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Diffstat (limited to 'source/smbd/sesssetup.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | source/smbd/sesssetup.c | 938 |
1 files changed, 938 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source/smbd/sesssetup.c b/source/smbd/sesssetup.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b8777be6971 --- /dev/null +++ b/source/smbd/sesssetup.c @@ -0,0 +1,938 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + handle SMBsessionsetup + Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1998-2001 + Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001 + Copyright (C) Jim McDonough <jmcd@us.ibm.com> 2002 + Copyright (C) Luke Howard 2003 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. +*/ + +#include "includes.h" + +uint32 global_client_caps = 0; + +static struct auth_ntlmssp_state *global_ntlmssp_state; + +/* + on a logon error possibly map the error to success if "map to guest" + is set approriately +*/ +static NTSTATUS do_map_to_guest(NTSTATUS status, auth_serversupplied_info **server_info, + const char *user, const char *domain) +{ + if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) { + if ((lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_USER) || + (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD)) { + DEBUG(3,("No such user %s [%s] - using guest account\n", + user, domain)); + status = make_server_info_guest(server_info); + } + } + + if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD)) { + if (lp_map_to_guest() == MAP_TO_GUEST_ON_BAD_PASSWORD) { + DEBUG(3,("Registered username %s for guest access\n",user)); + status = make_server_info_guest(server_info); + } + } + + return status; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Add the standard 'Samba' signature to the end of the session setup. +****************************************************************************/ + +static int add_signature(char *outbuf, char *p) +{ + char *start = p; + fstring lanman; + + fstr_sprintf( lanman, "Samba %s", SAMBA_VERSION_STRING); + + p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, "Unix", -1, STR_TERMINATE); + p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, lanman, -1, STR_TERMINATE); + p += srvstr_push(outbuf, p, lp_workgroup(), -1, STR_TERMINATE); + + return PTR_DIFF(p, start); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Send a security blob via a session setup reply. +****************************************************************************/ + +static BOOL reply_sesssetup_blob(connection_struct *conn, char *outbuf, + DATA_BLOB blob, NTSTATUS nt_status) +{ + char *p; + + set_message(outbuf,4,0,True); + + nt_status = nt_status_squash(nt_status); + SIVAL(outbuf, smb_rcls, NT_STATUS_V(nt_status)); + SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv0, 0xFF); /* no chaining possible */ + SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, blob.length); + p = smb_buf(outbuf); + + /* should we cap this? */ + memcpy(p, blob.data, blob.length); + p += blob.length; + + p += add_signature( outbuf, p ); + + set_message_end(outbuf,p); + + return send_smb(smbd_server_fd(),outbuf); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Do a 'guest' logon, getting back the +****************************************************************************/ + +static NTSTATUS check_guest_password(auth_serversupplied_info **server_info) +{ + struct auth_context *auth_context; + auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL; + + NTSTATUS nt_status; + unsigned char chal[8]; + + ZERO_STRUCT(chal); + + DEBUG(3,("Got anonymous request\n")); + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status = make_auth_context_fixed(&auth_context, chal))) { + return nt_status; + } + + if (!make_user_info_guest(&user_info)) { + (auth_context->free)(&auth_context); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + nt_status = auth_context->check_ntlm_password(auth_context, user_info, server_info); + (auth_context->free)(&auth_context); + free_user_info(&user_info); + return nt_status; +} + + +#ifdef HAVE_KRB5 +/**************************************************************************** +reply to a session setup spnego negotiate packet for kerberos +****************************************************************************/ +static int reply_spnego_kerberos(connection_struct *conn, + char *inbuf, char *outbuf, + int length, int bufsize, + DATA_BLOB *secblob) +{ + DATA_BLOB ticket; + char *client, *p, *domain; + fstring netbios_domain_name; + struct passwd *pw; + char *user; + int sess_vuid; + NTSTATUS ret; + DATA_BLOB auth_data; + DATA_BLOB ap_rep, ap_rep_wrapped, response; + auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL; + DATA_BLOB session_key; + uint8 tok_id[2]; + BOOL foreign = False; + DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob(NULL, 0); + fstring real_username; + + ZERO_STRUCT(ticket); + ZERO_STRUCT(auth_data); + ZERO_STRUCT(ap_rep); + ZERO_STRUCT(ap_rep_wrapped); + ZERO_STRUCT(response); + + if (!spnego_parse_krb5_wrap(*secblob, &ticket, tok_id)) { + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); + } + + ret = ads_verify_ticket(lp_realm(), &ticket, &client, &auth_data, &ap_rep, &session_key); + + data_blob_free(&ticket); + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) { + DEBUG(1,("Failed to verify incoming ticket!