# Authors: # Alexander Bokovoy # # Copyright (C) 2011-2016 Red Hat # see file 'COPYING' for use and warranty information # # Portions (C) Andrew Tridgell, Andrew Bartlett # # This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by # the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or # (at your option) any later version. # # This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, # but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of # MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the # GNU General Public License for more details. # # You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License # along with this program. If not, see . # Make sure we only run this module at the server where samba4-python # package is installed to avoid issues with unavailable modules import re import time from ipalib import api, _ from ipalib import errors from ipapython import ipautil from ipapython.ipa_log_manager import root_logger from ipapython.dn import DN from ipaserver.install import installutils from ipalib.util import normalize_name import os import struct import random # TODO: Remove pylint disable when Python 3 bindings are available. # pylint: disable=import-error from samba import param from samba import credentials from samba.dcerpc import security, lsa, drsblobs, nbt, netlogon from samba.ndr import ndr_pack, ndr_print from samba import net import samba # pylint: enable=import-error from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend import ldap as _ldap from ipapython import ipaldap from dns import resolver, rdatatype from dns.exception import DNSException import pysss_nss_idmap import pysss import six from ipaplatform.paths import paths from ldap.filter import escape_filter_chars from time import sleep try: from ldap.controls import RequestControl as LDAPControl except ImportError: from ldap.controls import LDAPControl as LDAPControl if six.PY3: unicode = str long = int __doc__ = _(""" Classes to manage trust joins using DCE-RPC calls The code in this module relies heavily on samba4-python package and Samba4 python bindings. """) # Both constants can be used as masks against trust direction # because bi-directional has two lower bits set. TRUST_ONEWAY = 1 TRUST_BIDIRECTIONAL = 3 # Trust join behavior # External trust -- allow creating trust to a non-root domain in the forest TRUST_JOIN_EXTERNAL = 1 def is_sid_valid(sid): try: security.dom_sid(sid) except TypeError: return False else: return True access_denied_error = errors.ACIError( info=_('CIFS server denied your credentials')) dcerpc_error_codes = { -1073741823: errors.RemoteRetrieveError( reason=_('communication with CIFS server was unsuccessful')), -1073741790: access_denied_error, -1073741715: access_denied_error, -1073741614: access_denied_error, -1073741603: errors.ValidationError( name=_('AD domain controller'), error=_('unsupported functional level')), -1073741811: # NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER errors.RemoteRetrieveError( reason=_('AD domain controller complains about communication ' 'sequence. It may mean unsynchronized time on both ' 'sides, for example')), -1073741776: # NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX, # we simply will skip the binding access_denied_error, -1073741772: # NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND errors.RemoteRetrieveError( reason=_('CIFS server configuration does not allow ' 'access to \\\\pipe\\lsarpc')), } dcerpc_error_messages = { "NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND": errors.NotFound( reason=_('Cannot find specified domain or server name')), "WERR_NO_LOGON_SERVERS": errors.RemoteRetrieveError( reason=_('AD DC was unable to reach any IPA domain controller. ' 'Most likely it is a DNS or firewall issue')), "NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX": errors.RequirementError( name=_('At least the domain or IP address should be specified')), } pysss_type_key_translation_dict = { pysss_nss_idmap.ID_USER: 'user', pysss_nss_idmap.ID_GROUP: 'group', # Used for users with magic private groups pysss_nss_idmap.ID_BOTH: 'both', } class TrustTopologyConflictSolved(Exception): """ Internal trust error: raised when previously detected trust topology conflict is automatically solved. No separate errno is assigned as this error should not be visible outside the dcerpc.py code. """ pass def assess_dcerpc_exception(num=None, message=None): """ Takes error returned by Samba bindings and converts it into an IPA error class. """ if num and num in dcerpc_error_codes: return dcerpc_error_codes[num] if message and message in dcerpc_error_messages: return dcerpc_error_messages[message] reason = _('CIFS server communication error: code "%(num)s", ' 'message "%(message)s" (both may be "None")') % \ dict(num=num, message=message) return errors.RemoteRetrieveError(reason=reason) def arcfour_encrypt(key, data): algorithm = algorithms.ARC4(key) cipher = Cipher(algorithm, mode=None, backend=default_backend()) encryptor = cipher.encryptor() return encryptor.update(data) class ExtendedDNControl(LDAPControl): # This class attempts to implement LDAP control that would work # with both python-ldap 2.4.x and 2.3.x, thus there is mix of properties # from both worlds and encodeControlValue has default parameter def __init__(self): self.controlValue = 1 self.controlType = "1.2.840.113556.1.4.529" self.criticality = False self.integerValue = 1 def encodeControlValue(self, value=None): return '0\x03\x02\x01\x01' class DomainValidator(object): ATTR_FLATNAME = 'ipantflatname' ATTR_SID = 'ipantsecurityidentifier' ATTR_TRUSTED_SID = 'ipanttrusteddomainsid' ATTR_TRUST_PARTNER = 'ipanttrustpartner' ATTR_TRUST_AUTHOUT = 'ipanttrustauthoutgoing' def __init__(self, api): self.api = api self.ldap = self.api.Backend.ldap2 self.domain = None self.flatname = None self.dn = None self.sid = None self._domains = None self._info = dict() self._creds = None self._admin_creds = None self._parm = None def is_configured(self): cn_trust_local = DN(('cn', self.api.env.domain), self.api.env.container_cifsdomains, self.api.env.basedn) try: entry_attrs = self.ldap.get_entry(cn_trust_local, [self.ATTR_FLATNAME, self.ATTR_SID]) self.flatname = entry_attrs[self.ATTR_FLATNAME][0] self.sid = entry_attrs[self.ATTR_SID][0] self.dn = entry_attrs.dn self.domain = self.api.env.domain except errors.NotFound: return False return True def get_trusted_domains(self): """ Returns case-insensitive dict of trusted domain tuples (flatname, sid, trust_auth_outgoing), keyed by domain name. """ cn_trust = DN(('cn', 'ad'), self.api.env.container_trusts, self.api.env.basedn) try: search_kw = {'objectClass': 'ipaNTTrustedDomain'} filter = self.ldap.make_filter(search_kw, rules=self.ldap.MATCH_ALL) entries, _truncated = self.ldap.find_entries( filter=filter, base_dn=cn_trust, attrs_list=[self.ATTR_TRUSTED_SID, self.ATTR_FLATNAME, self.ATTR_TRUST_PARTNER] ) # We need to use case-insensitive dictionary since we use # domain names as keys and those are generally case-insensitive result = ipautil.CIDict() for e in entries: try: t_partner = e.single_value.get(self.ATTR_TRUST_PARTNER) fname_norm = e.single_value.get(self.ATTR_FLATNAME).lower() trusted_sid = e.single_value.get(self.ATTR_TRUSTED_SID) except KeyError as exc: # Some piece of trusted domain info in LDAP is missing # Skip the domain, but leave log entry for investigation api.log.warning("Trusted domain '%s' entry misses an " "attribute: %s", e.dn, exc) continue result[t_partner] = (fname_norm, security.dom_sid(trusted_sid)) return result except errors.NotFound as exc: return [] def set_trusted_domains(self): # At this point we have SID_NT_AUTHORITY family SID and really need to # check it against prefixes of domain SIDs we trust to if not self._domains: self._domains = self.get_trusted_domains() if len(self._domains) == 0: # Our domain is configured but no trusted domains are configured # This means we can't check the correctness of a trusted # domain SIDs raise errors.ValidationError(name='sid', error=_('no trusted domain ' 'is configured')) def get_domain_by_sid(self, sid, exact_match=False): if not self.domain: # our domain is not configured or self.is_configured() never run # reject SIDs as we can't check correctness of them raise errors.ValidationError(name='sid', error=_('domain is not configured')) # Parse sid string to see if it is really in a SID format try: test_sid = security.dom_sid(sid) except TypeError: raise errors.ValidationError(name='sid', error=_('SID is not valid')) # At this point we have SID_NT_AUTHORITY family SID and really need to # check it against prefixes of domain SIDs we trust to self.set_trusted_domains() # We have non-zero list of trusted domains and have to go through # them one by one and check their sids as prefixes / exact match # depending on the value of exact_match flag if exact_match: # check exact match of sids for domain in self._domains: if sid == str(self._domains[domain][1]): return domain raise errors.NotFound(reason=_("SID does not match exactly" "with any trusted domain's SID")) else: # check as prefixes test_sid_subauths = test_sid.sub_auths for domain in self._domains: domsid = self._domains[domain][1] sub_auths = domsid.sub_auths num_auths = min(test_sid.num_auths, domsid.num_auths) if test_sid_subauths[:num_auths] == sub_auths[:num_auths]: return domain raise errors.NotFound(reason=_('SID does not match any ' 'trusted domain')) def is_trusted_sid_valid(self, sid): try: self.get_domain_by_sid(sid) except (errors.ValidationError, errors.NotFound): return False else: return True def is_trusted_domain_sid_valid(self, sid): try: self.get_domain_by_sid(sid, exact_match=True) except (errors.ValidationError, errors.NotFound): return False else: return True def get_sid_from_domain_name(self, name): """Returns binary representation of SID for the trusted domain name or None if name is not in the list of trusted domains.""" domains = self.get_trusted_domains() if name in domains: return domains[name][1] else: return None def get_trusted_domain_objects(self, domain=None, flatname=None, filter="", attrs=None, scope=_ldap.SCOPE_SUBTREE, basedn=None): """ Search for LDAP objects in a trusted domain specified either by `domain' or `flatname'. The actual LDAP search is specified by `filter', `attrs', `scope' and `basedn'. When `basedn' is empty, database root DN is used. """ assert domain is not None or flatname is not None """Returns SID for the trusted domain object (user or group only)""" if not self.domain: # our domain is not configured or self.is_configured() never run raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('Trust setup'), error=_('Our domain is ' 'not configured')) if not self._domains: self._domains = self.get_trusted_domains() if len(self._domains) == 0: # Our domain is configured but no trusted domains are configured raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('Trust setup'), error=_('No trusted domain is ' 'not configured')) entries = None if domain is not None: if domain not in self._domains: raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'), error=_('domain is not trusted')) # Now we have a name to check against our list of trusted domains entries = self.search_in_dc(domain, filter, attrs, scope, basedn) elif flatname is not None: # Flatname was specified, traverse through the list of trusted # domains first to find the proper one found_flatname = False for domain in self._domains: if self._domains[domain][0] == flatname: found_flatname = True entries = self.search_in_dc(domain, filter, attrs, scope, basedn) if entries: break if not found_flatname: raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'), error=_('no trusted domain ' 'matched the specified ' 'flat name')) if not entries: raise errors.NotFound(reason=_('trusted domain object not found')) return entries def get_trusted_domain_object_sid(self, object_name, fallback_to_ldap=True): result = pysss_nss_idmap.getsidbyname(object_name) if object_name in result and \ (pysss_nss_idmap.SID_KEY in result[object_name]): object_sid = result[object_name][pysss_nss_idmap.SID_KEY] return object_sid # If fallback to AD DC LDAP is not allowed, bail out if not fallback_to_ldap: raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'), error=_('SSSD was unable to resolve ' 'the object to a valid SID')) # Else, we are going to contact AD DC LDAP components = normalize_name(object_name) if not ('domain' in components or 'flatname' in components): # No domain or realm specified, ambiguous search raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'), error=_('Ambiguous search, user ' 'domain was not specified')) attrs = ['objectSid'] filter = '(&(sAMAccountName=%(name)s)' \ '(|(objectClass=user)(objectClass=group)))' \ % dict(name=components['name']) scope = _ldap.SCOPE_SUBTREE entries = self.get_trusted_domain_objects(components.get('domain'), components.get('flatname'), filter, attrs, scope) if len(entries) > 1: # Treat non-unique entries as invalid raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'), error=_('Trusted domain did not ' 'return a unique object')) sid = self.