diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'source/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | source/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c | 1651 |
1 files changed, 1651 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/source/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c b/source/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..df0d37a4631 --- /dev/null +++ b/source/rpc_client/cli_pipe.c @@ -0,0 +1,1651 @@ +/* + * Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + * RPC Pipe client / server routines + * Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998, + * Copyright (C) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton 1996-1998, + * Copyright (C) Paul Ashton 1998. + * Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 1999. + * Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2003. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + * (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#undef DBGC_CLASS +#define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_RPC_CLI + +extern struct pipe_id_info pipe_names[]; + +/* convert pipe auth flags into the RPC auth type and level */ + +void get_auth_type_level(int pipe_auth_flags, int *auth_type, int *auth_level) +{ + *auth_type = 0; + *auth_level = 0; + if (pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SEAL) { + *auth_level = RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SEAL_LEVEL; + } else if (pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SIGN) { + *auth_level = RPC_PIPE_AUTH_SIGN_LEVEL; + } + + if (pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC) { + *auth_type = NETSEC_AUTH_TYPE; + } else if (pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP) { + *auth_type = NTLMSSP_AUTH_TYPE; + } +} + +/******************************************************************** + Rpc pipe call id. + ********************************************************************/ + +static uint32 get_rpc_call_id(void) +{ + static uint32 call_id = 0; + return ++call_id; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Use SMBreadX to get rest of one fragment's worth of rpc data. + ********************************************************************/ + +static BOOL rpc_read(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *rdata, uint32 data_to_read, uint32 *rdata_offset) +{ + size_t size = (size_t)cli->max_recv_frag; + int stream_offset = 0; + int num_read; + char *pdata; + int extra_data_size = ((int)*rdata_offset) + ((int)data_to_read) - (int)prs_data_size(rdata); + + DEBUG(5,("rpc_read: data_to_read: %u rdata offset: %u extra_data_size: %d\n", + (int)data_to_read, (unsigned int)*rdata_offset, extra_data_size)); + + /* + * Grow the buffer if needed to accommodate the data to be read. + */ + + if (extra_data_size > 0) { + if(!prs_force_grow(rdata, (uint32)extra_data_size)) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_read: Failed to grow parse struct by %d bytes.\n", extra_data_size )); + return False; + } + DEBUG(5,("rpc_read: grew buffer by %d bytes to %u\n", extra_data_size, prs_data_size(rdata) )); + } + + pdata = prs_data_p(rdata) + *rdata_offset; + + do /* read data using SMBreadX */ + { + uint32 ecode; + uint8 eclass; + + if (size > (size_t)data_to_read) + size = (size_t)data_to_read; + + num_read = (int)cli_read(cli, cli->nt_pipe_fnum, pdata, (off_t)stream_offset, size); + + DEBUG(5,("rpc_read: num_read = %d, read offset: %d, to read: %d\n", + num_read, stream_offset, data_to_read)); + + if (cli_is_dos_error(cli)) { + cli_dos_error(cli, &eclass, &ecode); + if (eclass != ERRDOS && ecode != ERRmoredata) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_read: Error %d/%u in cli_read\n", + eclass, (unsigned int)ecode)); + return False; + } + } + + data_to_read -= num_read; + stream_offset += num_read; + pdata += num_read; + + } while (num_read > 0 && data_to_read > 0); + /* && err == (0x80000000 | STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW)); */ + + /* + * Update the current offset into rdata by the amount read. + */ + *rdata_offset += stream_offset; + + return True; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Checks the header. This will set the endian bit in the rdata prs_struct. JRA. + ****************************************************************************/ + +static BOOL rpc_check_hdr(prs_struct *rdata, RPC_HDR *rhdr, + BOOL *first, BOOL *last, uint32 *len) +{ + DEBUG(5,("rpc_check_hdr: rdata->data_size = %u\n", (uint32)prs_data_size(rdata) )); + + /* Next call sets endian bit. */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("rpc_hdr ", rhdr, rdata, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_check_hdr: Failed to unmarshall RPC_HDR.\n")); + return False; + } + + if (prs_offset(rdata) != RPC_HEADER_LEN) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_check_hdr: offset was %x, should be %x.