlen(chap_r));
- 
- 	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("md5", 0, 0);
- 	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
-@@ -349,9 +344,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5(
- 		pr_err("Could not find CHAP_C.\n");
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", challenge);
--	challenge_len = chap_string_to_hex(challenge_binhex, challenge,
--				strlen(challenge));
-+	challenge_len = DIV_ROUND_UP(strlen(challenge), 2);
- 	if (!challenge_len) {
- 		pr_err("Unable to convert incoming challenge\n");
- 		goto out;
-@@ -360,6 +353,11 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5(
- 		pr_err("CHAP_C exceeds maximum binary size of 1024 bytes\n");
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	if (hex2bin(challenge_binhex, challenge, challenge_len) < 0) {
-+		pr_err("Malformed CHAP_C\n");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	pr_debug("[server] Got CHAP_C=%s\n", challenge);
- 	/*
- 	 * During mutual authentication, the CHAP_C generated by the
- 	 * initiator must not match the original CHAP_C generated by
--- 
-cgit 1.2-0.3.lf.el7
-
-From 8c39e2699f8acb2e29782a834e56306da24937fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun, 9 Sep 2018 04:09:27 +0000
-Subject: scsi: target: iscsi: Use bin2hex instead of a re-implementation
-
-Signed-off-by: Vincent Pelletier <plr.vincent@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
----
- drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 15 +++------------
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
-index 6c3b4c022894..4e680d753941 100644
---- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
-+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
-@@ -26,15 +26,6 @@
- #include "iscsi_target_nego.h"
- #include "iscsi_target_auth.h"
- 
--static void chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(char *dst, char *src, int src_len)
--{
--	int i;
--
--	for (i = 0; i < src_len; i++) {
--		sprintf(&dst[i*2], "%02x", (int) src[i] & 0xff);
--	}
--}
--
- static int chap_gen_challenge(
- 	struct iscsi_conn *conn,
- 	int caller,
-@@ -50,7 +41,7 @@ static int chap_gen_challenge(
- 	ret = get_random_bytes_wait(chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
- 	if (unlikely(ret))
- 		return ret;
--	chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(challenge_asciihex, chap->challenge,
-+	bin2hex(challenge_asciihex, chap->challenge,
- 				CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
- 	/*
- 	 * Set CHAP_C, and copy the generated challenge into c_str.
-@@ -289,7 +280,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5(
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
--	chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(response, server_digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
-+	bin2hex(response, server_digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
- 	pr_debug("[server] MD5 Server Digest: %s\n", response);
- 
- 	if (memcmp(server_digest, client_digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE) != 0) {
-@@ -411,7 +402,7 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5(
- 	/*
- 	 * Convert response from binary hex to ascii hext.
- 	 */
--	chap_binaryhex_to_asciihex(response, digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
-+	bin2hex(response, digest, MD5_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
- 	*nr_out_len += sprintf(nr_out_ptr + *nr_out_len, "CHAP_R=0x%s",
- 			response);
- 	*nr_out_len += 1;
--- 
-cgit 1.2-0.3.lf.el7
-
diff --git a/drm-vc4-Fix-the-no-scaling-case-on-multi-planar-YUV-formats.patch b/drm-vc4-Fix-the-no-scaling-case-on-multi-planar-YUV-formats.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 195ced13b..000000000
--- a/drm-vc4-Fix-the-no-scaling-case-on-multi-planar-YUV-formats.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-From patchwork Wed Jul 25 12:29:07 2018
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
-Subject: drm/vc4: Fix the "no scaling" case on multi-planar YUV formats
-From: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@bootlin.com>
-X-Patchwork-Id: 240917
-Message-Id: <20180725122907.13702-1-boris.brezillon@bootlin.com>
-To: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
-Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>,
- Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@bootlin.com>, stable@vger.kernel.org,
- dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
-Date: Wed, 25 Jul 2018 14:29:07 +0200
-
-When there's no scaling requested ->is_unity should be true no matter
-the format.
-
-Also, when no scaling is requested and we have a multi-planar YUV
-format, we should leave ->y_scaling[0] to VC4_SCALING_NONE and only
-set ->x_scaling[0] to VC4_SCALING_PPF.
-
-Doing this fixes an hardly visible artifact (seen when using modetest
-and a rather big overlay plane in YUV420).
-
-Fixes: fc04023fafec ("drm/vc4: Add support for YUV planes.")
-Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
-Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@bootlin.com>
-Reviewed-by: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
----
- drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_plane.c | 25 ++++++++++++-------------
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_plane.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_plane.c
-index cfb50fedfa2b..a3275fa66b7b 100644
---- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_plane.c
-+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_plane.c
-@@ -297,6 +297,9 @@ static int vc4_plane_setup_clipping_and_scaling(struct drm_plane_state *state)
- 	vc4_state->y_scaling[0] = vc4_get_scaling_mode(vc4_state->src_h[0],
- 						       vc4_state->crtc_h);
- 
-+	vc4_state->is_unity = (vc4_state->x_scaling[0] == VC4_SCALING_NONE &&
-+			       vc4_state->y_scaling[0] == VC4_SCALING_NONE);
-+
- 	if (num_planes > 1) {
- 		vc4_state->is_yuv = true;
- 
-@@ -312,24 +315,17 @@ static int vc4_plane_setup_clipping_and_scaling(struct drm_plane_state *state)
- 			vc4_get_scaling_mode(vc4_state->src_h[1],
- 					     vc4_state->crtc_h);
- 
--		/* YUV conversion requires that scaling be enabled,
--		 * even on a plane that's otherwise 1:1.  Choose TPZ
--		 * for simplicity.
-+		/* YUV conversion requires that horizontal scaling be enabled,
-+		 * even on a plane that's otherwise 1:1. Looks like only PPF
-+		 * works in that case, so let's pick that one.
- 		 */
--		if (vc4_state->x_scaling[0] == VC4_SCALING_NONE)
--			vc4_state->x_scaling[0] = VC4_SCALING_TPZ;
--		if (vc4_state->y_scaling[0] == VC4_SCALING_NONE)
--			vc4_state->y_scaling[0] = VC4_SCALING_TPZ;
-+		if (vc4_state->is_unity)
-+			vc4_state->x_scaling[0] = VC4_SCALING_PPF;
- 	} else {
- 		vc4_state->x_scaling[1] = VC4_SCALING_NONE;
- 		vc4_state->y_scaling[1] = VC4_SCALING_NONE;
- 	}
- 
--	vc4_state->is_unity = (vc4_state->x_scaling[0] == VC4_SCALING_NONE &&
--			       vc4_state->y_scaling[0] == VC4_SCALING_NONE &&
--			       vc4_state->x_scaling[1] == VC4_SCALING_NONE &&
--			       vc4_state->y_scaling[1] == VC4_SCALING_NONE);
--
- 	/* No configuring scaling on the cursor plane, since it gets
- 	   non-vblank-synced updates, and scaling requires requires
- 	   LBM changes which have to be vblank-synced.
-@@ -672,7 +668,10 @@ static int vc4_plane_mode_set(struct drm_plane *plane,
- 		vc4_dlist_write(vc4_state, SCALER_CSC2_ITR_R_601_5);
- 	}
- 
--	if (!vc4_state->is_unity) {
-+	if (vc4_state->x_scaling[0] != VC4_SCALING_NONE ||
-+	    vc4_state->x_scaling[1] != VC4_SCALING_NONE ||
-+	    vc4_state->y_scaling[0] != VC4_SCALING_NONE ||
-+	    vc4_state->y_scaling[1] != VC4_SCALING_NONE) {
- 		/* LBM Base Address. */
- 		if (vc4_state->y_scaling[0] != VC4_SCALING_NONE ||
- 		    vc4_state->y_scaling[1] != VC4_SCALING_NONE) {
diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec
index 65fac6610..f1d26de74 100644
--- a/kernel.spec
+++ b/kernel.spec
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
 %if 0%{?released_kernel}
 