__sid_to_str(entries[0]['objectSid'][0]) try: test_sid = security.dom_sid(sid) return unicode(test_sid) except TypeError: raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'), error=_('Trusted domain did not ' 'return a valid SID for ' 'the object')) def get_trusted_domain_object_type(self, name_or_sid): """ Return the type of the object corresponding to the given name in the trusted domain, which is either 'user', 'group' or 'both'. The 'both' types is used for users with magic private groups. """ object_type = None if is_sid_valid(name_or_sid): result = pysss_nss_idmap.getnamebysid(name_or_sid) else: result = pysss_nss_idmap.getsidbyname(name_or_sid) if name_or_sid in result: object_type = result[name_or_sid].get(pysss_nss_idmap.TYPE_KEY) # Do the translation to hide pysss_nss_idmap constants # from higher-level code return pysss_type_key_translation_dict.get(object_type) def get_trusted_domain_object_from_sid(self, sid): root_logger.debug("Converting SID to object name: %s" % sid) # Check if the given SID is valid if not self.is_trusted_sid_valid(sid): raise errors.ValidationError(name='sid', error='SID is not valid') # Use pysss_nss_idmap to obtain the name result = pysss_nss_idmap.getnamebysid(sid).get(sid) valid_types = (pysss_nss_idmap.ID_USER, pysss_nss_idmap.ID_GROUP, pysss_nss_idmap.ID_BOTH) if result: if result.get(pysss_nss_idmap.TYPE_KEY) in valid_types: return result.get(pysss_nss_idmap.NAME_KEY) # If unsuccessful, search AD DC LDAP root_logger.debug("Searching AD DC LDAP") escaped_sid = escape_filter_chars( security.dom_sid(sid).__ndr_pack__(), 2 # 2 means every character needs to be escaped ) attrs = ['sAMAccountName'] filter = (r'(&(objectSid=%(sid)s)' '(|(objectClass=user)(objectClass=group)))' % dict(sid=escaped_sid)) # sid in binary domain = self.get_domain_by_sid(sid) entries = self.get_trusted_domain_objects(domain=domain, filter=filter, attrs=attrs) if len(entries) > 1: # Treat non-unique entries as invalid raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'), error=_('Trusted domain did not ' 'return a unique object')) object_name = ( "%s@%s" % (entries[0].single_value['sAMAccountName'].lower(), domain.lower()) ) return unicode(object_name) def __get_trusted_domain_user_and_groups(self, object_name): """ Returns a tuple with user SID and a list of SIDs of all groups he is a member of. LIMITATIONS: - only Trusted Admins group members can use this function as it uses secret for IPA-Trusted domain link - List of group SIDs does not contain group memberships outside of the trusted domain """ components = normalize_name(object_name) domain = components.get('domain') flatname = components.get('flatname') name = components.get('name') is_valid_sid = is_sid_valid(object_name) if is_valid_sid: # Find a trusted domain for the SID domain = self.get_domain_by_sid(object_name) # Now search a trusted domain for a user with this SID attrs = ['cn'] filter = '(&(objectClass=user)(objectSid=%(sid)s))' \ % dict(sid=object_name) try: entries = self.get_trusted_domain_objects(domain=domain, filter=filter, attrs=attrs, scope=_ldap.SCOPE_SUBTREE) except errors.NotFound: raise errors.NotFound(reason=_('trusted domain user not found')) user_dn = entries[0].dn elif domain or flatname: attrs = ['cn'] filter = '(&(sAMAccountName=%(name)s)(objectClass=user))' \ % dict(name=name) try: entries = self.get_trusted_domain_objects(domain, flatname, filter, attrs, _ldap.SCOPE_SUBTREE) except errors.NotFound: raise errors.NotFound(reason=_('trusted domain user not found')) user_dn = entries[0].dn else: # No domain or realm specified, ambiguous search raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('trusted domain object'), error=_('Ambiguous search, ' 'user domain was not specified')) # Get SIDs of user object and it's groups # tokenGroups attribute must be read with a scope BASE for a known user # distinguished name to avoid search error attrs = ['objectSID', 'tokenGroups'] filter = "(objectClass=user)" entries = self.get_trusted_domain_objects(domain, flatname, filter, attrs, _ldap.SCOPE_BASE, user_dn) object_sid = self.__sid_to_str(entries[0]['objectSid'][0]) group_sids = [self.__sid_to_str(sid) for sid in entries[0]['tokenGroups']] return (object_sid, group_sids) def get_trusted_domain_user_and_groups(self, object_name): """ Returns a tuple with user SID and a list of SIDs of all groups he is a member of. First attempts to perform SID lookup via SSSD and in case of failure resorts back to checking trusted domain's AD DC LDAP directly. LIMITATIONS: - only Trusted Admins group members can use this function as it uses secret for IPA-Trusted domain link if SSSD lookup failed - List of group SIDs does not contain group memberships outside of the trusted domain """ group_sids = None group_list = None object_sid = None is_valid_sid = is_sid_valid(object_name) if is_valid_sid: object_sid = object_name result = pysss_nss_idmap.getnamebysid(object_name) if object_name in result and \ (pysss_nss_idmap.NAME_KEY in result[object_name]): group_list = pysss.getgrouplist( result[object_name][pysss_nss_idmap.NAME_KEY]) else: result = pysss_nss_idmap.getsidbyname(object_name) if object_name in result and \ (pysss_nss_idmap.SID_KEY in result[object_name]): object_sid = result[object_name][pysss_nss_idmap.SID_KEY] group_list = pysss.getgrouplist(object_name) if not group_list: return self.