\n", prs_offset(rdata), RPC_HEADER_LEN)); + return False; + } + + (*first) = ((rhdr->flags & RPC_FLG_FIRST) != 0); + (*last) = ((rhdr->flags & RPC_FLG_LAST ) != 0); + (*len) = (uint32)rhdr->frag_len - prs_data_size(rdata); + + return (rhdr->pkt_type != RPC_FAULT); +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Verify data on an rpc pipe. + The VERIFY & SEAL code is only executed on packets that look like this : + + Request/Response PDU's look like the following... + + |<------------------PDU len----------------------------------------------->| + |<-HDR_LEN-->|<--REQ LEN------>|.............|<-AUTH_HDRLEN->|<-AUTH_LEN-->| + + +------------+-----------------+-------------+---------------+-------------+ + | RPC HEADER | REQ/RESP HEADER | DATA ...... | AUTH_HDR | AUTH DATA | + +------------+-----------------+-------------+---------------+-------------+ + + Never on bind requests/responses. + ****************************************************************************/ + +static BOOL rpc_auth_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *rdata, + uint32 fragment_start, int len, int auth_len, uint8 pkt_type, + int *pauth_padding_len) +{ + + /* + * The following is that length of the data we must sign or seal. + * This doesn't include the RPC headers or the auth_len or the RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + * preceeding the auth_data. + */ + + int data_len = len - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN - RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN - auth_len; + + /* + * The start of the data to sign/seal is just after the RPC headers. + */ + char *reply_data = prs_data_p(rdata) + fragment_start + RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN; + + RPC_HDR_AUTH rhdr_auth; + + char *dp = prs_data_p(rdata) + fragment_start + len - + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN - auth_len; + prs_struct auth_verf; + + *pauth_padding_len = 0; + + if (auth_len == 0) { + if (cli->pipe_auth_flags == 0) { + /* move along, nothing to see here */ + return True; + } + + DEBUG(2, ("No authenticaton header recienved on reply, but this pipe is authenticated\n")); + return False; + } + + DEBUG(5,("rpc_auth_pipe: pkt_type: %d len: %d auth_len: %d NTLMSSP %s schannel %s sign %s seal %s \n", + pkt_type, len, auth_len, + BOOLSTR(cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP), + BOOLSTR(cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC), + BOOLSTR(cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SIGN), + BOOLSTR(cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SEAL))); + + if (dp - prs_data_p(rdata) > prs_data_size(rdata)) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: schannel auth data > data size !\n")); + return False; + } + + DEBUG(10,("rpc_auth_pipe: packet:\n")); + dump_data(100, dp, auth_len); + + prs_init(&auth_verf, 0, cli->mem_ctx, UNMARSHALL); + + /* The endinness must be preserved. JRA. */ + prs_set_endian_data( &auth_verf, rdata->bigendian_data); + + /* Point this new parse struct at the auth section of the main + parse struct - rather than copying it. Avoids needing to + free it on every error + */ + prs_give_memory(&auth_verf, dp, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + auth_len, False /* not dynamic */); + prs_set_offset(&auth_verf, 0); + + { + int auth_type; + int auth_level; + if (!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("auth_hdr", &rhdr_auth, &auth_verf, 0)) { + DEBUG(0, ("rpc_auth_pipe: Could not parse auth header\n")); + return False; + } + + /* Let the caller know how much padding at the end of the data */ + *pauth_padding_len = rhdr_auth.padding; + + /* Check it's the type of reply we were expecting to decode */ + + get_auth_type_level(cli->pipe_auth_flags, &auth_type, &auth_level); + if (rhdr_auth.auth_type != auth_type) { + DEBUG(0, ("BAD auth type %d (should be %d)\n", + rhdr_auth.auth_type, auth_type)); + return False; + } + + if (rhdr_auth.auth_level != auth_level) { + DEBUG(0, ("BAD auth level %d (should be %d)\n", + rhdr_auth.auth_level, auth_level)); + return False; + } + } + + if (pkt_type == RPC_BINDACK) { + if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP) { + /* copy the next auth_len bytes into a buffer for + later use */ + + DATA_BLOB ntlmssp_verf = data_blob(NULL, auth_len); + BOOL store_ok; + + /* save the reply away, for use a little later */ + prs_copy_data_out((char *)ntlmssp_verf.data, &auth_verf, auth_len); + + store_ok = (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(ntlmssp_store_response(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state, + ntlmssp_verf))); + + data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_verf); + return store_ok; + } + else if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC) { + /* nothing to do here - we don't seem to be able