\n")); + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); + } + + data_blob_free(&auth_data); + + DEBUG(3,("Ticket name is [%s]\n", client)); + + p = strchr_m(client, '@'); + if (!p) { + DEBUG(3,("Doesn't look like a valid principal\n")); + data_blob_free(&ap_rep); + SAFE_FREE(client); + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); + } + + *p = 0; + if (!strequal(p+1, lp_realm())) { + DEBUG(3,("Ticket for foreign realm %s@%s\n", client, p+1)); + if (!lp_allow_trusted_domains()) { + data_blob_free(&ap_rep); + SAFE_FREE(client); + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); + } + foreign = True; + } + + /* this gives a fully qualified user name (ie. with full realm). + that leads to very long usernames, but what else can we do? */ + + domain = p+1; + + { + /* If we have winbind running, we can (and must) shorten the + username by using the short netbios name. Otherwise we will + have inconsistent user names. With Kerberos, we get the + fully qualified realm, with ntlmssp we get the short + name. And even w2k3 does use ntlmssp if you for example + connect to an ip address. */ + + struct winbindd_request wb_request; + struct winbindd_response wb_response; + NSS_STATUS wb_result; + + ZERO_STRUCT(wb_request); + ZERO_STRUCT(wb_response); + + DEBUG(10, ("Mapping [%s] to short name\n", domain)); + + fstrcpy(wb_request.domain_name, domain); + + wb_result = winbindd_request(WINBINDD_DOMAIN_INFO, + &wb_request, &wb_response); + + if (wb_result == NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS) { + + fstrcpy(netbios_domain_name, + wb_response.data.domain_info.name); + domain = netbios_domain_name; + + DEBUG(10, ("Mapped to [%s]\n", domain)); + } else { + DEBUG(3, ("Could not find short name -- winbind " + "not running?\n")); + } + } + + asprintf(&user, "%s%c%s", domain, *lp_winbind_separator(), client); + + /* lookup the passwd struct, create a new user if necessary */ + + pw = smb_getpwnam( user, real_username, True ); + + if (!pw) { + DEBUG(1,("Username %s is invalid on this system\n",user)); + SAFE_FREE(user); + SAFE_FREE(client); + data_blob_free(&ap_rep); + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); + } + + /* setup the string used by %U */ + + sub_set_smb_name( real_username ); + reload_services(True); + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret = make_server_info_pw(&server_info, real_username, pw))) + { + DEBUG(1,("make_server_info_from_pw failed!\n")); + SAFE_FREE(user); + SAFE_FREE(client); + data_blob_free(&ap_rep); + return ERROR_NT(ret); + } + + /* make_server_info_pw does not set the domain. Without this we end up + * with the local netbios name in substitutions for %D. */ + + if (server_info->sam_account != NULL) { + pdb_set_domain(server_info->sam_account, domain, PDB_SET); + } + + /* register_vuid keeps the server info */ + sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, client); + + SAFE_FREE(user); + SAFE_FREE(client); + + if (sess_vuid == -1) { + ret = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE; + } else { + /* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */ + reload_services( True ); + + set_message(outbuf,4,0,True); + SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0); + + if (server_info->guest) { + SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1); + } + + SSVAL(outbuf, smb_uid, sess_vuid); + + if (!server_info->guest && !srv_signing_started()) { + /* We need to start the signing engine + * here but a W2K client sends the old + * "BSRSPYL " signature instead of the + * correct one. Subsequent packets will + * be correct. + */ + srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf, False); + } + } + + /* wrap that up in a nice GSS-API wrapping */ + if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ret)) { + ap_rep_wrapped = spnego_gen_krb5_wrap(ap_rep, TOK_ID_KRB_AP_REP); + } else { + ap_rep_wrapped = data_blob(NULL, 0); + } + response = spnego_gen_auth_response(&ap_rep_wrapped, ret, OID_KERBEROS5_OLD); + reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, outbuf, response, ret); + + data_blob_free(&ap_rep); + data_blob_free(&ap_rep_wrapped); + data_blob_free(&response); + + return -1; /* already replied */ +} +#endif + +/**************************************************************************** + Send a session setup reply, wrapped in SPNEGO. + Get vuid and check first. + End the NTLMSSP exchange context if we are OK/complete fail +***************************************************************************/ + +static BOOL reply_spnego_ntlmssp(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf, char *outbuf, + AUTH_NTLMSSP_STATE **auth_ntlmssp_state, + DATA_BLOB *ntlmssp_blob, NTSTATUS nt_status) +{ + BOOL ret; + DATA_BLOB response; + struct auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL; + + if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + server_info = (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->server_info; + } else { + nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status, + &server_info, + (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user, + (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->domain); + } + + if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + int sess_vuid; + DATA_BLOB nullblob = data_blob(NULL, 0); + DATA_BLOB session_key = data_blob((*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.data, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->session_key.length); + + /* register_vuid keeps the server info */ + sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nullblob, (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->ntlmssp_state->user); + (*auth_ntlmssp_state)->server_info = NULL; + + if (sess_vuid == -1) { + nt_status = NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE; + } else { + + /* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */ + reload_services( True ); + + set_message(outbuf,4,0,True); + SSVAL(outbuf, smb_vwv3, 0); + + if (server_info->guest) { + SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1); + } + + SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid); + + if (!server_info->guest && !srv_signing_started()) { + /* We need to start the signing engine + * here but a W2K client sends the old + * "BSRSPYL " signature instead of the + * correct one. Subsequent packets will + * be correct. + */ + + srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf, False); + } + } + } + + response = spnego_gen_auth_response(ntlmssp_blob, nt_status, OID_NTLMSSP); + ret = reply_sesssetup_blob(conn, outbuf, response, nt_status); + data_blob_free(&response); + + /* NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED from our NTLMSSP code tells us, + and the other end, that we are not finished yet. */ + + if (!ret || !NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) { + auth_ntlmssp_end(auth_ntlmssp_state); + } + + return ret; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Reply to a session setup spnego negotiate packet. +****************************************************************************/ + +static int reply_spnego_negotiate(connection_struct *conn, + char *inbuf, + char *outbuf, + int length, int bufsize, + DATA_BLOB blob1) +{ + char *OIDs[ASN1_MAX_OIDS]; + DATA_BLOB secblob; + int i; + DATA_BLOB chal; + BOOL got_kerberos = False; + NTSTATUS nt_status; + + /* parse out the OIDs and the first sec blob */ + if (!parse_negTokenTarg(blob1, OIDs, &secblob)) { + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); + } + + /* only look at the first OID for determining the mechToken -- + accoirding to RFC2478, we should choose the one we want + and renegotiate, but i smell a client bug here.. + + Problem observed when connecting to a member (samba box) + of an AD domain as a user in a Samba domain. Samba member + server sent back krb5/mskrb5/ntlmssp as mechtypes, but the + client (2ksp3) replied with ntlmssp/mskrb5/krb5 and an + NTLMSSP mechtoken. --jerry */ + + if (strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5, OIDs[0]) == 0 || + strcmp(OID_KERBEROS5_OLD, OIDs[0]) == 0) { + got_kerberos = True; + } + + for (i=0;OIDs[i];i++) { + DEBUG(3,("Got OID %s\n", OIDs[i])); + free(OIDs[i]); + } + DEBUG(3,("Got secblob of size %lu\n", (unsigned long)secblob.length)); + +#ifdef HAVE_KRB5 + if (got_kerberos && (SEC_ADS == lp_security())) { + int ret = reply_spnego_kerberos(conn, inbuf, outbuf, + length, bufsize, &secblob); + data_blob_free(&secblob); + return ret; + } +#endif + + if (global_ntlmssp_state) { + auth_ntlmssp_end(&global_ntlmssp_state); + } + + nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_start(&global_ntlmssp_state); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + return ERROR_NT(nt_status); + } + + nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_update(global_ntlmssp_state, + secblob, &chal); + + data_blob_free(&secblob); + + reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, inbuf, outbuf, &global_ntlmssp_state, + &chal, nt_status); + + data_blob_free(&chal); + + /* already replied */ + return -1; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Reply to a session setup spnego auth packet. +****************************************************************************/ + +static int reply_spnego_auth(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf, char *outbuf, + int length, int bufsize, + DATA_BLOB blob1) +{ + DATA_BLOB auth, auth_reply; + NTSTATUS