__get_trusted_domain_user_and_groups(object_name) group_sids = pysss_nss_idmap.getsidbyname(group_list) return ( object_sid, [el[1][pysss_nss_idmap.SID_KEY] for el in group_sids.items()] ) def __sid_to_str(self, sid): """ Converts binary SID to string representation Returns unicode string """ sid_rev_num = ord(sid[0]) number_sub_id = ord(sid[1]) ia = struct.unpack('!Q', '\x00\x00'+sid[2:8])[0] subs = [ struct.unpack(', we use kinit_++ so there is no clash. Returns tuple (ccache path, principal) where (None, None) signifes an error on ccache initialization """ if self._admin_creds is None: return (None, None) domain_suffix = domain.replace('.', '-') ccache_name = "kinit_TDA%s" % (domain_suffix) ccache_path = os.path.join(paths.IPA_CCACHES, ccache_name) (principal, password) = self._admin_creds.split('%', 1) # Destroy the contents of the ccache root_logger.debug('Destroying the contents of the separate ccache') ipautil.run( [paths.KDESTROY, '-A', '-c', ccache_path], env={'KRB5CCNAME': ccache_path}, raiseonerr=False) # Destroy the contents of the ccache root_logger.debug('Running kinit with credentials of AD administrator') result = ipautil.run( [paths.KINIT, principal], env={'KRB5CCNAME': ccache_path}, stdin=password, raiseonerr=False) if result.returncode == 0: return (ccache_path, principal) else: return (None, None) def search_in_dc(self, domain, filter, attrs, scope, basedn=None, quiet=False): """ Perform LDAP search in a trusted domain `domain' Domain Controller. Returns resulting entries or None. """ entries = None info = self.__retrieve_trusted_domain_gc_list(domain) if not info: raise errors.ValidationError( name=_('Trust setup'), error=_('Cannot retrieve trusted domain GC list')) for (host, port) in info['gc']: entries = self.__search_in_dc(info, host, port, filter, attrs, scope, basedn=basedn, quiet=quiet) if entries: break return entries def __search_in_dc(self, info, host, port, filter, attrs, scope, basedn=None, quiet=False): """ Actual search in AD LDAP server, using SASL GSSAPI authentication Returns LDAP result or None. """ ccache_name = None if self._admin_creds: (ccache_name, _principal) = self.kinit_as_administrator(info['dns_domain']) if ccache_name: with ipautil.private_ccache(path=ccache_name): entries = None try: ldap_uri = ipaldap.get_ldap_uri(host) conn = ipaldap.LDAPClient( ldap_uri, no_schema=True, decode_attrs=False, sasl_nocanon=True) # sasl_nocanon used to avoid hard requirement for PTR # records pointing back to the same host name conn.gssapi_bind() if basedn is None: # Use domain root base DN basedn = ipautil.realm_to_suffix(info['dns_domain']) entries = conn.get_entries(basedn, scope, filter, attrs) except Exception as e: msg = "Search on AD DC {host}:{port} failed with: {err}"\ .format(host=host, port=str(port), err=str(e)) if quiet: root_logger.debug(msg) else: root_logger.warning(msg) return entries def __retrieve_trusted_domain_gc_list(self, domain): """ Retrieves domain information and preferred GC list Returns dictionary with following keys name -- NetBIOS name of the trusted domain dns_domain -- DNS name of the trusted domain gc -- array of tuples (server, port) for Global Catalog """ if domain in self._info: return self._info[domain] if not self._creds: self._parm = param.LoadParm() self._parm.load( os.path.join(paths.USR_SHARE_IPA_DIR, "smb.conf.empty")) self._parm.set('netbios name', self.flatname) self._creds = credentials.Credentials() self._creds.set_kerberos_state(credentials.MUST_USE_KERBEROS) self._creds.guess(self._parm) self._creds.set_workstation(self.flatname) netrc = net.Net(creds=self._creds, lp=self._parm) finddc_error = None result = None flags = nbt.NBT_SERVER_LDAP | nbt.NBT_SERVER_GC | nbt.NBT_SERVER_CLOSEST try: result = netrc.finddc(domain=domain, flags=flags) except RuntimeError as e: try: # If search of closest GC failed, attempt to find any one flags = nbt.NBT_SERVER_LDAP | nbt.NBT_SERVER_GC result = netrc.finddc(domain=domain, flags=flags) except RuntimeError as e: finddc_error = e if not self._domains: self._domains = self.get_trusted_domains() info = dict() servers = [] if result: info['name'] = unicode(result.domain_name) info['dns_domain'] = unicode(result.dns_domain) servers = [(unicode(result.pdc_dns_name), 3268)] else: info['name'] = self._domains[domain] info['dns_domain'] = domain # Retrieve GC servers list gc_name = '_gc._tcp.%s.' % info['dns_domain'] try: answers = resolver.query(gc_name, rdatatype.SRV) except DNSException as e: answers = [] for answer in answers: server = str(answer.target).rstrip(".") servers.append((server, answer.port)) info['gc'] = servers # Both methods should not fail at the same time if finddc_error and len(info['gc']) == 0: raise assess_dcerpc_exception(message=str(finddc_error)) self._info[domain] = info return info def string_to_array(what): return [ord(v) for v in what] class TrustDomainInstance(object): def __init__(self, hostname, creds=None): self.parm = param.LoadParm() self.parm.load(os.path.join(paths.USR_SHARE_IPA_DIR, "smb.conf.empty")) if len(hostname) > 0: self.parm.set('netbios name', hostname) self.creds = creds self.hostname = hostname self.info = {} self._pipe = None self._policy_handle = None self.read_only = False self.ftinfo_records = None self.validation_attempts = 0 def __gen_lsa_connection(self, binding): if self.creds is None: raise errors.RequirementError(name=_('CIFS credentials object')) try: result = lsa.lsarpc(binding, self.parm, self.creds) return result except RuntimeError as e: num, message = e.args # pylint: disable=unpacking-non-sequence raise assess_dcerpc_exception(num=num, message=message) def init_lsa_pipe(self, remote_host): """ Try to initialize connection to the LSA pipe at remote host. This method tries consequently all possible transport options and selects one that works. See __gen_lsa_bindings() for details. The actual result may depend on details of existing credentials. For example, using signing causes NO_SESSION_KEY with Win2K8 and using kerberos against Samba with signing does not work. """ # short-cut: if LSA pipe is initialized, skip completely if self._pipe: return attempts = 0 session_attempts = 0 bindings = self.__gen_lsa_bindings(remote_host) for binding in bindings: try: self._pipe = self.