to + validate the bindack based on VL's comments */ + return True; + } + } + + if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP) { + NTSTATUS nt_status; + DATA_BLOB sig; + if ((cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SIGN) || + (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SEAL)) { + if (auth_len != RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: wrong ntlmssp auth len %d\n", auth_len)); + return False; + } + sig = data_blob(NULL, auth_len); + prs_copy_data_out((char *)sig.data, &auth_verf, auth_len); + } + + /* + * Unseal any sealed data in the PDU, not including the + * 8 byte auth_header or the auth_data. + */ + + /* + * Now unseal and check the auth verifier in the auth_data at + * the end of the packet. + */ + + if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SEAL) { + if (data_len < 0) { + DEBUG(1, ("Can't unseal - data_len < 0!!\n")); + return False; + } + nt_status = ntlmssp_unseal_packet(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state, + (unsigned char *)reply_data, data_len, + &sig); + } + else if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SIGN) { + nt_status = ntlmssp_check_packet(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state, + (const unsigned char *)reply_data, data_len, + &sig); + } + + data_blob_free(&sig); + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + DEBUG(0, ("rpc_auth_pipe: could not validate " + "incoming NTLMSSP packet!\n")); + return False; + } + } + + if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC) { + RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK chk; + + if (auth_len != RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_auth_pipe: wrong schannel auth len %d\n", auth_len)); + return False; + } + + if (!smb_io_rpc_auth_netsec_chk("schannel_auth_sign", + &chk, &auth_verf, 0)) { + DEBUG(0, ("rpc_auth_pipe: schannel unmarshalling " + "RPC_AUTH_NETSECK_CHK failed\n")); + return False; + } + + if (!netsec_decode(&cli->auth_info, + cli->pipe_auth_flags, + SENDER_IS_ACCEPTOR, + &chk, reply_data, data_len)) { + DEBUG(0, ("rpc_auth_pipe: Could not decode schannel\n")); + return False; + } + + cli->auth_info.seq_num++; + + } + return True; +} + + +/**************************************************************************** + Send data on an rpc pipe via trans, which *must* be the last fragment. + receive response data from an rpc pipe, which may be large... + + Read the first fragment: unfortunately have to use SMBtrans for the first + bit, then SMBreadX for subsequent bits. + + If first fragment received also wasn't the last fragment, continue + getting fragments until we _do_ receive the last fragment. + + Request/Response PDU's look like the following... + + |<------------------PDU len----------------------------------------------->| + |<-HDR_LEN-->|<--REQ LEN------>|.............|<-AUTH_HDRLEN->|<-AUTH_LEN-->| + + +------------+-----------------+-------------+---------------+-------------+ + | RPC HEADER | REQ/RESP HEADER | DATA ...... | AUTH_HDR | AUTH DATA | + +------------+-----------------+-------------+---------------+-------------+ + + Where the presence of the AUTH_HDR and AUTH are dependent on the + signing & sealing being negotiated. + + ****************************************************************************/ + +static BOOL rpc_api_pipe(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rdata, + uint8 expected_pkt_type) +{ + uint32 len; + char *rparam = NULL; + uint32 rparam_len = 0; + uint16 setup[2]; + BOOL first = True; + BOOL last = True; + RPC_HDR rhdr; + char *pdata = data ? prs_data_p(data) : NULL; + uint32 data_len = data ? prs_offset(data) : 0; + char *prdata = NULL; + uint32 rdata_len = 0; + uint32 current_offset = 0; + uint32 fragment_start = 0; + uint32 max_data = cli->max_xmit_frag ? cli->max_xmit_frag : 1024; + int auth_padding_len = 0; + + /* Create setup parameters - must be in native byte order. */ + + setup[0] = TRANSACT_DCERPCCMD; + setup[1] = cli->nt_pipe_fnum; /* Pipe file handle. */ + + DEBUG(5,("rpc_api_pipe: fnum:%x\n", (int)cli->nt_pipe_fnum)); + + /* Send the RPC request and receive a response. For short RPC + calls (about 1024 bytes or so) the RPC request and response + appears in a SMBtrans request and response. Larger RPC + responses are received further on. */ + + if (!cli_api_pipe(cli, "\\PIPE\\", + setup, 2, 0, /* Setup, length, max */ + NULL, 0, 0, /* Params, length, max */ + pdata, data_len, max_data, /* data, length, max */ + &rparam, &rparam_len, /* return params, len */ + &prdata, &rdata_len)) /* return data, len */ + { + DEBUG(0, ("cli_pipe: return critical error. Error was %s\n", cli_errstr(cli))); + return False; + } + + /* Throw away returned params - we know we won't use them. */ + + SAFE_FREE(rparam); + + if (prdata == NULL) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_api_pipe: pipe %x failed to return data.