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Resolves: https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/ticket/112
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/ticket/111
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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Unfortunately strerror() is not thread safe so we have to juggle with
strerror_r() which is a can of worms as 2 incompatible implementations
are available depending on what is defined at compile time.
Try to do something sane.
https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/ticket/111
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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proxymehc.so may be used in setuid binaries so follow best security
practices and use secure_getenv() if available.
Fallback to poorman emulation when secure_getenv() is not available.
Resolves: https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/ticket/110
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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When a service is configured with cred_usage = initiate it is
ok to allow only client credentials to be defined.
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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Take a copy here, the option string is const and strtok_r() is not a safe
function as it may change the string it manipulates.
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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Resolves: https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/ticket/109
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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2 New configuration options are made available:
- filter_flags
- enforce_flags
Any GSS Flags listed in the filter_flags option is forcibly filtered
out before a gss_init_sec_context() call is invoked.
Any GSS Flags listed in the enforce_flags option is forcibly added
to the list of flags requested by a gss_init_sec_context() call is
invoked.
Flags can be either literals or numeric and must be preceded by the
sign + (to add to the list) or - (to remove from the list).
Resolves: https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/ticket/109
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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In some cases a name may not be provided, still try to perform
impersonation if the service is configured that way.
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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If the remote client tries to initialize the context without first
acquiring credentials, try to acquire appropriate credentials if
the service allows it.
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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Properly support continuations, including returning the rigth error code
and exporting partial contexts.
Fixes multistep authentications in particular for the initialization case
which always uses continuations.
Resolves: https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/ticket/108
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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We need to pass the real mechanism oid here, not the spcial oid.
special oids are used exclusively by the interposer and gssapi
machinery that calls the interposer, they must never be propagated
to clients or servers.
https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/ticket/107
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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In some cases we need to pass on the corresponding real oid, after we
are given a special oid.
Add helper functions to do that.
https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/ticket/107
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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These arguments have been accidentally forgotten causing failures for
applications that specify non default flags and non indefinite lifetime.
https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/ticket/106
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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By setting the impersonate flag to true, the acquisition of credentials will
be done using constrained delegation (s4uself + s4u2proxy).
To work this needs MIT Kereberos 1.11.4 or later.
Previous versions have a bug in the import_cred function that prevents the
library from properly importing previously exported delegated credentials.
Resolves: https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/ticket/95
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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Credentials can often be used both to accept and to initiate contexts.
With this option admins can allow a specific usage only.
This is to avoid allowing an unprivileged process to fool a remote
client by allowing it to impersonate a server, when we only want to
allow this service to use credentials to initiate contexts.
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com
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The rpc.gssd daemon is changing to fork and change uid to the unprivileged
user it wants to authenticate, this means gssproxy needs to allow connection
from any euid. When this is done though, the trusted flag needs to be dropped,
if the connecting euid does not match the default trusted uid to prevent
improper impersonation.
Resolves: https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/ticket/103
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com
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We were erroneously returning and never falling back if LOCAL_FIRST was
selected. Correct also the remote first fallback flow.
Resolves: https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/ticket/105
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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Resolves Coverity CID #12027.
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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gp_export_creds_*() functions are using a arrays of int32_t values, however this
array holds uids and gids which are unsigned integers.
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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Found by coverity (CID 11894)
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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Using getpeercon we can know the elinux context of the process talking to
gssproxy. Use this information as an optional additional filter to match
processes to service definitions.
If a selinux_context option with a full user;role;type context is specified
into a service section, then the connecting process must also be running under
the specified selinux context in order to be allowed to connect.
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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Fix a 4 coverity issues, ranging from memory leaks, to uninitialized
variables, to potential NULL derefernce.
Also a TOCTOU report that is in one of the accessory test scripts.
The bug itself is not reallya TOCTOU, but the check done in the script is
unecessary, so I just removed it.
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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We always need to chekc if the socket matches otherwise the worng service may
be selected if a specific socket is being used but a service allowing the same
euid is confgured to use the deault socket as well.
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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This fixes a segfault when no client_keytab is passed in via cred_store api.
See https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/ticket/85 for details.
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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This is required to make sure we never recurse into ourselves.
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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1. Grab the socket lock for the whole conversation.
We need to keep the lock until the whole conversation is over.
Otherwise we may have concurrency issues where communication gets intermixed
and errors in one thread can cause a thread to hang.
Here is what we observed:
thread 1: grabs lock and send a request.
thread 2: grabs lock and sends a request
server: thread 2 request causes a fatal error and the server close the
connection
thread 2: grabs the lock and waits for a reply.
thread 2: gets the error and returns to caller with it (connection is closed).
thread 1: grabs the lock (which reopens the closed channel) and reads ...
... forever as the server has already killed all the previous state.
2. Fail immediately on short reads for the initial 4 byte length header.
If the first 4 bytes do not come at once don't bother retrying. In 99.9% of the
cases what we are witnessing here is a fatal error from the proxy that closed
the socket. Reopening the scket cannot accomplish anything as the request sent
down the channel is tied to the specific socket, so once the socket is closed
there is no hope to ever get back a reply.
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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We were failing to find the right service as the test was reversed.
It works with the default socket as it is not stored per service.
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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We first need to fix our tests and implementation.
Temporary workaround for:
https://fedorahosted.org/gss-proxy/ticket/81
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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We do not want to generate an exported name buffer.
Let's the mechglue code in MIT generate it for use from the display name.
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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At the same time, rename gp_common.c to gp_util.c to make it more visible
there is no relation to gp_common.h.
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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Only LOCAL_ONLY,LOCAL_FIRST and REMOTE_FIRST allowed.
REMOTE_ONLY is recognized but configure aborts as long as it is not supported.
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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ENOENT is returned if no value is available.
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
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This way different processes running as the same user can be configured as
different servervices
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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The credential store design goal is to allow administrators to set arbitrary
strings without additional applications knowledge. This allows extending the
number of crdential types GSSAPI can be made to support without having to
recompile applications to add explicit support.
Only explicitly check for cred store values that ned special treatment and let
admins decide what to put in cred_store.
Signed-off-by: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gdeschner@redhat.com>
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