__gen_lsa_connection(binding) if self._pipe and self._pipe.session_key: break except errors.ACIError: attempts = attempts + 1 except RuntimeError: # When session key is not available, we just skip this binding session_attempts = session_attempts + 1 if self._pipe is None and \ (attempts + session_attempts) == len(bindings): raise errors.ACIError( info=_('CIFS server %(host)s denied your credentials') % dict(host=remote_host)) if self._pipe is None: raise errors.RemoteRetrieveError( reason=_('Cannot establish LSA connection to %(host)s. ' 'Is CIFS server running?') % dict(host=remote_host)) self.binding = binding self.session_key = self._pipe.session_key def __gen_lsa_bindings(self, remote_host): """ There are multiple transports to issue LSA calls. However, depending on a system in use they may be blocked by local operating system policies. Generate all we can use. init_lsa_pipe() will try them one by one until there is one working. We try NCACN_NP before NCACN_IP_TCP and use SMB2 before SMB1. """ transports = (u'ncacn_np', u'ncacn_ip_tcp') options = (u'smb2,print', u'print') return [u'%s:%s[%s]' % (t, remote_host, o) for t in transports for o in options] def retrieve_anonymously(self, remote_host, discover_srv=False, search_pdc=False): """ When retrieving DC information anonymously, we can't get SID of the domain """ netrc = net.Net(creds=self.creds, lp=self.parm) flags = nbt.NBT_SERVER_LDAP | nbt.NBT_SERVER_DS | nbt.NBT_SERVER_WRITABLE if search_pdc: flags = flags | nbt.NBT_SERVER_PDC try: if discover_srv: result = netrc.finddc(domain=remote_host, flags=flags) else: result = netrc.finddc(address=remote_host, flags=flags) except RuntimeError as e: raise assess_dcerpc_exception(message=str(e)) if not result: return False self.info['name'] = unicode(result.domain_name) self.info['dns_domain'] = unicode(result.dns_domain) self.info['dns_forest'] = unicode(result.forest) self.info['guid'] = unicode(result.domain_uuid) self.info['dc'] = unicode(result.pdc_dns_name) self.info['is_pdc'] = (result.server_type & nbt.NBT_SERVER_PDC) != 0 # Netlogon response doesn't contain SID of the domain. # We need to do rootDSE search with LDAP_SERVER_EXTENDED_DN_OID # control to reveal the SID ldap_uri = 'ldap://%s' % (result.pdc_dns_name) conn = _ldap.initialize(ldap_uri) conn.set_option(_ldap.OPT_SERVER_CONTROLS, [ExtendedDNControl()]) search_result = None try: _objtype, res = conn.search_s('', _ldap.SCOPE_BASE)[0] search_result = res['defaultNamingContext'][0] self.info['dns_hostname'] = res['dnsHostName'][0] except _ldap.LDAPError as e: root_logger.error( "LDAP error when connecting to %(host)s: %(error)s" % dict(host=unicode(result.pdc_name), error=str(e))) except KeyError as e: root_logger.error("KeyError: {err}, LDAP entry from {host} " "returned malformed. Your DNS might be " "misconfigured." .format(host=unicode(result.pdc_name), err=unicode(e))) if search_result: self.info['sid'] = self.parse_naming_context(search_result) return True def parse_naming_context(self, context): naming_ref = re.compile('.*.*') return unicode(naming_ref.match(context).group(1)) def retrieve(self, remote_host): self.init_lsa_pipe(remote_host) objectAttribute = lsa.ObjectAttribute() objectAttribute.sec_qos = lsa.QosInfo() try: self._policy_handle = \ self._pipe.OpenPolicy2(u"", objectAttribute, security.SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED) result = self._pipe.QueryInfoPolicy2(self._policy_handle, lsa.LSA_POLICY_INFO_DNS) except RuntimeError as e: num, message = e.args # pylint: disable=unpacking-non-sequence raise assess_dcerpc_exception(num=num, message=message) self.info['name'] = unicode(result.name.string) self.info['dns_domain'] = unicode(result.dns_domain.string) self.info['dns_forest'] = unicode(result.dns_forest.string) self.info['guid'] = unicode(result.domain_guid) self.info['sid'] = unicode(result.sid) self.info['dc'] = remote_host try: result = self._pipe.QueryInfoPolicy2(self._policy_handle, lsa.LSA_POLICY_INFO_ROLE) except RuntimeError as e: num, message = e.args # pylint: disable=unpacking-non-sequence raise assess_dcerpc_exception(num=num, message=message) self.info['is_pdc'] = (result.role == lsa.LSA_ROLE_PRIMARY) def generate_auth(self, trustdom_secret): password_blob = string_to_array(trustdom_secret.encode('utf-16-le')) clear_value = drsblobs.AuthInfoClear() clear_value.size = len(password_blob) clear_value.password = password_blob clear_authinfo = drsblobs.AuthenticationInformation() clear_authinfo.LastUpdateTime = samba.unix2nttime(int(time.time())) clear_authinfo.AuthType = lsa.TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR clear_authinfo.AuthInfo = clear_value authinfo_array = drsblobs.AuthenticationInformationArray() authinfo_array.count = 1 authinfo_array.array = [clear_authinfo] outgoing = drsblobs.trustAuthInOutBlob() outgoing.count = 1 outgoing.current = authinfo_array confounder = [3]*512 for i in range(512): confounder[i] = random.randint(0, 255) trustpass = drsblobs.trustDomainPasswords() trustpass.confounder = confounder trustpass.outgoing = outgoing trustpass.incoming = outgoing trustpass_blob = ndr_pack(trustpass) encrypted_trustpass = arcfour_encrypt(self._pipe.session_key, trustpass_blob) auth_blob = lsa.DATA_BUF2() auth_blob.size = len(encrypted_trustpass) auth_blob.data = string_to_array(encrypted_trustpass) auth_info = lsa.TrustDomainInfoAuthInfoInternal() auth_info.auth_blob = auth_blob self.auth_info = auth_info def generate_ftinfo(self, another_domain): """ Generates TrustDomainInfoFullInfo2Internal structure This structure allows to pass information about all domains associated with the another domain's realm. Only top level name and top level name exclusions are handled here. """ if not another_domain.ftinfo_records: return ftinfo_records = [] info = lsa.ForestTrustInformation() for rec in another_domain.ftinfo_records: record = lsa.ForestTrustRecord() record.flags = 0 record.time = rec['rec_time'] record.type = rec['rec_type'] record.forest_trust_data.string = rec['rec_name'] ftinfo_records.append(record) info.count = len(ftinfo_records) info.entries = ftinfo_records return info def clear_ftinfo_conflict(self, another_domain, cinfo): """ Attempt to clean up the forest trust collisions :param self: the forest we establish trust to :param another_domain: a forest that establishes trust to 'self' :param cinfo: lsa_ForestTrustCollisionInfo structure that contain set of of lsa_ForestTrustCollisionRecord structures :raises: TrustTopologyConflictSolved, TrustTopologyConflictError This code tries to perform intelligent job of going over individual collisions and making exclusion entries for affected IPA namespaces. There are three possible conflict configurations: - conflict of DNS namespace (TLN conflict, LSA_TLN_DISABLED_CONFLICT) - conflict of SID namespace (LSA_SID_DISABLED_CONFLICT) - conflict of NetBIOS namespace (LSA_NB_DISABLED_CONFLICT) we only can handle TLN conflicts because (a) excluding SID namespace is not possible and (b) excluding NetBIOS namespace not possible. These two types of conflicts should result in trust-add CLI error These conflicts can come from external source (another forest) or from internal source (another domain in the same forest). We only can fix the problems with another forest. To resolve TLN