\n", + (int)cli->nt_pipe_fnum)); + return False; + } + + /* + * Give this memory as dynamically allocated to the return parse + * struct. + */ + + prs_give_memory(rdata, prdata, rdata_len, True); + current_offset = rdata_len; + + /* This next call sets the endian bit correctly in rdata. */ + + if (!rpc_check_hdr(rdata, &rhdr, &first, &last, &len)) { + prs_mem_free(rdata); + return False; + } + + if (rhdr.pkt_type == RPC_BINDACK) { + if (!last && !first) { + DEBUG(5,("rpc_api_pipe: bug in server (AS/U?), setting fragment first/last ON.\n")); + first = True; + last = True; + } + } + + if (rhdr.pkt_type == RPC_BINDNACK) { + DEBUG(3, ("Bind NACK received on pipe %x!\n", (int)cli->nt_pipe_fnum)); + prs_mem_free(rdata); + return False; + } + + if (rhdr.pkt_type == RPC_RESPONSE) { + RPC_HDR_RESP rhdr_resp; + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_resp("rpc_hdr_resp", &rhdr_resp, rdata, 0)) { + DEBUG(5,("rpc_api_pipe: failed to unmarshal RPC_HDR_RESP.\n")); + prs_mem_free(rdata); + return False; + } + } + + if (rhdr.pkt_type != expected_pkt_type) { + DEBUG(3, ("Connection to pipe %x got an unexpected RPC packet type - %d, not %d\n", (int)cli->nt_pipe_fnum, rhdr.pkt_type, expected_pkt_type)); + prs_mem_free(rdata); + return False; + } + + DEBUG(5,("rpc_api_pipe: len left: %u smbtrans read: %u\n", + (unsigned int)len, (unsigned int)rdata_len )); + + /* check if data to be sent back was too large for one SMBtrans */ + /* err status is only informational: the _real_ check is on the + length */ + + if (len > 0) { + /* || err == (0x80000000 | STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW)) */ + + /* Read the remaining part of the first response fragment */ + + if (!rpc_read(cli, rdata, len, ¤t_offset)) { + prs_mem_free(rdata); + return False; + } + } + + /* + * Now we have a complete PDU, check the auth struct if any was sent. + */ + + if(!rpc_auth_pipe(cli, rdata, fragment_start, rhdr.frag_len, + rhdr.auth_len, rhdr.pkt_type, &auth_padding_len)) { + prs_mem_free(rdata); + return False; + } + + if (rhdr.auth_len != 0) { + /* + * Drop the auth footers from the current offset. + * We need this if there are more fragments. + * The auth footers consist of the auth_data and the + * preceeding 8 byte auth_header. + */ + current_offset -= (auth_padding_len + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + rhdr.auth_len); + } + + /* + * Only one rpc fragment, and it has been read. + */ + + if (first && last) { + DEBUG(6,("rpc_api_pipe: fragment first and last both set\n")); + return True; + } + + /* + * Read more fragments using SMBreadX until we get one with the + * last bit set. + */ + + while (!last) { + RPC_HDR_RESP rhdr_resp; + int num_read; + char hdr_data[RPC_HEADER_LEN+RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN]; + prs_struct hps; + uint8 eclass; + uint32 ecode; + + /* + * First read the header of the next PDU. + */ + + prs_init(&hps, 0, cli->mem_ctx, UNMARSHALL); + prs_give_memory(&hps, hdr_data, sizeof(hdr_data), False); + + num_read = cli_read(cli, cli->nt_pipe_fnum, hdr_data, 0, RPC_HEADER_LEN+RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN); + if (cli_is_dos_error(cli)) { + cli_dos_error(cli, &eclass, &ecode); + if (eclass != ERRDOS && ecode != ERRmoredata) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_api_pipe: cli_read error : %d/%d\n", eclass, ecode)); + return False; + } + } + + DEBUG(5,("rpc_api_pipe: read header (size:%d)\n", num_read)); + + if (num_read != RPC_HEADER_LEN+RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_api_pipe: Error : requested %d bytes, got %d.\n", + RPC_HEADER_LEN+RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN, num_read )); + return False; + } + + /* This call sets the endianness in hps. */ + + if (!rpc_check_hdr(&hps, &rhdr, &first, &last, &len)) + return False; + + /* Ensure the endianness in rdata is set correctly - must be same as hps. */ + + if (hps.bigendian_data != rdata->bigendian_data) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_api_pipe: Error : Endianness changed from %s to %s\n", + rdata->bigendian_data ? "big" : "little", + hps.bigendian_data ? "big" : "little" )); + return False; + } + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_resp("rpc_hdr_resp", &rhdr_resp, &hps, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_api_pipe: Error in unmarshalling RPC_HDR_RESP.\n")); + return False; + } + + if (first) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_api_pipe: secondary PDU rpc header has 'first' set !