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authorJustin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org>2018-01-05 09:30:15 -0600
committerJustin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org>2018-01-05 09:30:15 -0600
commit05dab9c5372f7a71bfc95ba118e6ea0923d19eca (patch)
tree015ddca4ee0227716d2962a8a9d64ba71c58d391
parentb4569abca33d473095788b76cb49096c5a046d4e (diff)
downloadkernel-05dab9c5372f7a71bfc95ba118e6ea0923d19eca.tar.gz
kernel-05dab9c5372f7a71bfc95ba118e6ea0923d19eca.tar.xz
kernel-05dab9c5372f7a71bfc95ba118e6ea0923d19eca.zip
Linux v4.14.12
-rw-r--r--kernel.spec6
-rw-r--r--sources1
-rw-r--r--x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch46
3 files changed, 5 insertions, 48 deletions
diff --git a/kernel.spec b/kernel.spec
index c6db63868..58226ae03 100644
--- a/kernel.spec
+++ b/kernel.spec
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Summary: The Linux kernel
%if 0%{?released_kernel}
# Do we have a -stable update to apply?
-%define stable_update 11
+%define stable_update 12
# Set rpm version accordingly
%if 0%{?stable_update}
%define stablerev %{stable_update}
@@ -667,7 +667,6 @@ Patch628: HID-rmi-Check-that-a-device-is-a-RMI-device-before-c.patch
Patch630: v4-KVM-Fix-stack-out-of-bounds-read-in-write_mmio.patch
Patch631: cgroup-for-4.15-fixes-cgroup-fix-css_task_iter-crash-on-CSS_TASK_ITER_PROC.patch
-Patch632: x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch
# rhbz1514969
Patch633: 0001-platform-x86-dell-laptop-Filter-out-spurious-keyboar.patch
@@ -2227,6 +2226,9 @@ fi
#
#
%changelog
+* Fri Jan 05 2018 Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org> - 4.14.12-300
+- Linux v4.14.12
+
* Thu Jan 04 2018 Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
- Add a patch to filter false positive kbd backlight change events (#1514969)
diff --git a/sources b/sources
index 05d19ed73..8bd0682b0 100644
--- a/sources
+++ b/sources
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
SHA512 (linux-4.14.tar.xz) = 77e43a02d766c3d73b7e25c4aafb2e931d6b16e870510c22cef0cdb05c3acb7952b8908ebad12b10ef982c6efbe286364b1544586e715cf38390e483927904d8
SHA512 (perf-man-4.14.tar.gz) = 76a9d8adc284cdffd4b3fbb060e7f9a14109267707ce1d03f4c3239cd70d8d164f697da3a0f90a363fbcac42a61d3c378afbcc2a86f112c501b9cb5ce74ef9f8
SHA512 (patch-4.14.11.xz) = 3fbaf02eb236d7490eb65e64b841fc43bd3abbbf97deef79b7457faf8005ef7f2cbaf5c4a8c3b2d22998f5197a5a98b6fef717ed60a34ff666fa7eaf8376118d
+SHA512 (patch-4.14.12.xz) = b11b91503c9eb879b79cb16683204f5dbb467aac62dcfc1b025f889dc38016d990c0fd1879210226430e9f9ac6e168439b13603781188d67d213b12a334b4e5b
diff --git a/x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch b/x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a7e0accb6..000000000
--- a/x86-cpu-x86-pti-Do-not-enable-PTI-on-AMD-processors.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-From patchwork Wed Dec 27 05:43:54 2017
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
-Subject: x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors
-From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
-X-Patchwork-Id: 10133447
-Message-Id: <20171227054354.20369.94587.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
-To: x86@kernel.org
-Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
- linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
- Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
- Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
-Date: Tue, 26 Dec 2017 23:43:54 -0600
-
-AMD processors are not subject to the types of attacks that the kernel
-page table isolation feature protects against. The AMD microarchitecture
-does not allow memory references, including speculative references, that
-access higher privileged data when running in a lesser privileged mode
-when that access would result in a page fault.
-
-Disable page table isolation by default on AMD processors by not setting
-the X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE feature, which controls whether X86_FEATURE_PTI
-is set.
-
-Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
-Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
----
- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
-index c47de4e..7d9e3b0 100644
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
-@@ -923,8 +923,8 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
-
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
-
-- /* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */
-- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
-+ if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
-+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
-
- fpu__init_system(c);
-