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Diffstat (limited to 'source/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | source/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c | 1625 |
1 files changed, 1625 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c b/source/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..90c20a97fa6 --- /dev/null +++ b/source/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c @@ -0,0 +1,1625 @@ +/* + * Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + * RPC Pipe client / server routines + * Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998 + * Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-1998, + * Copyright (C) Paul Ashton 1997-1998, + * Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 1999, + * Copyright (C) Jim McDonough <jmcd@us.ibm.com> 2003. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. + */ + +/* this module apparently provides an implementation of DCE/RPC over a + * named pipe (IPC$ connection using SMBtrans). details of DCE/RPC + * documentation are available (in on-line form) from the X-Open group. + * + * this module should provide a level of abstraction between SMB + * and DCE/RPC, while minimising the amount of mallocs, unnecessary + * data copies, and network traffic. + * + * in this version, which takes a "let's learn what's going on and + * get something running" approach, there is additional network + * traffic generated, but the code should be easier to understand... + * + * ... if you read the docs. or stare at packets for weeks on end. + * + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_RPC_SRV + +/************************************************************* + HACK Alert! + We need to transfer the session key from one rpc bind to the + next. This is the way the netlogon schannel works. +**************************************************************/ +struct dcinfo last_dcinfo; + +static void NTLMSSPcalc_p( pipes_struct *p, unsigned char *data, int len) +{ + unsigned char *hash = p->ntlmssp_hash; + unsigned char index_i = hash[256]; + unsigned char index_j = hash[257]; + int ind; + + for( ind = 0; ind < len; ind++) { + unsigned char tc; + unsigned char t; + + index_i++; + index_j += hash[index_i]; + + tc = hash[index_i]; + hash[index_i] = hash[index_j]; + hash[index_j] = tc; + + t = hash[index_i] + hash[index_j]; + data[ind] = data[ind] ^ hash[t]; + } + + hash[256] = index_i; + hash[257] = index_j; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Generate the next PDU to be returned from the data in p->rdata. + We cheat here as this function doesn't handle the special auth + footers of the authenticated bind response reply. + ********************************************************************/ + +BOOL create_next_pdu(pipes_struct *p) +{ + RPC_HDR_RESP hdr_resp; + BOOL auth_verify = ((p->ntlmssp_chal_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN) != 0); + BOOL auth_seal = ((p->ntlmssp_chal_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL) != 0); + uint32 data_len; + uint32 data_space_available; + uint32 data_len_left; + prs_struct outgoing_pdu; + uint32 data_pos; + + /* + * If we're in the fault state, keep returning fault PDU's until + * the pipe gets closed. JRA. + */ + + if(p->fault_state) { + setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(0x1c010002)); + return True; + } + + memset((char *)&hdr_resp, '\0', sizeof(hdr_resp)); + + /* Change the incoming request header to a response. */ + p->hdr.pkt_type = RPC_RESPONSE; + + /* Set up rpc header flags. */ + if (p->out_data.data_sent_length == 0) + p->hdr.flags = RPC_FLG_FIRST; + else + p->hdr.flags = 0; + + /* + * Work out how much we can fit in a single PDU. + */ + + data_space_available = sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu) - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN; + if(p->ntlmssp_auth_validated) + data_space_available -= (RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN); + + if(p->netsec_auth_validated) + data_space_available -= (RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN); + + /* + * The amount we send is the minimum of the available + * space and the amount left to send. + */ + + data_len_left = prs_offset(&p->out_data.rdata) - p->out_data.data_sent_length; + + /* + * Ensure there really is data left to send. + */ + + if(!data_len_left) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: no data left to send !\n")); + return False; + } + + data_len = MIN(data_len_left, data_space_available); + + /* + * Set up the alloc hint. This should be the data left to + * send. + */ + + hdr_resp.alloc_hint = data_len_left; + + /* + * Set up the header lengths. + */ + + if (p->ntlmssp_auth_validated) { + p->hdr.frag_len = RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN + data_len + + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN; + p->hdr.auth_len = RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN; + } else if (p->netsec_auth_validated) { + p->hdr.frag_len = RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN + data_len + + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN; + p->hdr.auth_len = RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN; + } else { + p->hdr.frag_len = RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN + data_len; + p->hdr.auth_len = 0; + } + + /* + * Work out if this PDU will be the last. + */ + + if(p->out_data.data_sent_length + data_len >= prs_offset(&p->out_data.rdata)) + p->hdr.flags |= RPC_FLG_LAST; + + /* + * Init the parse struct to point at the outgoing + * data. + */ + + prs_init( &outgoing_pdu, 0, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL); + prs_give_memory( &outgoing_pdu, (char *)p->out_data.current_pdu, sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu), False); + + /* Store the header in the data stream. */ + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("hdr", &p->hdr, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_resp("resp", &hdr_resp, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_RESP.