\n")); + return False; + } + + /* + * Now read the rest of the PDU. + */ + + if (!rpc_read(cli, rdata, len, ¤t_offset)) { + prs_mem_free(rdata); + return False; + } + + fragment_start = current_offset - len - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_RESP_LEN; + + /* + * Verify any authentication footer. + */ + + + if(!rpc_auth_pipe(cli, rdata, fragment_start, rhdr.frag_len, + rhdr.auth_len, rhdr.pkt_type, &auth_padding_len)) { + prs_mem_free(rdata); + return False; + } + + if (rhdr.auth_len != 0 ) { + + /* + * Drop the auth footers from the current offset. + * The auth footers consist of the auth_data and the + * preceeding 8 byte auth_header. + * We need this if there are more fragments. + */ + current_offset -= (auth_padding_len + RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN + rhdr.auth_len); + } + } + + return True; +} + +/******************************************************************* + creates a DCE/RPC bind request + + - initialises the parse structure. + - dynamically allocates the header data structure + - caller is expected to free the header data structure once used. + + ********************************************************************/ + +static NTSTATUS create_rpc_bind_req(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *rpc_out, + uint32 rpc_call_id, + RPC_IFACE *abstract, RPC_IFACE *transfer, + const char *my_name, const char *domain) +{ + RPC_HDR hdr; + RPC_HDR_RB hdr_rb; + RPC_HDR_AUTH hdr_auth; + int auth_len = 0; + int auth_type, auth_level; + size_t saved_hdr_offset = 0; + + prs_struct auth_info; + prs_init(&auth_info, RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN, /* we will need at least this much */ + prs_get_mem_context(rpc_out), MARSHALL); + + if (cli->pipe_auth_flags) { + get_auth_type_level(cli->pipe_auth_flags, &auth_type, &auth_level); + + /* + * Create the auth structs we will marshall. + */ + + init_rpc_hdr_auth(&hdr_auth, auth_type, auth_level, 0x00, 1); + + /* + * Now marshall the data into the temporary parse_struct. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &hdr_auth, &auth_info, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_req: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&auth_info); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + saved_hdr_offset = prs_offset(&auth_info); + } + + if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP) { + + NTSTATUS nt_status; + DATA_BLOB null_blob = data_blob(NULL, 0); + DATA_BLOB request; + + DEBUG(5, ("Processing NTLMSSP Negotiate\n")); + nt_status = ntlmssp_update(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state, + null_blob, + &request); + + if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, + NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) { + prs_mem_free(&auth_info); + return nt_status; + } + + /* Auth len in the rpc header doesn't include auth_header. */ + auth_len = request.length; + prs_copy_data_in(&auth_info, (char *)request.data, request.length); + + DEBUG(5, ("NTLMSSP Negotiate:\n")); + dump_data(5, (const char *)request.data, request.length); + + data_blob_free(&request); + + } else if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC) { + RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_NEG netsec_neg; + + /* Use lp_workgroup() if domain not specified */ + + if (!domain || !domain[0]) { + DEBUG(10,("create_rpc_bind_req: no domain; assuming my own\n")); + domain = lp_workgroup(); + } + + init_rpc_auth_netsec_neg(&netsec_neg, domain, my_name); + + /* + * Now marshall the data into the temporary parse_struct. + */ + + if(!smb_io_rpc_auth_netsec_neg("netsec_neg", + &netsec_neg, &auth_info, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("Failed to marshall RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_NEG.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&auth_info); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + /* Auth len in the rpc header doesn't include auth_header. */ + auth_len = prs_offset(&auth_info) - saved_hdr_offset; + } + + /* Create the request RPC_HDR */ + init_rpc_hdr(&hdr, RPC_BIND, 0x3, rpc_call_id, + RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_RB_LEN + prs_offset(&auth_info), + auth_len); + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("hdr" , &hdr, rpc_out, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_req: failed to marshall RPC_HDR.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&auth_info); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + /* create the bind request RPC_HDR_RB */ + init_rpc_hdr_rb(&hdr_rb, MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, 0x0, + 0x1, 0x0, 0x1, abstract, transfer); + + /* Marshall the bind request data */ + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_rb("", &hdr_rb, rpc_out, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_req: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_RB.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&auth_info); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + /* + * Grow the outgoing buffer to store any auth info. + */ + + if(auth_len != 0) { + if(!prs_append_prs_data( rpc_out, &auth_info)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_req: failed to grow parse struct to add auth.