/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */ #include "k5-int.h" #include #include #include /* krb5_klog_syslog */ #include #include #include "kadm5/server_internal.h" /* XXX for kadm5_server_handle_t */ #include "misc.h" #ifndef GETSOCKNAME_ARG3_TYPE #define GETSOCKNAME_ARG3_TYPE int #endif #define RFC3244_VERSION 0xff80 krb5_error_code process_chpw_request(context, server_handle, realm, keytab, local_faddr, remote_faddr, req, rep) krb5_context context; void *server_handle; char *realm; krb5_keytab keytab; krb5_fulladdr *local_faddr; krb5_fulladdr *remote_faddr; krb5_data *req; krb5_data *rep; { krb5_error_code ret; char *ptr; int plen, vno; krb5_data ap_req, ap_rep; krb5_auth_context auth_context; krb5_principal changepw; krb5_principal client, target = NULL; krb5_ticket *ticket; krb5_data cipher, clear; krb5_replay_data replay; krb5_error krberror; int numresult; char strresult[1024]; char *clientstr = NULL, *targetstr = NULL; const char *errmsg = NULL; size_t clen; char *cdots; struct sockaddr_storage ss; socklen_t salen; char addrbuf[100]; krb5_address *addr = remote_faddr->address; ret = 0; rep->length = 0; auth_context = NULL; changepw = NULL; ap_rep.length = 0; ticket = NULL; clear.length = 0; cipher.length = 0; if (req->length < 4) { /* either this, or the server is printing bad messages, or the caller passed in garbage */ ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; strlcpy(strresult, "Request was truncated", sizeof(strresult)); goto chpwfail; } ptr = req->data; /* verify length */ plen = (*ptr++ & 0xff); plen = (plen<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff); if (plen != req->length) return(KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED); /* verify version number */ vno = (*ptr++ & 0xff) ; vno = (vno<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff); if (vno != 1 && vno != RFC3244_VERSION) { ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BAD_PVNO; numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_BAD_VERSION; snprintf(strresult, sizeof(strresult), "Request contained unknown protocol version number %d", vno); goto chpwfail; } /* read, check ap-req length */ ap_req.length = (*ptr++ & 0xff); ap_req.length = (ap_req.length<<8) | (*ptr++ & 0xff); if (ptr + ap_req.length >= req->data + req->length) { ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED; numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; strlcpy(strresult, "Request was truncated in AP-REQ", sizeof(strresult)); goto chpwfail; } /* verify ap_req */ ap_req.data = ptr; ptr += ap_req.length; ret = krb5_auth_con_init(context, &auth_context); if (ret) { numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR; strlcpy(strresult, "Failed initializing auth context", sizeof(strresult)); goto chpwfail; } ret = krb5_auth_con_setflags(context, auth_context, KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_SEQUENCE); if (ret) { numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR; strlcpy(strresult, "Failed initializing auth context", sizeof(strresult)); goto chpwfail; } ret = krb5_build_principal(context, &changepw, strlen(realm), realm, "kadmin", "changepw", NULL); if (ret) { numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR; strlcpy(strresult, "Failed building kadmin/changepw principal", sizeof(strresult)); goto chpwfail; } ret = krb5_rd_req(context, &auth_context, &ap_req, changepw, keytab, NULL, &ticket); if (ret) { numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR; strlcpy(strresult, "Failed reading application request", sizeof(strresult)); goto chpwfail; } /* mk_priv requires that the local address be set. getsockname is used for this. rd_priv requires that the remote address be set. recvfrom is used for this. If rd_priv is given a local address, and the message has the recipient addr in it, this will be checked. However, there is simply no way to know ahead of time what address the message will be delivered *to*. Therefore, it is important that either no recipient address is in the messages when mk_priv is called, or that no local address is passed to rd_priv. Both is a better idea, and I have done that. In summary, when mk_priv is called, *only* a local address is specified. when rd_priv is called, *only* a remote address is specified. Are we having fun yet? */ ret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs(context, auth_context, NULL, remote_faddr->address); if (ret) { numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR; strlcpy(strresult, "Failed storing client internet address", sizeof(strresult)); goto chpwfail; } /* construct the ap-rep */ ret = krb5_mk_rep(context, auth_context, &ap_rep); if (ret) { numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_AUTHERROR; strlcpy(strresult, "Failed replying to application request", sizeof(strresult)); goto chpwfail; } /* decrypt the ChangePasswdData */ cipher.length = (req->data + req->length) - ptr; cipher.data = ptr; ret = krb5_rd_priv(context, auth_context, &cipher, &clear, &replay); if (ret) { numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR; strlcpy(strresult, "Failed decrypting request", sizeof(strresult)); goto chpwfail; } client = ticket->enc_part2->client; /* decode ChangePasswdData for setpw requests */ if (vno == RFC3244_VERSION) { krb5_data *clear_data; ret = decode_krb5_setpw_req(&clear, &clear_data, &target); if (ret != 0) { numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_MALFORMED; strlcpy(strresult, "Failed decoding ChangePasswdData", sizeof(strresult)); goto chpwfail; } memset(clear.data, 0, clear.length); free(clear.data); clear = *clear_data; free(clear_data); if (target != NULL) { ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, target, &targetstr); if (ret != 0) { numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR; strlcpy(strresult, "Failed unparsing target name for log", sizeof(strresult)); goto chpwfail; } } } ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client, &clientstr); if (ret) { numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR; strlcpy(strresult, "Failed unparsing client name for log", sizeof(strresult)); goto chpwfail; } /* for cpw, verify that this is an AS_REQ ticket */ if (vno == 1 && (ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INITIAL) == 0) { numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_INITIAL_FLAG_NEEDED; strlcpy(strresult, "Ticket must be derived from a password", sizeof(strresult)); goto chpwfail; } /* change the password */ ptr = (char *) malloc(clear.length+1); memcpy(ptr, clear.data, clear.length); ptr[clear.length] = '\0'; ret = schpw_util_wrapper(server_handle, client, target, (ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INITIAL) != 0, ptr, NULL, strresult, sizeof(strresult)); if (ret) errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret); /* zap the password */ memset(clear.data, 0, clear.length); memset(ptr, 0, clear.length); free(clear.data); free(ptr); clear.length = 0; clen = strlen(clientstr); trunc_name(&clen, &cdots); switch (addr->addrtype) { case ADDRTYPE_INET: { struct sockaddr_in *sin = ss2sin(&ss); sin->sin_family = AF_INET; memcpy(&sin->sin_addr, addr->contents, addr->length); sin->sin_port = htons(remote_faddr->port); salen = sizeof(*sin); break; } case ADDRTYPE_INET6: { struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = ss2sin6(&ss); sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6; memcpy(&sin6->sin6_addr, addr->contents, addr->length); sin6->sin6_port = htons(remote_faddr->port); salen = sizeof(*sin6); break; } default: { struct sockaddr *sa = ss2sa(&ss); sa->sa_family = AF_UNSPEC; salen = sizeof(*sa); break; } } if (getnameinfo(ss2sa(&ss), salen, addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) strlcpy(addrbuf, "", sizeof(addrbuf)); if (vno == RFC3244_VERSION) { size_t tlen; char *tdots; const char *targetp; if (target == NULL) { tlen = clen; tdots = cdots; targetp = targetstr; } else { tlen = strlen(targetstr); trunc_name(&tlen, &tdots); targetp = clientstr; } krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "setpw request from %s by %.*s%s for %.*s%s: %s", addrbuf, (int) clen, clientstr, cdots, (int) tlen, targetp, tdots, errmsg ? errmsg : "success"); } else { krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "chpw request from %s for %.