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + /* Store the current offset. */ + data_pos = prs_offset(&outgoing_pdu); + + /* Copy the data into the PDU. */ + + if(!prs_append_some_prs_data(&outgoing_pdu, &p->out_data.rdata, p->out_data.data_sent_length, data_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to copy %u bytes of data.\n", (unsigned int)data_len)); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + if (p->ntlmssp_auth_validated) { + uint32 crc32 = 0; + char *data; + + DEBUG(5,("create_next_pdu: sign: %s seal: %s data %d auth %d\n", + BOOLSTR(auth_verify), BOOLSTR(auth_seal), data_len, p->hdr.auth_len)); + + /* + * Set data to point to where we copied the data into. + */ + + data = prs_data_p(&outgoing_pdu) + data_pos; + + if (auth_seal) { + crc32 = crc32_calc_buffer(data, data_len); + NTLMSSPcalc_p(p, (uchar*)data, data_len); + } + + if (auth_seal || auth_verify) { + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + + init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE, RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SEAL_LEVEL, + (auth_verify ? RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN : 0), (auth_verify ? 1 : 0)); + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &auth_info, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + } + + if (auth_verify) { + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK ntlmssp_chk; + char *auth_data = prs_data_p(&outgoing_pdu); + + p->ntlmssp_seq_num++; + init_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk(&ntlmssp_chk, NTLMSSP_SIGN_VERSION, + crc32, p->ntlmssp_seq_num++); + auth_data = prs_data_p(&outgoing_pdu) + prs_offset(&outgoing_pdu) + 4; + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk("auth_sign", &ntlmssp_chk, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + NTLMSSPcalc_p(p, (uchar*)auth_data, RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN - 4); + } + } + + if (p->netsec_auth_validated) { + int auth_type, auth_level; + char *data; + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + + RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK verf; + prs_struct rverf; + prs_struct rauth; + + data = prs_data_p(&outgoing_pdu) + data_pos; + /* Check it's the type of reply we were expecting to decode */ + + get_auth_type_level(p->netsec_auth.auth_flags, &auth_type, &auth_level); + init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, auth_type, auth_level, + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, 1); + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &auth_info, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_next_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + prs_init(&rverf, 0, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL); + prs_init(&rauth, 0, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL); + + netsec_encode(&p->netsec_auth, + p->netsec_auth.auth_flags, + SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR, + &verf, data, data_len); + + smb_io_rpc_auth_netsec_chk("", &verf, &outgoing_pdu, 0); + + p->netsec_auth.seq_num++; + } + + /* + * Setup the counts for this PDU. + */ + + p->out_data.data_sent_length += data_len; + p->out_data.current_pdu_len = p->hdr.frag_len; + p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0; + + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Process an NTLMSSP authentication response. + If this function succeeds, the user has been authenticated + and their domain, name and calling workstation stored in + the pipe struct. + The initial challenge is stored in p->challenge. + *******************************************************************/ + +static BOOL api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify(pipes_struct *p, RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_RESP *ntlmssp_resp) +{ + uchar lm_owf[24]; + uchar nt_owf[128]; + int nt_pw_len; + int lm_pw_len; + fstring user_name; + fstring domain; + fstring wks; + + NTSTATUS nt_status; + + struct auth_context *auth_context = NULL; + auth_usersupplied_info *user_info = NULL; + auth_serversupplied_info *server_info = NULL; + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify: checking user details\n")); + + memset(p->user_name, '\0', sizeof(p->user_name)); + memset(p->pipe_user_name, '\0', sizeof(p->pipe_user_name)); + memset(p->domain, '\0', sizeof(p->domain)); + memset(p->wks, '\0', sizeof(p->wks)); + + /* Set up for non-authenticated user. */ + delete_nt_token(&p->pipe_user.nt_user_token); + p->pipe_user.ngroups = 0; + SAFE_FREE( p->pipe_user.groups); + + /* + * Setup an empty password for a guest user. + */ + + /* + * We always negotiate UNICODE. + */ + + if (p->ntlmssp_chal_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_UNICODE) { + rpcstr_pull(user_name, ntlmssp_resp->user, sizeof(fstring), ntlmssp_resp->hdr_usr.str_str_len*2, 0 ); + rpcstr_pull(domain, ntlmssp_resp->domain, sizeof(fstring), ntlmssp_resp->hdr_domain.str_str_len*2, 0); + rpcstr_pull(wks, ntlmssp_resp->wks, sizeof(fstring), ntlmssp_resp->hdr_wks.str_str_len*2, 0); + } else { + pull_ascii_fstring(user_name, ntlmssp_resp->user); + pull_ascii_fstring(domain, ntlmssp_resp->domain); + pull_ascii_fstring(wks, ntlmssp_resp->wks); + } + + DEBUG(5,("user: %s domain: %s wks: %s\n", user_name, domain, wks)); + + nt_pw_len = MIN(sizeof(nt_owf), ntlmssp_resp->hdr_nt_resp.str_str_len); + lm_pw_len = MIN(sizeof(lm_owf), ntlmssp_resp->hdr_lm_resp.str_str_len); + + memcpy(lm_owf, ntlmssp_resp->lm_resp, sizeof(lm_owf)); + memcpy(nt_owf, ntlmssp_resp->nt_resp, nt_pw_len); + +#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD + DEBUG(100,("lm, nt owfs, chal\n")); + dump_data(100, (char *)lm_owf, sizeof(lm_owf)); + dump_data(100, (char *)nt_owf, nt_pw_len); + dump_data(100, (char *)p->challenge, 8); +#endif + + /* + * Allow guest access. Patch from Shirish Kalele <kalele@veritas.com>. + */ + + if (*user_name) { + + /* + * Do the length checking only if user is not NULL. + */ + + if (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_lm_resp.str_str_len == 0) + return False; + if (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_nt_resp.str_str_len == 0) + return False; + if (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_usr.str_str_len == 0) + return False; + if (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_domain.str_str_len == 0) + return False; + if (ntlmssp_resp->hdr_wks.str_str_len == 0) + return False; + + } + + make_auth_context_fixed(&auth_context, (uchar*)p->challenge); + + if (!make_user_info_netlogon_network(&user_info, + user_name, domain, wks, + lm_owf, lm_pw_len, + nt_owf, nt_pw_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("make_user_info_netlogon_network failed! Failing authenticaion.