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&auth_info); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + } + prs_mem_free(&auth_info); + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Creates a DCE/RPC bind authentication response. + This is the packet that is sent back to the server once we + have received a BIND-ACK, to finish the third leg of + the authentication handshake. + ********************************************************************/ + +static NTSTATUS create_rpc_bind_resp(struct cli_state *cli, + uint32 rpc_call_id, + prs_struct *rpc_out) +{ + NTSTATUS nt_status; + RPC_HDR hdr; + RPC_HDR_AUTHA hdr_autha; + DATA_BLOB ntlmssp_null_response = data_blob(NULL, 0); + DATA_BLOB ntlmssp_reply; + int auth_type, auth_level; + + /* The response is picked up from the internal cache, + where it was placed by the rpc_auth_pipe() code */ + nt_status = ntlmssp_update(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state, + ntlmssp_null_response, + &ntlmssp_reply); + + if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) { + return nt_status; + } + + /* Create the request RPC_HDR */ + init_rpc_hdr(&hdr, RPC_BINDRESP, 0x0, rpc_call_id, + RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_AUTHA_LEN + ntlmssp_reply.length, + ntlmssp_reply.length ); + + /* Marshall it. */ + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("hdr", &hdr, rpc_out, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_resp: failed to marshall RPC_HDR.\n")); + data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_reply); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + get_auth_type_level(cli->pipe_auth_flags, &auth_type, &auth_level); + + /* Create the request RPC_HDR_AUTHA */ + init_rpc_hdr_autha(&hdr_autha, MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN, + auth_type, auth_level, 0x00); + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_autha("hdr_autha", &hdr_autha, rpc_out, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_resp: failed to marshall RPC_HDR_AUTHA.\n")); + data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_reply); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + /* + * Append the auth data to the outgoing buffer. + */ + + if(!prs_copy_data_in(rpc_out, (char *)ntlmssp_reply.data, ntlmssp_reply.length)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_rpc_bind_req: failed to grow parse struct to add auth.\n")); + data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_reply); + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } + + data_blob_free(&ntlmssp_reply); + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + + +/******************************************************************* + Creates a DCE/RPC request. + ********************************************************************/ + +static uint32 create_rpc_request(prs_struct *rpc_out, uint8 op_num, int data_len, int auth_len, uint8 flags, uint32 oldid, uint32 data_left) +{ + uint32 alloc_hint; + RPC_HDR hdr; + RPC_HDR_REQ hdr_req; + uint32 callid = oldid ? oldid : get_rpc_call_id(); + + DEBUG(5,("create_rpc_request: opnum: 0x%x data_len: 0x%x\n", op_num, data_len)); + + /* create the rpc header RPC_HDR */ + init_rpc_hdr(&hdr, RPC_REQUEST, flags, + callid, data_len, auth_len); + + /* + * The alloc hint should be the amount of data, not including + * RPC headers & footers. + */ + + if (auth_len != 0) + alloc_hint = data_len - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN - auth_len; + else + alloc_hint = data_len - RPC_HEADER_LEN; + + DEBUG(10,("create_rpc_request: data_len: %x auth_len: %x alloc_hint: %x\n", + data_len, auth_len, alloc_hint)); + + /* Create the rpc request RPC_HDR_REQ */ + init_rpc_hdr_req(&hdr_req, alloc_hint, op_num); + + /* stream-time... */ + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr("hdr ", &hdr, rpc_out, 0)) + return 0; + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_req("hdr_req", &hdr_req, rpc_out, 0)) + return 0; + + if (prs_offset(rpc_out) != RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN) + return 0; + + return callid; +} + +/******************************************************************* + Puts an auth header into an rpc request. + ********************************************************************/ + +static BOOL create_auth_hdr(prs_struct *outgoing_packet, + int auth_type, + int auth_level, int padding) +{ + RPC_HDR_AUTH hdr_auth; + + init_rpc_hdr_auth(&hdr_auth, auth_type, auth_level, + padding, 1); + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_auth("hdr_auth", &hdr_auth, + outgoing_packet, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("create_auth_hdr:Failed to marshal RPC_HDR_AUTH.