 # Do we have a -stable update to apply?
-%define stable_update 10
+%define stable_update 11
 # Set rpm version accordingly
 %if 0%{?stable_update}
 %define stablerev %{stable_update}
@@ -601,8 +601,6 @@ Patch311: arm64-ZynqMP-firmware-clock-drivers-core.patch
 # Enabling Patches for the RPi3+
 Patch330: bcm2837-enable-pmu.patch
 
-# https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/240917/
-Patch334: drm-vc4-Fix-the-no-scaling-case-on-multi-planar-YUV-formats.patch
 
 # Fix for AllWinner A64 Timer Errata, still not final
 # https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10392891/
@@ -626,9 +624,6 @@ Patch504: xsa270.patch
 Patch506: 0001-random-add-a-config-option-to-trust-the-CPU-s-hwrng.patch
 Patch507: 0001-random-make-CPU-trust-a-boot-parameter.patch
 
-# CVE-2018-14633 rhbz 1626035 1632185
-Patch508: CVE-2018-14633.patch
-
 # rhbz 1628394
 Patch509: powerpc-ipv6.patch
 
@@ -1881,6 +1876,9 @@ fi
 #
 #
 %changelog
+* Sun Sep 30 2018 Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> - 4.18.11-200
+- Linux v4.18.11
+
 * Wed Sep 26 2018 Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> - 4.18.10-200
 - Linux v4.18.10
 
diff --git a/sources b/sources
index e56e0a5d9..37528b63e 100644
--- a/sources
+++ b/sources
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 SHA512 (linux-4.18.tar.xz) = 950eb85ac743b291afe9f21cd174d823e25f11883ee62cecfbfff8fe8c5672aae707654b1b8f29a133b1f2e3529e63b9f7fba4c45d6dacccc8000b3a9a9ae038
-SHA512 (patch-4.18.10.xz) = ff00f5b50921654494bf0cc290a82871bf3f053dc170abbde906499e3bffe1f368a94a6c09196ded618ae46fe2fa74e05b4e594f31ccc08a7071efa1e9ec4a68
+SHA512 (patch-4.18.11.xz) = a1cfab9c4fb7bec8da33fa95da0986ed7605ff9953fd425f5122978c462a6024886955827ce52a87f93312d5e17a4533606bbabf3e6ad6a5dd353d430db92e7e