\n")); + return False; + } + + nt_status = auth_context->check_ntlm_password(auth_context, user_info, &server_info); + + (auth_context->free)(&auth_context); + free_user_info(&user_info); + + p->ntlmssp_auth_validated = NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status); + + if (!p->ntlmssp_auth_validated) { + DEBUG(1,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify: User [%s]\\[%s] from machine %s \ +failed authentication on named pipe %s.\n", domain, user_name, wks, p->name )); + free_server_info(&server_info); + return False; + } + + /* + * Set up the sign/seal data. + */ + + if (server_info->lm_session_key.length != 16) { + DEBUG(1,("api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify: User [%s]\\[%s] from machine %s \ +succeeded authentication on named pipe %s, but session key was of incorrect length [%u].\n", + domain, user_name, wks, p->name, server_info->lm_session_key.length)); + free_server_info(&server_info); + return False; + } else { + uchar p24[24]; + NTLMSSPOWFencrypt(server_info->lm_session_key.data, lm_owf, p24); + { + unsigned char j = 0; + int ind; + + unsigned char k2[8]; + + memcpy(k2, p24, 5); + k2[5] = 0xe5; + k2[6] = 0x38; + k2[7] = 0xb0; + + for (ind = 0; ind < 256; ind++) + p->ntlmssp_hash[ind] = (unsigned char)ind; + + for( ind = 0; ind < 256; ind++) { + unsigned char tc; + + j += (p->ntlmssp_hash[ind] + k2[ind%8]); + + tc = p->ntlmssp_hash[ind]; + p->ntlmssp_hash[ind] = p->ntlmssp_hash[j]; + p->ntlmssp_hash[j] = tc; + } + + p->ntlmssp_hash[256] = 0; + p->ntlmssp_hash[257] = 0; + } + + dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP hash (v1)\n", p->ntlmssp_hash, + sizeof(p->ntlmssp_hash)); + +/* NTLMSSPhash(p->ntlmssp_hash, p24); */ + p->ntlmssp_seq_num = 0; + + } + + fstrcpy(p->user_name, user_name); + fstrcpy(p->pipe_user_name, server_info->unix_name); + fstrcpy(p->domain, domain); + fstrcpy(p->wks, wks); + + /* + * Store the UNIX credential data (uid/gid pair) in the pipe structure. + */ + + p->session_key = data_blob(server_info->lm_session_key.data, server_info->lm_session_key.length); + + p->pipe_user.uid = server_info->uid; + p->pipe_user.gid = server_info->gid; + + p->pipe_user.ngroups = server_info->n_groups; + if (p->pipe_user.ngroups) { + if (!(p->pipe_user.groups = memdup(server_info->groups, sizeof(gid_t) * p->pipe_user.ngroups))) { + DEBUG(0,("failed to memdup group list to p->pipe_user.groups\n")); + free_server_info(&server_info); + return False; + } + } + + if (server_info->ptok) + p->pipe_user.nt_user_token = dup_nt_token(server_info->ptok); + else { + DEBUG(1,("Error: Authmodule failed to provide nt_user_token\n")); + p->pipe_user.nt_user_token = NULL; + free_server_info(&server_info); + return False; + } + + p->ntlmssp_auth_validated = True; + + free_server_info(&server_info); + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + The switch table for the pipe names and the functions to handle them. + *******************************************************************/ + +struct rpc_table +{ + struct + { + const char *clnt; + const char *srv; + } pipe; + struct api_struct *cmds; + int n_cmds; +}; + +static struct rpc_table *rpc_lookup; +static int rpc_lookup_size; + +/******************************************************************* + This is the client reply to our challenge for an authenticated + bind request. The challenge we sent is in p->challenge. +*******************************************************************/ + +BOOL api_pipe_bind_auth_resp(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in_p) +{ + RPC_HDR_AUTHA autha_info; + RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER auth_verifier; + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_RESP ntlmssp_resp; + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: decode request. %d\n", __LINE__)); + + if (p->hdr.auth_len == 0) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: No auth field sent !\n")); + return False; + } + + /* + * Decode the authentication verifier response. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_autha("", &autha_info, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: unmarshall of RPC_HDR_AUTHA failed.\n")); + return False; + } + + if (autha_info.auth_type != NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE || autha_info.auth_level != RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SEAL_LEVEL) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: incorrect auth type (%d) or level (%d).\n", + (int)autha_info.auth_type, (int)autha_info.auth_level )); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_verifier("", &auth_verifier, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: unmarshall of RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER failed.\n")); + return False; + } + + /* + * Ensure this is a NTLMSSP_AUTH packet type. + */ + + if (!rpc_auth_verifier_chk(&auth_verifier, "NTLMSSP", NTLMSSP_AUTH)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: rpc_auth_verifier_chk failed.\n")); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_resp("", &ntlmssp_resp, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_auth_resp: Failed to unmarshall RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_RESP.\n")); + return False; + } + + /* + * The following call actually checks the challenge/response data. + * for correctness against the given DOMAIN\user name. + */ + + if (!api_pipe_ntlmssp_verify(p, &ntlmssp_resp)) + return False; + + p->pipe_bound = True +; + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Marshall a bind_nak pdu. +*******************************************************************/ + +static BOOL setup_bind_nak(pipes_struct *p) +{ + prs_struct outgoing_rpc; + RPC_HDR nak_hdr; + uint16 zero = 0; + + /* Free any memory in the current return data buffer. */ + prs_mem_free(&p->out_data.rdata); + + /* + * Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We + * must do this as we need to set to the bind response + * header and are never sending more than one PDU here. + */ + + prs_init( &outgoing_rpc, 0, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL); + prs_give_memory( &outgoing_rpc, (char *)p->out_data.current_pdu, sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu), False); + + + /* + * Initialize a bind_nak header. + */ + + init_rpc_hdr(&nak_hdr, RPC_BINDNACK, RPC_FLG_FIRST | RPC_FLG_LAST, + p->hdr.call_id, RPC_HEADER_LEN + sizeof(uint16), 0); + + /* + * Marshall the header into the outgoing PDU. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("", &nak_hdr, &outgoing_rpc, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("setup_bind_nak: marshalling of RPC_HDR failed.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_rpc); + return False; + } + + /* + * Now add the reject reason. + */ + + if(!prs_uint16("reject code", &outgoing_rpc, 0, &zero)) { + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_rpc); + return False; + } + + p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0; + p->out_data.current_pdu_len = prs_offset(&outgoing_rpc); + p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0; + + p->pipe_bound = False; + + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Marshall a fault pdu. +*******************************************************************/ + +BOOL setup_fault_pdu(pipes_struct *p, NTSTATUS status) +{ + prs_struct outgoing_pdu; + RPC_HDR fault_hdr; + RPC_HDR_RESP hdr_resp; + RPC_HDR_FAULT fault_resp; + + /* Free any memory in the current return data buffer. */ + prs_mem_free(&p->out_data.rdata); + + /* + * Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We + * must do this as we need to set to the bind response + * header and are never sending more than one PDU here. + */ + + prs_init( &outgoing_pdu, 0, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL); + prs_give_memory( &outgoing_pdu, (char *)p->out_data.current_pdu, sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu), False); + + /* + * Initialize a fault header. + */ + + init_rpc_hdr(&fault_hdr, RPC_FAULT, RPC_FLG_FIRST | RPC_FLG_LAST | RPC_FLG_NOCALL, + p->hdr.call_id, RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN + RPC_HDR_FAULT_LEN, 0); + + /* + * Initialize the HDR_RESP and FAULT parts of the PDU. + */ + + memset((char *)&hdr_resp, '\0', sizeof(hdr_resp)); + + fault_resp.status = status; + fault_resp.reserved = 0; + + /* + * Marshall the header into the outgoing PDU. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("", &fault_hdr, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("setup_fault_pdu: marshalling of RPC_HDR failed.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_resp("resp", &hdr_resp, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("setup_fault_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_RESP.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_fault("fault", &fault_resp, &outgoing_pdu, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("setup_fault_pdu: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_FAULT.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return False; + } + + p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0; + p->out_data.current_pdu_len = prs_offset(&outgoing_pdu); + p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0; + + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_pdu); + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Ensure a bind request has the correct abstract & transfer interface. + Used to reject unknown binds from Win2k. +*******************************************************************/ + +BOOL check_bind_req(struct pipes_struct *p, RPC_IFACE* abstract, + RPC_IFACE* transfer, uint32 context_id) +{ + extern struct pipe_id_info pipe_names[]; + char *pipe_name = p->name; + int i=0; + fstring pname; + + fstrcpy(pname,"\\PIPE\\"); + fstrcat(pname,pipe_name); + + DEBUG(3,("check_bind_req for %s\n", pname)); + + /* we have to check all now since win2k introduced a new UUID on the lsaprpc pipe */ + + for ( i=0; pipe_names[i].client_pipe; i++ ) + { + if ( strequal(pipe_names[i].client_pipe, pname) + && (abstract->version == pipe_names[i].abstr_syntax.version) + && (memcmp(&abstract->uuid, &pipe_names[i].abstr_syntax.uuid, sizeof(struct uuid)) == 0) + && (transfer->version == pipe_names[i].trans_syntax.version) + && (memcmp(&transfer->uuid, &pipe_names[i].trans_syntax.uuid, sizeof(struct uuid)) == 0) ) + { + struct api_struct *fns = NULL; + int n_fns = 0; + PIPE_RPC_FNS *context_fns; + + if ( !(context_fns = malloc(sizeof(PIPE_RPC_FNS))) ) { + DEBUG(0,("check_bind_req: malloc() failed!\n")); + return False; + } + + /* save the RPC function table associated with this bind */ + + get_pipe_fns(i, &fns, &n_fns); + + context_fns->cmds = fns; + context_fns->n_cmds = n_fns; + context_fns->context_id = context_id; + + /* add to the list of open contexts */ + + DLIST_ADD( p->contexts, context_fns ); + + break; + } + } + + if(pipe_names[i].client_pipe == NULL) + return False; + + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Register commands to an RPC pipe +*******************************************************************/ +NTSTATUS rpc_pipe_register_commands(int version, const char *clnt, const char *srv, const struct api_struct *cmds, int size) +{ + struct rpc_table *rpc_entry; + + if (!clnt || !srv || !cmds) { + return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + if (version != SMB_RPC_INTERFACE_VERSION) { + DEBUG(0,("Can't register rpc commands!\n" + "You tried to register a rpc module with SMB_RPC_INTERFACE_VERSION %d" + ", while this version of samba uses version %d!