Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into rawhide-user-thl-vanilla-fedorakernel-5.8.0-0.rc5.1.vanilla.1.fc33kernel-5.8.0-0.rc5.1.vanilla.1.fc32kernel-5.8.0-0.rc5.1.vanilla.1.fc31

1 files changed, 49 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/0001-selinux-allow-reading-labels-before-policy-is-loaded.patch b/0001-selinux-allow-reading-labels-before-policy-is-loaded.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5c2384cd6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0001-selinux-allow-reading-labels-before-policy-is-loaded.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 10:39:40 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] selinux: allow reading labels before policy is loaded
+
+This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b42043 ("selinux: allow
+labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows
+querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded.
+
+One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this
+patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be
+able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID,
+on first boot, at initrd time.[1]
+
+Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be
+able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply
+them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the
+second part of this process; this commit enables the first part.
+
+[1] https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/94
+
+Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+---
+ security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
+index efa6108b1ce9..ca901025802a 100644
+--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
++++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
+@@ -3332,7 +3332,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void
+ 	char *context = NULL;
+ 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+-	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
++	/*
++	 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
++	 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
++	 */
++	if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
++	    strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+ 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ 	/*
+-- 
+2.26.2
+