conflict we need to do following: 1. Retrieve forest trust information for the forest we conflict on 2. Add an exclusion entry for IPA DNS namespace to it 3. Set forest trust information for the forest we conflict on 4. Re-try establishing trust to the original forest This all can only be done under privileges of Active Directory admin that can change forest trusts. If we cannot have those privileges, the work has to be done manually in the Windows UI for 'Active Directory Domains and Trusts' by the administrator of the original forest. """ # List of entries for unsolved conflicts result = [] trust_timestamp = long(time.time()*1e7+116444736000000000) # Collision information contains entries for specific trusted domains # we collide with. Look into TLN collisions and add a TLN exclusion # entry to the specific domain trust. root_logger.error("Attempt to solve forest trust topology conflicts") for rec in cinfo.entries: if rec.type == lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_COLLISION_TDO: dominfo = self._pipe.lsaRQueryForestTrustInformation( self._policy_handle, rec.name, lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO) # Oops, we were unable to retrieve trust topology for this # trusted domain (forest). if not dominfo: result.append(rec) root_logger.error("Unable to resolve conflict for " "DNS domain %s in the forest %s " "for domain trust %s. Trust cannot " "be established unless this conflict " "is fixed manually." % (another_domain.info['dns_domain'], self.info['dns_domain'], rec.name.string)) continue # Copy over the entries, extend with TLN exclusion entries = [] for e in dominfo.entries: e1 = lsa.ForestTrustRecord() e1.type = e.type e1.flags = e.flags e1.time = e.time e1.forest_trust_data = e.forest_trust_data entries.append(e1) # Create TLN exclusion record record = lsa.ForestTrustRecord() record.type = lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_TOP_LEVEL_NAME_EX record.flags = 0 record.time = trust_timestamp record.forest_trust_data.string = \ another_domain.info['dns_domain'] entries.append(record) fti = lsa.ForestTrustInformation() fti.count = len(entries) fti.entries = entries # Update the forest trust information now ldname = lsa.StringLarge() ldname.string = rec.name.string cninfo = self._pipe.lsaRSetForestTrustInformation( self._policy_handle, ldname, lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO, fti, 0) if cninfo: result.append(rec) root_logger.error("When defining exception for DNS " "domain %s in forest %s for " "trusted forest %s, " "got collision info back:\n%s" % (another_domain.info['dns_domain'], self.info['dns_domain'], rec.name.string, ndr_print(cninfo))) else: result.append(rec) root_logger.error("Unable to resolve conflict for " "DNS domain %s in the forest %s " "for in-forest domain %s. Trust cannot " "be established unless this conflict " "is fixed manually." % (another_domain.info['dns_domain'], self.info['dns_domain'], rec.name.string)) if len(result) == 0: root_logger.error("Successfully solved all conflicts") raise TrustTopologyConflictSolved() # Otherwise, raise TrustTopologyConflictError() exception domains = [x.name.string for x in result] raise errors.TrustTopologyConflictError( target=self.info['dns_domain'], conflict=another_domain.info['dns_domain'], domains=domains) def update_ftinfo(self, another_domain): """ Updates forest trust information in this forest corresponding to the another domain's information. """ if another_domain.ftinfo_records: ftinfo = self.generate_ftinfo(another_domain) # Set forest trust information -- we do it only against AD DC as # smbd already has the information about itself ldname = lsa.StringLarge() ldname.string = another_domain.info['dns_domain'] ftlevel = lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO # RSetForestTrustInformation returns collision information # for trust topology cinfo = self._pipe.lsaRSetForestTrustInformation( self._policy_handle, ldname, ftlevel, ftinfo, 0) if cinfo: root_logger.error("When setting forest trust information, " "got collision info back:\n%s" % (ndr_print(cinfo))) self.clear_ftinfo_conflict(another_domain, cinfo) def establish_trust(self, another_domain, trustdom_secret, trust_type='bidirectional', trust_external=False): """ Establishes trust between our and another domain Input: another_domain -- instance of TrustDomainInstance, initialized with #retrieve call trustdom_secret -- shared secred used for the trust """ if self.info['name'] == another_domain.info['name']: # Check that NetBIOS names do not clash raise errors.ValidationError(name=u'AD Trust Setup', error=_('the IPA server and the ' 'remote domain cannot share ' 'the same NetBIOS name: %s') % self.info['name']) self.generate_auth(trustdom_secret) info = lsa.TrustDomainInfoInfoEx() info.domain_name.string = another_domain.info['dns_domain'] info.netbios_name.string = another_domain.info['name'] info.sid = security.dom_sid(another_domain.info['sid']) info.trust_direction = lsa.LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND if trust_type == TRUST_BIDIRECTIONAL: info.trust_direction |= lsa.LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND info.trust_type = lsa.LSA_TRUST_TYPE_UPLEVEL info.trust_attributes = 0 if trust_external: info.trust_attributes |= lsa.LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_NON_TRANSITIVE try: dname = lsa.String() dname.string = another_domain.info['dns_domain'] res = self._pipe.QueryTrustedDomainInfoByName( self._policy_handle, dname, lsa.LSA_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO_FULL_INFO) self._pipe.DeleteTrustedDomain(self._policy_handle, res.info_ex.sid) except RuntimeError as e: num, message = e.args # pylint: disable=unpacking-non-sequence # Ignore anything but access denied (NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED) if num == -1073741790: raise access_denied_error try: trustdom_handle = self._pipe.CreateTrustedDomainEx2( self._policy_handle, info, self.auth_info, security.SEC_STD_DELETE) except RuntimeError as e: num, message = e.args # pylint: disable=unpacking-non-sequence raise assess_dcerpc_exception(num=num, message=message) # We should use proper trustdom handle in order to modify the # trust settings. Samba insists this has to be done with LSA # OpenTrustedDomain* calls, it is not enough to have a handle # returned by the CreateTrustedDomainEx2 call. trustdom_handle = self._pipe.OpenTrustedDomainByName( self._policy_handle, dname, security.SEC_FLAG_MAXIMUM_ALLOWED) try: infocls = lsa.TrustDomainInfoSupportedEncTypes() infocls.enc_types = security.KERB_ENCTYPE_RC4_HMAC_MD5 infocls.enc_types |= security.KERB_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 infocls.enc_types |= security.KERB_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 self._pipe.SetInformationTrustedDomain( trustdom_handle, lsa.LSA_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPES, infocls) except RuntimeError as e: # We can ignore the error here -- changing enctypes is for # improved security but the trust will work with default values as # well. In particular, the call may fail against Windows 2003 # server as that one doesn't support AES encryption types pass if not trust_external: try: info = self._pipe.QueryTrustedDomainInfo( trustdom_handle, lsa.LSA_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO_INFO_EX) info.trust_attributes |= lsa.LSA_TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE self._pipe.SetInformationTrustedDomain( trustdom_handle, lsa.LSA_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_INFO_INFO_EX, info) except RuntimeError as e: root_logger.error( 'unable to set trust transitivity status: %s' % (str(e))) # Updating forest trust info may fail # If it failed due to topology conflict, it may be fixed automatically # update_ftinfo() will through exceptions in that case # Note that MS-LSAD 3.1.4.7.16 says: # ------------------------- # The server MUST also make sure that the trust attributes associated # with the trusted domain object referenced by the TrustedDomainName # parameter has the TRUST_ATTRIBUTE_FOREST_TRANSITIVE set. # If the attribute is not present, the server MUST return # STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER. # ------------------------- # Thus, we must not update forest trust info for the external trust if self.info['is_pdc'] and not trust_external: self.update_ftinfo(another_domain) def verify_trust(self, another_domain): def retrieve_netlogon_info_2(logon_server, domain, function_code, data): try: netr_pipe = netlogon.netlogon(domain.binding, domain.parm, domain.creds) result = netr_pipe.netr_LogonControl2Ex( logon_server=logon_server, function_code=function_code, level=2, data=data) return result except RuntimeError as e: num, message = e.args # pylint: disable=unpacking-non-sequence raise assess_dcerpc_exception(num=num, message=message) result = retrieve_netlogon_info_2(None, self, netlogon.NETLOGON_CONTROL_TC_VERIFY, another_domain.info['dns_domain']) if result and result.flags and netlogon.NETLOGON_VERIFY_STATUS_RETURNED: if result.pdc_connection_status[0] != 0 and \ result.tc_connection_status[0] != 0: if result.pdc_connection_status[1] == "WERR_ACCESS_DENIED": # Most likely AD DC hit another IPA replica which # yet has no trust secret replicated # Sleep and repeat again self.validation_attempts += 1 if self.validation_attempts < 10: sleep(5) return self.verify_trust(another_domain) # If we get here, we already failed 10 times srv_record_templates = ( '_ldap._tcp.%s', '_ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.dc._msdcs.%s' ) srv_records = ', '.join( [srv_record % api.env.domain for srv_record in srv_record_templates] ) error_message = _( 'IPA master denied trust validation requests from AD ' 'DC %(count)d times. Most likely AD DC contacted a ' 'replica that has no trust information replicated ' 'yet. Additionally, please check that AD DNS is able ' 'to resolve %(records)s SRV records to the correct ' 'IPA server.') % dict(count=self.validation_attempts, records=srv_records) raise errors.ACIError(info=error_message) raise assess_dcerpc_exception(*result.pdc_connection_status) return True return False def fetch_domains(api, mydomain, trustdomain, creds=None, server=None): def communicate(td): td.init_lsa_pipe(td.info['dc']) netr_pipe = netlogon.netlogon(td.binding, td.parm, td.creds) # Older FreeIPA versions used netr_DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts call # but it doesn't provide information about non-domain UPNs associated # with the forest, thus we have to use netr_DsRGetForestTrustInformation domains = netr_pipe.netr_DsRGetForestTrustInformation(td.info['dc'], None, 0) return domains domains = None domain_validator = DomainValidator(api) configured = domain_validator.is_configured() if not configured: return None td = TrustDomainInstance('') td.parm.set('workgroup', mydomain) cr = credentials.Credentials() cr.set_kerberos_state(credentials.DONT_USE_KERBEROS) cr.guess(td.parm) cr.set_anonymous() cr.set_workstation(domain_validator.flatname) netrc = net.Net(creds=cr, lp=td.parm) try: if server: result = netrc.finddc(address=server, flags=nbt.NBT_SERVER_LDAP | nbt.NBT_SERVER_DS) else: result = netrc.finddc(domain=trustdomain, flags=nbt.NBT_SERVER_LDAP | nbt.NBT_SERVER_DS) except RuntimeError as e: raise assess_dcerpc_exception(message=str(e)) td.info['dc'] = unicode(result.pdc_dns_name) td.info['name'] = unicode(result.dns_domain) if type(creds) is bool: # Rely on existing Kerberos credentials in the environment td.creds = credentials.Credentials() td.creds.set_kerberos_state(credentials.MUST_USE_KERBEROS) td.creds.guess(td.parm) td.creds.set_workstation(domain_validator.flatname) domains = communicate(td) else: # Attempt to authenticate as HTTP/ipa.master and use cross-forest trust # or as passed-in user in case of a one-way trust domval = DomainValidator(api) ccache_name = None if creds: domval._admin_creds = creds ccache_name, _principal = domval.kinit_as_administrator( trustdomain) else: raise errors.ValidationError(name=_('Credentials'), error=_('Missing credentials for ' 'cross-forest communication')) td.creds = credentials.Credentials() td.creds.set_kerberos_state(credentials.MUST_USE_KERBEROS) if ccache_name: with ipautil.private_ccache(path=ccache_name): td.creds.guess(td.parm) td.creds.set_workstation(domain_validator.flatname) domains = communicate(td) if domains is None: return None result = {'domains': {}, 'suffixes': {}} # netr_DsRGetForestTrustInformation returns two types of entries: # domain information -- name, NetBIOS name, SID of the domain # top level name info -- a name suffix associated with the forest # We should ignore forest root name/name suffix as it is already part # of trust information for IPA purposes and only add what's inside the forest for t in