From 1f2f470889d63a2a81ee3f2d8bdff782ac8d0e28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Bartlett Date: Wed, 7 Sep 2005 21:52:50 +0000 Subject: r10066: This is the second in my patches to work on Samba4's kerberos support, with an aim to make the code simpiler and more correct. Gone is the old (since the very early Samba 3.0 krb5 days) 'iterate over all keytypes)' code in gensec_krb5, we now follow the approach used in gensec_gssapi, and use a keytab. I have also done a lot of work in the GSSAPI code, to try and reduce the diff between us and upstream heimdal. It was becoming hard to track patches in this code, and I also want this patch (the DCE_STYLE support) to be in a 'manageable' state for when lha considers it for merging. (metze assures me it still has memory leak problems, but I've started to address some of that). This patch also includes a simple update of other code to current heimdal, as well as changes we need for better PAC verification. On the PAC side of things we now match windows member servers by checking the name and authtime on an incoming PAC. Not generating these right was the cause of the PAC pain, and so now both the main code and torture test validate this behaviour. One thing doesn't work with this patch: - the sealing of RPC pipes with kerberos, Samba -> Samba seems broken. I'm pretty sure this is related to AES, and the need to break apart the gss_wrap interface. Andrew Bartlett (This used to be commit a3aba57c00a9c5318f4706db55d03f64e8bea60c) --- source4/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_rep.c | 146 +++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-) (limited to 'source4/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_rep.c') diff --git a/source4/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_rep.c b/source4/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_rep.c index a92eea5c043..53138d9f458 100644 --- a/source4/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_rep.c +++ b/source4/heimdal/lib/krb5/rd_rep.c @@ -36,94 +36,80 @@ RCSID("$Id: rd_rep.c,v 1.25 2005/06/17 07:49:33 lha Exp $"); krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION -_krb5_rd_rep_type(krb5_context context, - krb5_auth_context auth_context, - const krb5_data *inbuf, - krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **repl, - krb5_boolean dce_style_response) +krb5_rd_rep(krb5_context context, + krb5_auth_context auth_context, + const krb5_data *inbuf, + krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **repl) { - krb5_error_code ret; - AP_REP ap_rep; - size_t len; - krb5_data data; - krb5_crypto crypto; + krb5_error_code ret; + AP_REP ap_rep; + size_t len; + krb5_data data; + krb5_crypto crypto; - krb5_data_zero (&data); - ret = 0; + krb5_data_zero (&data); + ret = 0; - ret = decode_AP_REP(inbuf->data, inbuf->length, &ap_rep, &len); - if (ret) - return ret; - if (ap_rep.pvno != 5) { - ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION; - krb5_clear_error_string (context); - goto out; - } - if (ap_rep.msg_type != krb_ap_rep) { - ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE; - krb5_clear_error_string (context); - goto out; - } + ret = decode_AP_REP(inbuf->data, inbuf->length, &ap_rep, &len); + if (ret) + return ret; + if (ap_rep.pvno != 5) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADVERSION; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto out; + } + if (ap_rep.msg_type != krb_ap_rep) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MSG_TYPE; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto out; + } - ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, auth_context->keyblock, 0, &crypto); - if (ret) - goto out; - ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, - crypto, - KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_ENC_PART, - &ap_rep.enc_part, - &data); - krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); - if (ret) - goto out; + ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, auth_context->keyblock, 0, &crypto); + if (ret) + goto out; + ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context, + crypto, + KRB5_KU_AP_REQ_ENC_PART, + &ap_rep.enc_part, + &data); + krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto); + if (ret) + goto out; - *repl = malloc(sizeof(**repl)); - if (*repl == NULL) { - ret = ENOMEM; - krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); - goto out; - } - ret = krb5_decode_EncAPRepPart(context, - data.data, - data.length, - *repl, - &len); - if (ret) - return ret; - - if (!dce_style_response) { - if ((*repl)->ctime != auth_context->authenticator->ctime || - (*repl)->cusec != auth_context->authenticator->cusec) { - ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL; - krb5_set_error_string (context, "Mutual authentication failed: Timestamps mismatch"); - goto out; - } - } - if ((*repl)->seq_number) - krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber(context, auth_context, - *((*repl)->seq_number)); - if ((*repl)->subkey) - krb5_auth_con_setremotesubkey(context, auth_context, (*repl)->subkey); + *repl = malloc(sizeof(**repl)); + if (*repl == NULL) { + ret = ENOMEM; + krb5_set_error_string (context, "malloc: out of memory"); + goto out; + } + ret = krb5_decode_EncAPRepPart(context, + data.data, + data.length, + *repl, + &len); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (auth_context->flags & KRB5_AUTH_CONTEXT_DO_TIME) { + if ((*repl)->ctime != auth_context->authenticator->ctime || + (*repl)->cusec != auth_context->authenticator->cusec) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_MUT_FAIL; + krb5_clear_error_string (context); + goto out; + } + } + if ((*repl)->seq_number) + krb5_auth_con_setremoteseqnumber(context, auth_context, + *((*repl)->seq_number)); + if ((*repl)->subkey) + krb5_auth_con_setremotesubkey(context, auth_context, (*repl)->subkey); -out: - krb5_data_free (&data); - free_AP_REP (&ap_rep); - return ret; + out: + krb5_data_free (&data); + free_AP_REP (&ap_rep); + return ret; } -krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION -krb5_rd_rep(krb5_context context, - krb5_auth_context auth_context, - const krb5_data *inbuf, - krb5_ap_rep_enc_part **repl) -{ - return _krb5_rd_rep_type(context, - auth_context, - inbuf, - repl, - FALSE); -} - void KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_free_ap_rep_enc_part (krb5_context context, krb5_ap_rep_enc_part *val) -- cgit