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To facilitate code sharing between statd and sm-notify (and with other
components of nfs-utils), replace sm-notify's nsm_log() with xlog().
Since opt_quiet is used in only a handful of insignificant cases, it
is removed.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
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TI-RPC's version of the svc_getcaller() macro points to a sockaddr_in6,
not a sockaddr_in, though for AF_INET callers, an AF_INET address
resides there. To squelch compiler warnings when the TI-RPC version of
the svc_req structure is used, add inline helpers with appropriate
type casting.
Note that tcp_wrappers support only AF_INET addresses for now.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
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Clean up: Remove RESTRICTED_STATD to help make IPv6 changes simpler.
We keep the code behind RESTRICTED_STATD, and toss anything that is
compiled out when it is set.
RESTRICTED_STATD was added almost 10 years ago in response to CERT
CERT CA-99.05, which addresses exposures in rpc.statd that might allow
an attacker to take advantage of buffer overflows in rpc.statd while it
is running in privileged mode.
These days, I can't think of a reason why anyone would want to run
rpc.statd without setting RESTRICTED_STATD. In addition, I don't
think rpc.statd is ever tested without it.
Removing RESTRICTED_STATD will get rid of some address storage and
comparison issues that will make IPv6 support simpler. Plus it will
make our test matrix smaller!
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
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i.e. you now need --disable-secure-statd if you want any client
other than lockd to talk to statd.
Also relax the RESTRICTED_STATD checks so that a recent kernel
with /proc/sys/fs/nfs/nsm_use_hostnames set can still talk to
statd.
Finally, restrict access to simulate_crash so that only privileged
processes on localhost can call it. Having it accessible by the
whole world is probably not much more than a minor inconvenience,
but it really should be kept closed.
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