\n", + version,SMB_RPC_INTERFACE_VERSION)); + return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + + /* TODO: + * + * we still need to make sure that don't register the same commands twice!!! + * + * --metze + */ + + /* We use a temporary variable because this call can fail and + rpc_lookup will still be valid afterwards. It could then succeed if + called again later */ + rpc_entry = realloc(rpc_lookup, + ++rpc_lookup_size*sizeof(struct rpc_table)); + if (NULL == rpc_entry) { + rpc_lookup_size--; + DEBUG(0, ("rpc_pipe_register_commands: memory allocation failed\n")); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } else { + rpc_lookup = rpc_entry; + } + + rpc_entry = rpc_lookup + (rpc_lookup_size - 1); + ZERO_STRUCTP(rpc_entry); + rpc_entry->pipe.clnt = strdup(clnt); + rpc_entry->pipe.srv = strdup(srv); + rpc_entry->cmds = realloc(rpc_entry->cmds, + (rpc_entry->n_cmds + size) * + sizeof(struct api_struct)); + memcpy(rpc_entry->cmds + rpc_entry->n_cmds, cmds, + size * sizeof(struct api_struct)); + rpc_entry->n_cmds += size; + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Respond to a pipe bind request. +*******************************************************************/ + +BOOL api_pipe_bind_req(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in_p) +{ + RPC_HDR_BA hdr_ba; + RPC_HDR_RB hdr_rb; + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + uint16 assoc_gid; + fstring ack_pipe_name; + prs_struct out_hdr_ba; + prs_struct out_auth; + prs_struct outgoing_rpc; + int i = 0; + int auth_len = 0; + enum RPC_PKT_TYPE reply_pkt_type; + + p->ntlmssp_auth_requested = False; + p->netsec_auth_validated = False; + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_bind_req: decode request. %d\n", __LINE__)); + + /* + * Try and find the correct pipe name to ensure + * that this is a pipe name we support. + */ + + + for (i = 0; i < rpc_lookup_size; i++) { + if (strequal(rpc_lookup[i].pipe.clnt, p->name)) { + DEBUG(3, ("api_pipe_bind_req: \\PIPE\\%s -> \\PIPE\\%s\n", + rpc_lookup[i].pipe.clnt, rpc_lookup[i].pipe.srv)); + fstrcpy(p->pipe_srv_name, rpc_lookup[i].pipe.srv); + break; + } + } + + if (i == rpc_lookup_size) { + if (NT_STATUS_IS_ERR(smb_probe_module("rpc", p->name))) { + DEBUG(3,("api_pipe_bind_req: Unknown pipe name %s in bind request.\n", + p->name )); + if(!setup_bind_nak(p)) + return False; + return True; + } + + for (i = 0; i < rpc_lookup_size; i++) { + if (strequal(rpc_lookup[i].pipe.clnt, p->name)) { + DEBUG(3, ("api_pipe_bind_req: \\PIPE\\%s -> \\PIPE\\%s\n", + rpc_lookup[i].pipe.clnt, rpc_lookup[i].pipe.srv)); + fstrcpy(p->pipe_srv_name, rpc_lookup[i].pipe.srv); + break; + } + } + + if (i == rpc_lookup_size) { + DEBUG(0, ("module %s doesn't provide functions for pipe %s!\n", p->name, p->name)); + return False; + } + } + + /* decode the bind request */ + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_rb("", &hdr_rb, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: unable to unmarshall RPC_HDR_RB struct.\n")); + return False; + } + + /* + * Check if this is an authenticated request. + */ + + if (p->hdr.auth_len != 0) { + RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER auth_verifier; + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_NEG ntlmssp_neg; + + /* + * Decode the authentication verifier. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &auth_info, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: unable to unmarshall RPC_HDR_AUTH struct.\n")); + return False; + } + + if(auth_info.auth_type == NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE) { + + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_verifier("", &auth_verifier, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: unable to " + "unmarshall RPC_HDR_AUTH struct.\n")); + return False; + } + + if(!strequal(auth_verifier.signature, "NTLMSSP")) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: " + "auth_verifier.signature != NTLMSSP\n")); + return False; + } + + if(auth_verifier.msg_type != NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: " + "auth_verifier.msg_type (%d) != NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE\n", + auth_verifier.msg_type)); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_neg("", &ntlmssp_neg, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: " + "Failed to unmarshall RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_NEG.\n")); + return False; + } + + p->ntlmssp_chal_flags = SMBD_NTLMSSP_NEG_FLAGS; + p->ntlmssp_auth_requested = True; + + } else if (auth_info.auth_type == NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE) { + + RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_NEG neg; + struct netsec_auth_struct *a = &(p->netsec_auth); + + if (!smb_io_rpc_auth_netsec_neg("", &neg, rpc_in_p, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: " + "Could not unmarshal SCHANNEL auth neg\n")); + return False; + } + + p->netsec_auth_validated = True; + + memset(a->sess_key, 0, sizeof(a->sess_key)); + memcpy(a->sess_key, last_dcinfo.sess_key, sizeof(last_dcinfo.sess_key)); + + a->seq_num = 0; + + DEBUG(10,("schannel auth: domain [%s] myname [%s]\n", + neg.domain, neg.myname)); + + } else { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: unknown auth type %x requested.\n", + auth_info.auth_type )); + return False; + } + } + + switch(p->hdr.pkt_type) { + case RPC_BIND: + /* name has to be \PIPE\xxxxx */ + fstrcpy(ack_pipe_name, "\\PIPE\\"); + fstrcat(ack_pipe_name, p->pipe_srv_name); + reply_pkt_type = RPC_BINDACK; + break; + case RPC_ALTCONT: + /* secondary address CAN be NULL + * as the specs say it's ignored. + * It MUST NULL to have the spoolss working. + */ + fstrcpy(ack_pipe_name,""); + reply_pkt_type = RPC_ALTCONTRESP; + break; + default: + return False; + } + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_bind_req: make response. %d\n", __LINE__)); + + /* + * Marshall directly into the outgoing PDU space. We + * must do this as we need to set to the bind response + * header and are never sending more than one PDU here. + */ + + prs_init( &outgoing_rpc, 0, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL); + prs_give_memory( &outgoing_rpc, (char *)p->out_data.current_pdu, sizeof(p->out_data.current_pdu), False); + + /* + * Setup the memory to marshall the ba header, and the + * auth footers. + */ + + if(!prs_init(&out_hdr_ba, 1024, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: malloc out_hdr_ba failed.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_rpc); + return False; + } + + if(!prs_init(&out_auth, 1024, p->mem_ctx, MARSHALL)) { + DEBUG(0,("pi_pipe_bind_req: malloc out_auth failed.