\n")); + return False; + } + return True; +} + +/** + * Send a request on an RPC pipe and get a response. + * + * @param data NDR contents of the request to be sent. + * @param rdata Unparsed NDR response data. +**/ + +BOOL rpc_api_pipe_req(struct cli_state *cli, uint8 op_num, + prs_struct *data, prs_struct *rdata) +{ + uint32 auth_len, real_auth_len, auth_hdr_len, max_data, data_left, data_sent; + NTSTATUS nt_status; + BOOL ret = False; + uint32 callid = 0; + fstring dump_name; + + auth_len = 0; + real_auth_len = 0; + auth_hdr_len = 0; + + if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SIGN) { + if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP) { + auth_len = RPC_AUTH_NTLMSSP_CHK_LEN; + } + if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC) { + auth_len = RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK_LEN; + } + auth_hdr_len = RPC_HDR_AUTH_LEN; + } + + /* + * calc how much actual data we can send in a PDU fragment + */ + max_data = cli->max_xmit_frag - RPC_HEADER_LEN - RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN - + auth_hdr_len - auth_len - 8; + + for (data_left = prs_offset(data), data_sent = 0; data_left > 0;) { + prs_struct outgoing_packet; + prs_struct sec_blob; + uint32 data_len, send_size; + uint8 flags = 0; + uint32 auth_padding = 0; + DATA_BLOB sign_blob; + + /* + * how much will we send this time + */ + send_size = MIN(data_left, max_data); + + if (!prs_init(&sec_blob, send_size, /* will need at least this much */ + cli->mem_ctx, MARSHALL)) { + DEBUG(0,("Could not malloc %u bytes", + send_size+auth_padding)); + return False; + } + + if(!prs_append_some_prs_data(&sec_blob, data, + data_sent, send_size)) { + DEBUG(0,("Failed to append data to netsec blob\n")); + prs_mem_free(&sec_blob); + return False; + } + + /* + * NT expects the data that is sealed to be 8-byte + * aligned. The padding must be encrypted as well and + * taken into account when generating the + * authentication verifier. The amount of padding must + * be stored in the auth header. + */ + + if (cli->pipe_auth_flags) { + size_t data_and_padding_size; + int auth_type; + int auth_level; + prs_align_uint64(&sec_blob); + + get_auth_type_level(cli->pipe_auth_flags, &auth_type, &auth_level); + + data_and_padding_size = prs_offset(&sec_blob); + auth_padding = data_and_padding_size - send_size; + + /* insert the auth header */ + + if(!create_auth_hdr(&sec_blob, auth_type, auth_level, auth_padding)) { + prs_mem_free(&sec_blob); + return False; + } + + /* create an NTLMSSP signature */ + if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP) { + /* + * Seal the outgoing data if requested. + */ + if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SEAL) { + + nt_status = ntlmssp_seal_packet(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state, + (unsigned char*)prs_data_p(&sec_blob), + data_and_padding_size, + &sign_blob); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + prs_mem_free(&sec_blob); + return False; + } + } + else if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SIGN) { + + nt_status = ntlmssp_sign_packet(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state, + (unsigned char*)prs_data_p(&sec_blob), + data_and_padding_size, &sign_blob); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + prs_mem_free(&sec_blob); + return False; + } + } + + + /* write auth footer onto the packet */ + real_auth_len = sign_blob.length; + + prs_copy_data_in(&sec_blob, (char *)sign_blob.data, sign_blob.length); + data_blob_free(&sign_blob); + + } + else if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC) { + size_t parse_offset_marker; + RPC_AUTH_NETSEC_CHK verf; + DEBUG(10,("SCHANNEL seq_num=%d\n", cli->auth_info.seq_num)); + + netsec_encode(&cli->auth_info, + cli->pipe_auth_flags, + SENDER_IS_INITIATOR, + &verf, + prs_data_p(&sec_blob), + data_and_padding_size); + + cli->auth_info.seq_num++; + + /* write auth footer onto the packet */ + + parse_offset_marker = prs_offset(&sec_blob); + if (!smb_io_rpc_auth_netsec_chk("", &verf, + &sec_blob, 0)) { + prs_mem_free(&sec_blob); + return False; + } + real_auth_len = prs_offset(&sec_blob) - parse_offset_marker; + } + } + + data_len = RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_REQ_LEN + prs_offset(&sec_blob); + + /* + * Malloc parse struct to hold it (and enough for alignments). + */ + if(!prs_init(&outgoing_packet, data_len + 8, + cli->mem_ctx, MARSHALL)) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_api_pipe_req: Failed to malloc %u bytes.\n", (unsigned int)data_len )); + return False; + } + + if (data_left == prs_offset(data)) + flags |= RPC_FLG_FIRST; + + if (data_left <= max_data) + flags |= RPC_FLG_LAST; + /* + * Write out the RPC header and the request header. + */ + if(!(callid = create_rpc_request(&outgoing_packet, op_num, + data_len, real_auth_len, flags, + callid, data_left))) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_api_pipe_req: Failed to create RPC request.