*s%s: %s", addrbuf, (int) clen, clientstr, cdots, errmsg ? errmsg : "success"); } switch (ret) { case KADM5_AUTH_CHANGEPW: numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_ACCESSDENIED; break; case KADM5_PASS_Q_TOOSHORT: case KADM5_PASS_REUSE: case KADM5_PASS_Q_CLASS: case KADM5_PASS_Q_DICT: case KADM5_PASS_TOOSOON: numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR; break; case 0: numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_SUCCESS; strlcpy(strresult, "", sizeof(strresult)); break; default: numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_SOFTERROR; break; } chpwfail: clear.length = 2 + strlen(strresult); clear.data = (char *) malloc(clear.length); ptr = clear.data; *ptr++ = (numresult>>8) & 0xff; *ptr++ = numresult & 0xff; memcpy(ptr, strresult, strlen(strresult)); cipher.length = 0; if (ap_rep.length) { ret = krb5_auth_con_setaddrs(context, auth_context, local_faddr->address, NULL); if (ret) { numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR; strlcpy(strresult, "Failed storing client and server internet addresses", sizeof(strresult)); } else { ret = krb5_mk_priv(context, auth_context, &clear, &cipher, &replay); if (ret) { numresult = KRB5_KPASSWD_HARDERROR; strlcpy(strresult, "Failed encrypting reply", sizeof(strresult)); } } } /* if no KRB-PRIV was constructed, then we need a KRB-ERROR. if this fails, just bail. there's nothing else we can do. */ if (cipher.length == 0) { /* clear out ap_rep now, so that it won't be inserted in the reply */ if (ap_rep.length) { free(ap_rep.data); ap_rep.length = 0; } krberror.ctime = 0; krberror.cusec = 0; krberror.susec = 0; ret = krb5_timeofday(context, &krberror.stime); if (ret) goto bailout; /* this is really icky. but it's what all the other callers to mk_error do. */ krberror.error = ret; krberror.error -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_krb5; if (krberror.error < 0 || krberror.error > 128) krberror.error = KRB_ERR_GENERIC; krberror.client = NULL; ret = krb5_build_principal(context, &krberror.server, strlen(realm), realm, "kadmin", "changepw", NULL); if (ret) goto bailout; krberror.text.length = 0; krberror.e_data = clear; ret = krb5_mk_error(context, &krberror, &cipher); krb5_free_principal(context, krberror.server); if (ret) goto bailout; } /* construct the reply */ rep->length = 6 + ap_rep.length + cipher.length; rep->data = (char *) malloc(rep->length); if (rep->data == NULL) { rep->length = 0; /* checked by caller */ ret = ENOMEM; goto bailout; } ptr = rep->data; /* length */ *ptr++ = (rep->length>>8) & 0xff; *ptr++ = rep->length & 0xff; /* version == 0x0001 big-endian */ *ptr++ = 0; *ptr++ = 1; /* ap_rep length, big-endian */ *ptr++ = (ap_rep.length>>8) & 0xff; *ptr++ = ap_rep.length & 0xff; /* ap-rep data */ if (ap_rep.length) { memcpy(ptr, ap_rep.data, ap_rep.length); ptr += ap_rep.length; } /* krb-priv or krb-error */ memcpy(ptr, cipher.data, cipher.length); bailout: if (auth_context) krb5_auth_con_free(context, auth_context); if (changepw) krb5_free_principal(context, changepw); if (ap_rep.length) free(ap_rep.data); if (ticket) krb5_free_ticket(context, ticket); if (clear.length) free(clear.data); if (cipher.length) free(cipher.data); if (target) krb5_free_principal(context, target); if (targetstr) krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, targetstr); if (clientstr) krb5_free_unparsed_name(context, clientstr); if (errmsg) krb5_free_error_message(context, errmsg); return(ret); } /* Dispatch routine for set/change password */ krb5_error_code dispatch(void *handle, struct sockaddr *local_saddr, const krb5_fulladdr *remote_faddr, krb5_data *request, krb5_data **response, int is_tcp) { krb5_error_code ret; krb5_keytab kt = NULL; kadm5_server_handle_t server_handle = (kadm5_server_handle_t)handle; krb5_fulladdr local_faddr; krb5_address **local_kaddrs = NULL, local_kaddr_buf; *response = NULL; if (local_saddr == NULL) { ret = krb5_os_localaddr(server_handle->context, &local_kaddrs); if (ret != 0) goto cleanup; local_faddr.address = local_kaddrs[0]; local_faddr.port = 0; } else { local_faddr.address = &local_kaddr_buf; init_addr(&local_faddr, local_saddr); } ret = krb5_kt_resolve(server_handle->context, "KDB:", &kt); if (ret != 0) { krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, "chpw: Couldn't open admin keytab %s", krb5_get_error_message(server_handle->context, ret)); goto cleanup; } *response = (krb5_data *)malloc(sizeof(krb5_data)); if (*response == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } ret = process_chpw_request(server_handle->context, handle, server_handle->params.realm, kt, &local_faddr, remote_faddr, request, *response); cleanup: if (local_kaddrs != NULL) krb5_free_addresses(server_handle->context, local_kaddrs); krb5_kt_close(server_handle->context, kt); return ret; }