nt_status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + + if (!spnego_parse_auth(blob1, &auth)) { +#if 0 + file_save("auth.dat", blob1.data, blob1.length); +#endif + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + if (!global_ntlmssp_state) { + /* auth before negotiatiate? */ + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + nt_status = auth_ntlmssp_update(global_ntlmssp_state, + auth, &auth_reply); + + data_blob_free(&auth); + + reply_spnego_ntlmssp(conn, inbuf, outbuf, &global_ntlmssp_state, + &auth_reply, nt_status); + + data_blob_free(&auth_reply); + + /* and tell smbd that we have already replied to this packet */ + return -1; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Reply to a session setup command. +****************************************************************************/ + +static int reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf, + char *outbuf, + int length,int bufsize) +{ + uint8 *p; + DATA_BLOB blob1; + int ret; + size_t bufrem; + fstring native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain; + char *p2; + uint16 data_blob_len = SVAL(inbuf, smb_vwv7); + enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch(); + + DEBUG(3,("Doing spnego session setup\n")); + + if (global_client_caps == 0) { + global_client_caps = IVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv10); + + if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) { + remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES); + } + + } + + p = (uint8 *)smb_buf(inbuf); + + if (data_blob_len == 0) { + /* an invalid request */ + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); + } + + bufrem = smb_bufrem(inbuf, p); + /* pull the spnego blob */ + blob1 = data_blob(p, MIN(bufrem, data_blob_len)); + +#if 0 + file_save("negotiate.dat", blob1.data, blob1.length); +#endif + + p2 = inbuf + smb_vwv13 + data_blob_len; + p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_os, p2, sizeof(native_os), STR_TERMINATE); + p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_lanman, p2, sizeof(native_lanman), STR_TERMINATE); + p2 += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, primary_domain, p2, sizeof(primary_domain), STR_TERMINATE); + DEBUG(3,("NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n", + native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain)); + + if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) { + /* Windows 2003 doesn't set the native lanman string, + but does set primary domain which is a bug I think */ + + if ( !strlen(native_lanman) ) + ra_lanman_string( primary_domain ); + else + ra_lanman_string( native_lanman ); + } + + if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) { + /* its a negTokenTarg packet */ + ret = reply_spnego_negotiate(conn, inbuf, outbuf, length, bufsize, blob1); + data_blob_free(&blob1); + return ret; + } + + if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_CONTEXT(1)) { + /* its a auth packet */ + ret = reply_spnego_auth(conn, inbuf, outbuf, length, bufsize, blob1); + data_blob_free(&blob1); + return ret; + } + + /* what sort of packet is this? */ + DEBUG(1,("Unknown packet in reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego\n")); + + data_blob_free(&blob1); + + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + On new VC == 0, shutdown *all* old connections and users. + It seems that only NT4.x does this. At W2K and above (XP etc.). + a new session setup with VC==0 is ignored. +****************************************************************************/ + +static void setup_new_vc_session(void) +{ + DEBUG(2,("setup_new_vc_session: New VC == 0, if NT4.x compatible we would close all old resources.\n")); +#if 0 + conn_close_all(); + invalidate_all_vuids(); +#endif +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Reply to a session setup command. +****************************************************************************/ + +int reply_sesssetup_and_X(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf, + int length,int bufsize) +{ + int sess_vuid; + int smb_bufsize; + DATA_BLOB lm_resp; + DATA_BLOB nt_resp; + DATA_BLOB plaintext_password; + fstring user; + fstring sub_user; /* Sainitised username for substituion */ + fstring domain; + fstring native_os; + fstring native_lanman; + fstring primary_domain; + static BOOL done_sesssetup = False; + extern BOOL global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated; + extern BOOL global_spnego_negotiated; + extern int Protocol; + extern int max_send; + + auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL; + extern struct auth_context *negprot_global_auth_context; + auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL; + + NTSTATUS nt_status; + + BOOL doencrypt = global_encrypted_passwords_negotiated; + + DATA_BLOB session_key; + + START_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX); + + ZERO_STRUCT(lm_resp); + ZERO_STRUCT(nt_resp); + ZERO_STRUCT(plaintext_password); + + DEBUG(3,("wct=%d flg2=0x%x\n", CVAL(inbuf, smb_wct), SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2))); + + /* a SPNEGO session setup has 12 command words, whereas a normal + NT1 session setup has 13. See the cifs spec. */ + if (CVAL(inbuf, smb_wct) == 12 && + (SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2) & FLAGS2_EXTENDED_SECURITY)) { + if (!global_spnego_negotiated) { + DEBUG(0,("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Rejecting attempt at SPNEGO session setup when it was not negoitiated.