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_rpc); + prs_mem_free(&out_hdr_ba); + return False; + } + + if (p->ntlmssp_auth_requested) + assoc_gid = 0x7a77; + else + assoc_gid = hdr_rb.bba.assoc_gid ? hdr_rb.bba.assoc_gid : 0x53f0; + + /* + * Create the bind response struct. + */ + + /* If the requested abstract synt uuid doesn't match our client pipe, + reject the bind_ack & set the transfer interface synt to all 0's, + ver 0 (observed when NT5 attempts to bind to abstract interfaces + unknown to NT4) + Needed when adding entries to a DACL from NT5 - SK */ + + if(check_bind_req(p, &hdr_rb.abstract, &hdr_rb.transfer, hdr_rb.context_id )) + { + init_rpc_hdr_ba(&hdr_ba, + MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, + MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, + assoc_gid, + ack_pipe_name, + 0x1, 0x0, 0x0, + &hdr_rb.transfer); + } else { + RPC_IFACE null_interface; + ZERO_STRUCT(null_interface); + /* Rejection reason: abstract syntax not supported */ + init_rpc_hdr_ba(&hdr_ba, MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, + MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, assoc_gid, + ack_pipe_name, 0x1, 0x2, 0x1, + &null_interface); + } + + /* + * and marshall it. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_ba("", &hdr_ba, &out_hdr_ba, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_HDR_BA failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* + * Now the authentication. + */ + + if (p->ntlmssp_auth_requested) { + RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER auth_verifier; + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHAL ntlmssp_chal; + + generate_random_buffer(p->challenge, 8, False); + + /*** Authentication info ***/ + + init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE, RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SEAL_LEVEL, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, 1); + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &auth_info, &out_auth, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_HDR_AUTH failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /*** NTLMSSP verifier ***/ + + init_rpc_auth_verifier(&auth_verifier, "NTLMSSP", NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE); + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_verifier("", &auth_verifier, &out_auth, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* NTLMSSP challenge ***/ + + init_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chal(&ntlmssp_chal, p->ntlmssp_chal_flags, p->challenge); + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chal("", &ntlmssp_chal, &out_auth, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHAL failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* Auth len in the rpc header doesn't include auth_header. */ + auth_len = prs_offset(&out_auth) - RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN; + } + + if (p->netsec_auth_validated) { + RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER auth_verifier; + uint32 flags; + + /* The client opens a second RPC NETLOGON pipe without + doing a auth2. The credentials for the schannel are + re-used from the auth2 the client did before. */ + p->dc = last_dcinfo; + + init_rpc_hdr_auth(&auth_info, NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE, RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SEAL_LEVEL, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, 1); + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("", &auth_info, &out_auth, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_HDR_AUTH failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /*** NETSEC verifier ***/ + + init_rpc_auth_verifier(&auth_verifier, "\001", 0x0); + if(!smb_io_rpc_netsec_verifier("", &auth_verifier, &out_auth, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_AUTH_VERIFIER failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + prs_align(&out_auth); + + flags = 5; + if(!prs_uint32("flags ", &out_auth, 0, &flags)) + goto err_exit; + + auth_len = prs_offset(&out_auth) - RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN; + } + + /* + * Create the header, now we know the length. + */ + + init_rpc_hdr(&p->hdr, reply_pkt_type, RPC_FLG_FIRST | RPC_FLG_LAST, + p->hdr.call_id, + RPC_HEADER_LEN + prs_offset(&out_hdr_ba) + prs_offset(&out_auth), + auth_len); + + /* + * Marshall the header into the outgoing PDU. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("", &p->hdr, &outgoing_rpc, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("pi_pipe_bind_req: marshalling of RPC_HDR failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + /* + * Now add the RPC_HDR_BA and any auth needed. + */ + + if(!prs_append_prs_data( &outgoing_rpc, &out_hdr_ba)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: append of RPC_HDR_BA failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + if((p->ntlmssp_auth_requested|p->netsec_auth_validated) && + !prs_append_prs_data( &outgoing_rpc, &out_auth)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_bind_req: append of auth info failed.\n")); + goto err_exit; + } + + if(!p->ntlmssp_auth_requested) + p->pipe_bound = True; + + /* + * Setup the lengths for the initial reply. + */ + + p->out_data.data_sent_length = 0; + p->out_data.current_pdu_len = prs_offset(&outgoing_rpc); + p->out_data.current_pdu_sent = 0; + + prs_mem_free(&out_hdr_ba); + prs_mem_free(&out_auth); + + return True; + + err_exit: + + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_rpc); + prs_mem_free(&out_hdr_ba); + prs_mem_free(&out_auth); + return False; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Deal with sign & seal processing on an RPC request. +****************************************************************************/ + +BOOL api_pipe_auth_process(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in) +{ + /* + * We always negotiate the following two bits.... + */ + BOOL auth_verify = ((p->ntlmssp_chal_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN) != 0); + BOOL auth_seal = ((p->ntlmssp_chal_flags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL) != 0); + int data_len; + int auth_len; + uint32 old_offset; + uint32 crc32 = 0; + + auth_len = p->hdr.auth_len; + + if ((auth_len != RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN) && auth_verify) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: Incorrect auth_len %d.