domains.entries: if t.type == lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_DOMAIN_INFO: tname = unicode(t.forest_trust_data.dns_domain_name.string) if tname == trustdomain: continue result['domains'][tname] = { 'cn': tname, 'ipantflatname': unicode( t.forest_trust_data.netbios_domain_name.string), 'ipanttrusteddomainsid': unicode( t.forest_trust_data.domain_sid) } elif t.type == lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_TOP_LEVEL_NAME: tname = unicode(t.forest_trust_data.string) if tname == trustdomain: continue result['suffixes'][tname] = {'cn': tname} return result def retrieve_remote_domain(hostname, local_flatname, realm, realm_server=None, realm_admin=None, realm_passwd=None): def get_instance(local_flatname): # Fetch data from foreign domain using password only rd = TrustDomainInstance('') rd.parm.set('workgroup', local_flatname) rd.creds = credentials.Credentials() rd.creds.set_kerberos_state(credentials.DONT_USE_KERBEROS) rd.creds.guess(rd.parm) return rd rd = get_instance(local_flatname) rd.creds.set_anonymous() rd.creds.set_workstation(hostname) if realm_server is None: rd.retrieve_anonymously(realm, discover_srv=True, search_pdc=True) else: rd.retrieve_anonymously(realm_server, discover_srv=False, search_pdc=True) rd.read_only = True if realm_admin and realm_passwd: if 'name' in rd.info: names = realm_admin.split('\\') if len(names) > 1: # realm admin is in DOMAIN\user format # strip DOMAIN part as we'll enforce the one discovered realm_admin = names[-1] auth_string = u"%s\%s%%%s" \ % (rd.info['name'], realm_admin, realm_passwd) td = get_instance(local_flatname) td.creds.parse_string(auth_string) td.creds.set_workstation(hostname) if realm_server is None: # we must have rd.info['dns_hostname'] then # as it is part of the anonymous discovery td.retrieve(rd.info['dns_hostname']) else: td.retrieve(realm_server) td.read_only = False return td # Otherwise, use anonymously obtained data return rd class TrustDomainJoins(object): def __init__(self, api): self.api = api self.local_domain = None self.remote_domain = None self.__allow_behavior = 0 domain_validator = DomainValidator(api) self.configured = domain_validator.is_configured() if self.configured: self.local_flatname = domain_validator.flatname self.local_dn = domain_validator.dn self.__populate_local_domain() def allow_behavior(self, *flags): for f in flags: self.__allow_behavior |= int(f) def __populate_local_domain(self): # Initialize local domain info using kerberos only ld = TrustDomainInstance(self.local_flatname) ld.creds = credentials.Credentials() ld.creds.set_kerberos_state(credentials.MUST_USE_KERBEROS) ld.creds.guess(ld.parm) ld.creds.set_workstation(ld.hostname) ld.retrieve(installutils.get_fqdn()) self.local_domain = ld def populate_remote_domain(self, realm, realm_server=None, realm_admin=None, realm_passwd=None): self.remote_domain = retrieve_remote_domain( self.local_domain.hostname, self.local_domain.info['name'], realm, realm_server=realm_server, realm_admin=realm_admin, realm_passwd=realm_passwd) def get_realmdomains(self): """ Generate list of records for forest trust information about our realm domains. Note that the list generated currently includes only top level domains, no exclusion domains, and no TDO objects as we handle the latter in a separate way """ if self.local_domain.read_only: return self.local_domain.ftinfo_records = [] realm_domains = self.api.Command.realmdomains_show()['result'] # Use realmdomains' modification timestamp # to judge records' last update time entry = self.api.Backend.ldap2.get_entry( realm_domains['dn'], ['modifyTimestamp']) # Convert the timestamp to Windows 64-bit timestamp format trust_timestamp = long( time.mktime( entry.single_value.get('modifytimestamp').timetuple() )*1e7+116444736000000000) for dom in realm_domains['associateddomain']: ftinfo = dict() ftinfo['rec_name'] = dom ftinfo['rec_time'] = trust_timestamp ftinfo['rec_type'] = lsa.LSA_FOREST_TRUST_TOP_LEVEL_NAME self.local_domain.ftinfo_records.append(ftinfo) def join_ad_full_credentials(self, realm, realm_server, realm_admin, realm_passwd, trust_type): if not self.configured: return None if not(isinstance(self.remote_domain, TrustDomainInstance)): self.populate_remote_domain( realm, realm_server, realm_admin, realm_passwd ) trust_external = bool(self.__allow_behavior & TRUST_JOIN_EXTERNAL) if self.remote_domain.info['dns_domain'] != \ self.remote_domain.info['dns_forest']: if not trust_external: raise errors.NotAForestRootError( forest=self.remote_domain.info['dns_forest'], domain=self.remote_domain.info['dns_domain']) if not self.remote_domain.read_only: trustdom_pass = samba.generate_random_password(128, 128) self.get_realmdomains() # Establishing trust may throw an exception for topology # conflict. If it was solved, re-establish the trust again # Otherwise let the CLI to display a message about the conflict try: self.remote_domain.establish_trust(self.local_domain, trustdom_pass, trust_type, trust_external) except TrustTopologyConflictSolved: # we solved topology conflict, retry again self.remote_domain.establish_trust(self.local_domain, trustdom_pass, trust_type, trust_external) # For local domain we don't set topology information self.local_domain.establish_trust(self.remote_domain, trustdom_pass, trust_type, trust_external) # if trust is inbound, we don't need to verify it because # AD DC will respond with WERR_NO_SUCH_DOMAIN -- # it only does verification for outbound trusts. result = True if trust_type == TRUST_BIDIRECTIONAL: result = self.remote_domain.verify_trust(self.local_domain) return dict( local=self.local_domain, remote=self.remote_domain, verified=result ) return None def join_ad_ipa_half(self, realm, realm_server, trustdom_passwd, trust_type): if not self.configured: return None if not(isinstance(self.remote_domain, TrustDomainInstance)): self.populate_remote_domain(realm, realm_server, realm_passwd=None) trust_external = bool(self.__allow_behavior & TRUST_JOIN_EXTERNAL) if self.remote_domain.info['dns_domain'] != \ self.remote_domain.info['dns_forest']: if not trust_external: raise errors.NotAForestRootError( forest=self.remote_domain.info['dns_forest'], domain=self.remote_domain.info['dns_domain']) self.local_domain.establish_trust(self.remote_domain, trustdom_passwd, trust_type, trust_external) return dict( local=self.local_domain, remote=self.remote_domain, verified=False )