\n")); + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL); + } + + if (SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv4) == 0) { + setup_new_vc_session(); + } + return reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(conn, inbuf, outbuf, length, bufsize); + } + + smb_bufsize = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv2); + + if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) { + uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7); + if ((passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN) || (passlen1 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, smb_buf(inbuf)))) { + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + if (doencrypt) { + lm_resp = data_blob(smb_buf(inbuf), passlen1); + } else { + plaintext_password = data_blob(smb_buf(inbuf), passlen1+1); + /* Ensure null termination */ + plaintext_password.data[passlen1] = 0; + } + + srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, user, smb_buf(inbuf)+passlen1, sizeof(user), STR_TERMINATE); + *domain = 0; + + } else { + uint16 passlen1 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv7); + uint16 passlen2 = SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv8); + enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch(); + char *p = smb_buf(inbuf); + char *save_p = smb_buf(inbuf); + uint16 byte_count; + + + if(global_client_caps == 0) { + global_client_caps = IVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv11); + + if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) { + remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES); + } + + /* client_caps is used as final determination if client is NT or Win95. + This is needed to return the correct error codes in some + circumstances. + */ + + if(ra_type == RA_WINNT || ra_type == RA_WIN2K || ra_type == RA_WIN95) { + if(!(global_client_caps & (CAP_NT_SMBS | CAP_STATUS32))) { + set_remote_arch( RA_WIN95); + } + } + } + + if (!doencrypt) { + /* both Win95 and WinNT stuff up the password lengths for + non-encrypting systems. Uggh. + + if passlen1==24 its a win95 system, and its setting the + password length incorrectly. Luckily it still works with the + default code because Win95 will null terminate the password + anyway + + if passlen1>0 and passlen2>0 then maybe its a NT box and its + setting passlen2 to some random value which really stuffs + things up. we need to fix that one. */ + + if (passlen1 > 0 && passlen2 > 0 && passlen2 != 24 && passlen2 != 1) + passlen2 = 0; + } + + /* check for nasty tricks */ + if (passlen1 > MAX_PASS_LEN || passlen1 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, p)) { + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + if (passlen2 > MAX_PASS_LEN || passlen2 > smb_bufrem(inbuf, p+passlen1)) { + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + } + + /* Save the lanman2 password and the NT md4 password. */ + + if ((doencrypt) && (passlen1 != 0) && (passlen1 != 24)) { + doencrypt = False; + } + + if (doencrypt) { + lm_resp = data_blob(p, passlen1); + nt_resp = data_blob(p+passlen1, passlen2); + } else { + pstring pass; + BOOL unic=SVAL(inbuf, smb_flg2) & FLAGS2_UNICODE_STRINGS; + + if ((ra_type == RA_WINNT) && (passlen2 == 0) && unic && passlen1) { + /* NT4.0 stuffs up plaintext unicode password lengths... */ + srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf) + 1, + sizeof(pass), passlen1, STR_TERMINATE); + } else { + srvstr_pull(inbuf, pass, smb_buf(inbuf), + sizeof(pass), unic ? passlen2 : passlen1, + STR_TERMINATE); + } + plaintext_password = data_blob(pass, strlen(pass)+1); + } + + p += passlen1 + passlen2; + p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, user, p, sizeof(user), STR_TERMINATE); + p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, domain, p, sizeof(domain), STR_TERMINATE); + p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_os, p, sizeof(native_os), STR_TERMINATE); + p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, native_lanman, p, sizeof(native_lanman), STR_TERMINATE); + + /* not documented or decoded by Ethereal but there is one more string + in the extra bytes which is the same as the PrimaryDomain when using + extended security. Windows NT 4 and 2003 use this string to store + the native lanman string. Windows 9x does not include a string here + at all so we have to check if we have any extra bytes left */ + + byte_count = SVAL(inbuf, smb_vwv13); + if ( PTR_DIFF(p, save_p) < byte_count) + p += srvstr_pull_buf(inbuf, primary_domain, p, sizeof(primary_domain), STR_TERMINATE); + else + fstrcpy( primary_domain, "null" ); + + DEBUG(3,("Domain=[%s] NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n", + domain, native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain)); + + if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) { + if ( strlen(native_lanman) == 0 ) + ra_lanman_string( primary_domain ); + else + ra_lanman_string( native_lanman ); + } + + } + + if (SVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv4) == 0) { + setup_new_vc_session(); + } + + DEBUG(3,("sesssetupX:name=[%s]\\[%s]@[%s]\n", domain, user, get_remote_machine_name())); + + if (*user) { + if (global_spnego_negotiated) { + + /* This has to be here, because this is a perfectly valid behaviour for guest logons :-( */ + + DEBUG(0,("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Rejecting attempt at 'normal' session setup after negotiating spnego.\n")); + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL); + } + fstrcpy(sub_user, user); + + /* setup the string used by %U */ + sub_set_smb_name(user); + } else { + fstrcpy(sub_user, lp_guestaccount()); + } + + sub_set_smb_name(sub_user); + + reload_services(True); + + if (lp_security() == SEC_SHARE) { + /* in share level we should ignore any passwords */ + + data_blob_free(&lm_resp); + data_blob_free(&nt_resp); + data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password); + + map_username(sub_user); + add_session_user(sub_user); + /* Then force it to null for the benfit of the code below */ + *user = 0; + } + + if (!*user) { + + nt_status = check_guest_password(&server_info); + + } else if (doencrypt) { + if (!negprot_global_auth_context) { + DEBUG(0, ("reply_sesssetup_and_X: Attempted encrypted session setup without negprot denied!\n")); + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); + } + nt_status = make_user_info_for_reply_enc(&user_info, user, domain, + lm_resp, nt_resp); + if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + nt_status = negprot_global_auth_context->check_ntlm_password(negprot_global_auth_context, + user_info, + &server_info); + } + } else { + struct auth_context *plaintext_auth_context = NULL; + const uint8 *chal; + if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status = make_auth_context_subsystem(&plaintext_auth_context))) { + chal = plaintext_auth_context->get_ntlm_challenge(plaintext_auth_context); + + if (!make_user_info_for_reply(&user_info, + user, domain, chal, + plaintext_password)) { + nt_status = NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + nt_status = plaintext_auth_context->check_ntlm_password(plaintext_auth_context, + user_info, + &server_info); + + (plaintext_auth_context->free)(&plaintext_auth_context); + } + } + } + + free_user_info(&user_info); + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + nt_status = do_map_to_guest(nt_status, &server_info, user, domain); + } + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + data_blob_free(&nt_resp); + data_blob_free(&lm_resp); + data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password); + return ERROR_NT(nt_status_squash(nt_status)); + } + + if (server_info->nt_session_key.data) { + session_key = data_blob(server_info->nt_session_key.data, server_info->nt_session_key.length); + } else if (server_info->lm_session_key.length >= 8 && lm_resp.length == 24) { + session_key = data_blob(NULL, 16); + SMBsesskeygen_lmv1(server_info->lm_session_key.data, lm_resp.data, + session_key.data); + } else { + session_key = data_blob(NULL, 0); + } + + data_blob_free(&lm_resp); + data_blob_clear_free(&plaintext_password); + + /* it's ok - setup a reply */ + set_message(outbuf,3,0,True); + if (Protocol >= PROTOCOL_NT1) { + char *p = smb_buf( outbuf ); + p += add_signature( outbuf, p ); + set_message_end( outbuf, p ); + /* perhaps grab OS version here?? */ + } + + if (server_info->guest) { + SSVAL(outbuf,smb_vwv2,1); + } + + /* register the name and uid as being validated, so further connections + to a uid can get through without a password, on the same VC */ + + /* register_vuid keeps the server info */ + sess_vuid = register_vuid(server_info, session_key, nt_resp, sub_user); + data_blob_free(&nt_resp); + + if (sess_vuid == -1) { + return ERROR_NT(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE); + } + + /* current_user_info is changed on new vuid */ + reload_services( True ); + + if (!server_info->guest && !srv_signing_started() && !srv_check_sign_mac(inbuf, True)) { + exit_server("reply_sesssetup_and_X: bad smb signature"); + } + + SSVAL(outbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid); + SSVAL(inbuf,smb_uid,sess_vuid); + + if (!done_sesssetup) + max_send = MIN(max_send,smb_bufsize); + + done_sesssetup = True; + + END_PROFILE(SMBsesssetupX); + return chain_reply(inbuf,outbuf,length,bufsize); +} |