\n", auth_len )); + return False; + } + + /* + * The following is that length of the data we must verify or unseal. + * This doesn't include the RPC headers or the auth_len or the RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + * preceeding the auth_data. + */ + + data_len = p->hdr.frag_len - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN - + (auth_verify ? RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN : 0) - auth_len; + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_auth_process: sign: %s seal: %s data %d auth %d\n", + BOOLSTR(auth_verify), BOOLSTR(auth_seal), data_len, auth_len)); + + if (auth_seal) { + /* + * The data in rpc_in doesn't contain the RPC_HEADER as this + * has already been consumed. + */ + char *data = prs_data_p(rpc_in) + RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN; + dump_data_pw("NTLMSSP hash (v1)\n", p->ntlmssp_hash, + sizeof(p->ntlmssp_hash)); + + dump_data_pw("Incoming RPC PDU (NTLMSSP sealed)\n", + (const unsigned char *)data, data_len); + NTLMSSPcalc_p(p, (uchar*)data, data_len); + dump_data_pw("Incoming RPC PDU (NTLMSSP unsealed)\n", + (const unsigned char *)data, data_len); + crc32 = crc32_calc_buffer(data, data_len); + } + + old_offset = prs_offset(rpc_in); + + if (auth_seal || auth_verify) { + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + + if(!prs_set_offset(rpc_in, old_offset + data_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: cannot move offset to %u.\n", + (unsigned int)old_offset + data_len )); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &auth_info, rpc_in, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: failed to unmarshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n")); + return False; + } + } + + if (auth_verify) { + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK ntlmssp_chk; + char *req_data = prs_data_p(rpc_in) + prs_offset(rpc_in) + 4; + + DEBUG(5,("api_pipe_auth_process: auth %d\n", prs_offset(rpc_in) + 4)); + + /* + * Ensure we have RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN - 4 more bytes in the + * incoming buffer. + */ + if(prs_mem_get(rpc_in, RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN - 4) == NULL) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: missing %d bytes in buffer.\n", + RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN - 4 )); + return False; + } + + NTLMSSPcalc_p(p, (uchar*)req_data, RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN - 4); + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk("auth_sign", &ntlmssp_chk, rpc_in, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: failed to unmarshall RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK.\n")); + return False; + } + + if (!rpc_auth_ntlmssp_chk(&ntlmssp_chk, crc32, p->ntlmssp_seq_num)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: NTLMSSP check failed.\n")); + return False; + } + } + + /* + * Return the current pointer to the data offset. + */ + + if(!prs_set_offset(rpc_in, old_offset)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_auth_process: failed to set offset back to %u\n", + (unsigned int)old_offset )); + return False; + } + + return True; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Deal with schannel processing on an RPC request. +****************************************************************************/ +BOOL api_pipe_netsec_process(pipes_struct *p, prs_struct *rpc_in) +{ + /* + * We always negotiate the following two bits.... + */ + int data_len; + int auth_len; + uint32 old_offset; + RPC_HDR_AUTH auth_info; + RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK netsec_chk; + + + auth_len = p->hdr.auth_len; + + if (auth_len != RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN) { + DEBUG(0,("Incorrect auth_len %d.\n", auth_len )); + return False; + } + + /* + * The following is that length of the data we must verify or unseal. + * This doesn't include the RPC headers or the auth_len or the RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + * preceeding the auth_data. + */ + + data_len = p->hdr.frag_len - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN - + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN - auth_len; + + DEBUG(5,("data %d auth %d\n", data_len, auth_len)); + + old_offset = prs_offset(rpc_in); + + if(!prs_set_offset(rpc_in, old_offset + data_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("cannot move offset to %u.\n", + (unsigned int)old_offset + data_len )); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &auth_info, rpc_in, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("failed to unmarshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n")); + return False; + } + + if (auth_info.auth_type != NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE) { + DEBUG(0,("Invalid auth info %d on schannel\n", + auth_info.auth_type)); + return False; + } + + if (auth_info.auth_level == RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SEAL_LEVEL) { + p->netsec_auth.auth_flags = AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC|AUTH_PIPE_SIGN|AUTH_PIPE_SEAL; + } else if (auth_info.auth_level == RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SIGN_LEVEL) { + p->netsec_auth.auth_flags = AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC|AUTH_PIPE_SIGN; + } else { + DEBUG(0,("Invalid auth level %d on schannel\n", + auth_info.auth_level)); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_netsec_chk("", &netsec_chk, rpc_in, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("failed to unmarshal RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK.\n")); + return False; + } + + if (!netsec_decode(&p->netsec_auth, + p->netsec_auth.auth_flags, + SENDER_IS_INITIATOR, + &netsec_chk, + prs_data_p(rpc_in)+old_offset, data_len)) { + DEBUG(0,("failed to decode PDU\n")); + return False; + } + + /* + * Return the current pointer to the data offset. + */ + + if(!prs_set_offset(rpc_in, old_offset)) { + DEBUG(0,("failed to set offset back to %u\n", + (unsigned int)old_offset )); + return False; + } + + /* The sequence number gets incremented on both send and receive. */ + p->netsec_auth.seq_num++; + + return True; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Return a user struct for a pipe user. +****************************************************************************/ + +struct current_user *get_current_user(struct current_user *user, pipes_struct *p) +{ + if (p->ntlmssp_auth_validated) { + memcpy(user, &p->pipe_user, sizeof(struct current_user)); + } else { + extern struct current_user current_user; + memcpy(user, ¤t_user, sizeof(struct current_user)); + } + + return user; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Find the set of RPC functions associated with this context_id +****************************************************************************/ + +static PIPE_RPC_FNS* find_pipe_fns_by_context( PIPE_RPC_FNS *list, uint32 context_id ) +{ + PIPE_RPC_FNS *fns = NULL; + PIPE_RPC_FNS *tmp = NULL; + + if ( !list ) { + DEBUG(0,("find_pipe_fns_by_context: ERROR! No context list for pipe!\n")); + return NULL; + } + + for (tmp=list; tmp; tmp=tmp->next ) { + if ( tmp->context_id == context_id ) + break; + } + + fns = tmp; + + return fns; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + memory cleanup +****************************************************************************/ + +void free_pipe_rpc_context( PIPE_RPC_FNS *list ) +{ + PIPE_RPC_FNS *tmp = list; + PIPE_RPC_FNS *tmp2; + + while (tmp) { + tmp2 = tmp->next; + SAFE_FREE(tmp); + tmp = tmp2; + } + + return; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Find the correct RPC function to call for this request. + If the pipe is authenticated then become the correct UNIX user + before doing the call. +****************************************************************************/ + +BOOL api_pipe_request(pipes_struct *p) +{ + BOOL ret = False; + PIPE_RPC_FNS *pipe_fns; + + if (p->ntlmssp_auth_validated) { + + if(!become_authenticated_pipe_user(p)) { + prs_mem_free(&p->out_data.rdata); + return False; + } + } + + DEBUG(5, ("Requested \\PIPE\\%s\n", p->name)); + + /* get the set of RPC functions for this context */ + + pipe_fns = find_pipe_fns_by_context(p->contexts, p->hdr_req.context_id); + + if ( pipe_fns ) { + set_current_rpc_talloc(p->mem_ctx); + ret = api_rpcTNP(p, p->name, pipe_fns->cmds, pipe_fns->n_cmds); + set_current_rpc_talloc(NULL); + } + else { + DEBUG(0,("api_pipe_request: No rpc function table associated with context [%d] on pipe [%s]\n", + p->hdr_req.context_id, p->name)); + } + + if(p->ntlmssp_auth_validated) + unbecome_authenticated_pipe_user(); + + return ret; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Calls the underlying RPC function for a named pipe. + ********************************************************************/ + +BOOL api_rpcTNP(pipes_struct *p, const char *rpc_name, + const struct api_struct *api_rpc_cmds, int n_cmds) +{ + int fn_num; + fstring name; + uint32 offset1, offset2; + + /* interpret the command */ + DEBUG(4,("api_rpcTNP: %s op 0x%x - ", rpc_name, p->hdr_req.opnum)); + + slprintf(name, sizeof(name)-1, "in_%s", rpc_name); + prs_dump(name, p->hdr_req.opnum, &p->in_data.data); + + for (fn_num = 0; fn_num < n_cmds; fn_num++) { + if (api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].opnum == p->hdr_req.opnum && api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].fn != NULL) { + DEBUG(3,("api_rpcTNP: rpc command: %s\n", api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].name)); + break; + } + } + + if (fn_num == n_cmds) { + /* + * For an unknown RPC just return a fault PDU but + * return True to allow RPC's on the pipe to continue + * and not put the pipe into fault state. JRA. + */ + DEBUG(4, ("unknown\n")); + setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(0x1c010002)); + return True; + } + + offset1 = prs_offset(&p->out_data.rdata); + + DEBUG(6, ("api_rpc_cmds[%d].fn == %p\n", + fn_num, api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].fn)); + /* do the actual command */ + if(!api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].fn(p)) { + DEBUG(0,("api_rpcTNP: %s: %s failed.\n", rpc_name, api_rpc_cmds[fn_num].name)); + prs_mem_free(&p->out_data.rdata); + return False; + } + + if (p->bad_handle_fault_state) { + DEBUG(4,("api_rpcTNP: bad handle fault return.\n")); + p->bad_handle_fault_state = False; + setup_fault_pdu(p, NT_STATUS(0x1C00001A)); + return True; + } + + slprintf(name, sizeof(name)-1, "out_%s", rpc_name); + offset2 = prs_offset(&p->out_data.rdata); + prs_set_offset(&p->out_data.rdata, offset1); + prs_dump(name, p->hdr_req.opnum, &p->out_data.rdata); + prs_set_offset(&p->out_data.rdata, offset2); + + DEBUG(5,("api_rpcTNP: called %s successfully\n", rpc_name)); + + /* Check for buffer underflow in rpc parsing */ + + if ((DEBUGLEVEL >= 10) && + (prs_offset(&p->in_data.data) != prs_data_size(&p->in_data.data))) { + size_t data_len = prs_data_size(&p->in_data.data) - prs_offset(&p->in_data.data); + char *data; + + data = malloc(data_len); + + DEBUG(10, ("api_rpcTNP: rpc input buffer underflow (parse error?)\n")); + if (data) { + prs_uint8s(False, "", &p->in_data.data, 0, (unsigned char *)data, (uint32)data_len); + SAFE_FREE(data); + } + + } + + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* +*******************************************************************/ + +void get_pipe_fns( int idx, struct api_struct **fns, int *n_fns ) +{ + struct api_struct *cmds = NULL; + int n_cmds = 0; + + switch ( idx ) { + case PI_LSARPC: + lsa_get_pipe_fns( &cmds, &n_cmds ); + break; + case PI_LSARPC_DS: + lsa_ds_get_pipe_fns( &cmds, &n_cmds ); + break; + case PI_SAMR: + samr_get_pipe_fns( &cmds, &n_cmds ); + break; + case PI_NETLOGON: + netlog_get_pipe_fns( &cmds, &n_cmds ); + break; + case PI_SRVSVC: + srvsvc_get_pipe_fns( &cmds, &n_cmds ); + break; + case PI_WKSSVC: + wkssvc_get_pipe_fns( &cmds, &n_cmds ); + break; + case PI_WINREG: + reg_get_pipe_fns( &cmds, &n_cmds ); + break; + case PI_SPOOLSS: + spoolss_get_pipe_fns( &cmds, &n_cmds ); + break; + case PI_NETDFS: + netdfs_get_pipe_fns( &cmds, &n_cmds ); + break; +#ifdef DEVELOPER + case PI_ECHO: + echo_get_pipe_fns( &cmds, &n_cmds ); + break; +#endif + case PI_EPM: + epm_get_pipe_fns( &cmds, &n_cmds ); + break; + default: + DEBUG(0,("get_pipe_fns: Unknown pipe index! [%d]\n", idx)); + } + + *fns = cmds; + *n_fns = n_cmds; + + return; +} + + |