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_packet); + prs_mem_free(&sec_blob); + return False; + } + + prs_append_prs_data(&outgoing_packet, &sec_blob); + prs_mem_free(&sec_blob); + + DEBUG(100,("data_len: %x data_calc_len: %x\n", data_len, + prs_offset(&outgoing_packet))); + + if (flags & RPC_FLG_LAST) + ret = rpc_api_pipe(cli, &outgoing_packet, + rdata, RPC_RESPONSE); + else { + cli_write(cli, cli->nt_pipe_fnum, 0x0008, + prs_data_p(&outgoing_packet), + data_sent, data_len); + } + prs_mem_free(&outgoing_packet); + data_sent += send_size; + data_left -= send_size; + } + /* Also capture received data */ + slprintf(dump_name, sizeof(dump_name) - 1, "reply_%s", + cli_pipe_get_name(cli)); + prs_dump(dump_name, op_num, rdata); + + return ret; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Set the handle state. +****************************************************************************/ + +static BOOL rpc_pipe_set_hnd_state(struct cli_state *cli, const char *pipe_name, uint16 device_state) +{ + BOOL state_set = False; + char param[2]; + uint16 setup[2]; /* only need 2 uint16 setup parameters */ + char *rparam = NULL; + char *rdata = NULL; + uint32 rparam_len, rdata_len; + + if (pipe_name == NULL) + return False; + + DEBUG(5,("Set Handle state Pipe[%x]: %s - device state:%x\n", + cli->nt_pipe_fnum, pipe_name, device_state)); + + /* create parameters: device state */ + SSVAL(param, 0, device_state); + + /* create setup parameters. */ + setup[0] = 0x0001; + setup[1] = cli->nt_pipe_fnum; /* pipe file handle. got this from an SMBOpenX. */ + + /* send the data on \PIPE\ */ + if (cli_api_pipe(cli, "\\PIPE\\", + setup, 2, 0, /* setup, length, max */ + param, 2, 0, /* param, length, max */ + NULL, 0, 1024, /* data, length, max */ + &rparam, &rparam_len, /* return param, length */ + &rdata, &rdata_len)) /* return data, length */ + { + DEBUG(5, ("Set Handle state: return OK\n")); + state_set = True; + } + + SAFE_FREE(rparam); + SAFE_FREE(rdata); + + return state_set; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + check the rpc bind acknowledge response +****************************************************************************/ + +int get_pipe_index( const char *pipe_name ) +{ + int pipe_idx = 0; + + while (pipe_names[pipe_idx].client_pipe != NULL) { + if (strequal(pipe_name, pipe_names[pipe_idx].client_pipe )) + return pipe_idx; + pipe_idx++; + }; + + return -1; +} + + +/**************************************************************************** + check the rpc bind acknowledge response +****************************************************************************/ + +const char* get_pipe_name_from_index( const int pipe_index ) +{ + + if ( (pipe_index < 0) || (pipe_index >= PI_MAX_PIPES) ) + return NULL; + + return pipe_names[pipe_index].client_pipe; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Check to see if this pipe index points to one of + the pipes only supported by Win2k + ****************************************************************************/ + +BOOL is_win2k_pipe( const int pipe_idx ) +{ + switch ( pipe_idx ) + { + case PI_LSARPC_DS: + return True; + } + + return False; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + check the rpc bind acknowledge response +****************************************************************************/ + +static BOOL valid_pipe_name(const int pipe_idx, RPC_IFACE *abstract, RPC_IFACE *transfer) +{ + if ( pipe_idx >= PI_MAX_PIPES ) { + DEBUG(0,("valid_pipe_name: Programmer error! Invalid pipe index [%d]\n", + pipe_idx)); + return False; + } + + DEBUG(5,("Bind Abstract Syntax: ")); + dump_data(5, (char*)&(pipe_names[pipe_idx].abstr_syntax), + sizeof(pipe_names[pipe_idx].abstr_syntax)); + DEBUG(5,("Bind Transfer Syntax: ")); + dump_data(5, (char*)&(pipe_names[pipe_idx].trans_syntax), + sizeof(pipe_names[pipe_idx].trans_syntax)); + + /* copy the required syntaxes out so we can do the right bind */ + + *transfer = pipe_names[pipe_idx].trans_syntax; + *abstract = pipe_names[pipe_idx].abstr_syntax; + + return True; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + check the rpc bind acknowledge response +****************************************************************************/ + +static BOOL check_bind_response(RPC_HDR_BA *hdr_ba, const int pipe_idx, RPC_IFACE *transfer) +{ +# if 0 /* JERRY -- apparently ASU forgets to fill in the server pipe name sometimes */ + if ( hdr_ba->addr.len <= 0) + return False; + + if ( !strequal(hdr_ba->addr.str, pipe_names[pipe_idx].client_pipe) && + !strequal(hdr_ba->addr.str, pipe_names[pipe_idx].server_pipe) ) + { + DEBUG(4,("bind_rpc_pipe: pipe_name %s != expected pipe %s. oh well!\n", + pipe_names[i].server_pipe ,hdr_ba->addr.str)); + return False; + } + + DEBUG(5,("bind_rpc_pipe: server pipe_name found: %s\n", pipe_names[i].server_pipe )); + + if (pipe_names[pipe_idx].server_pipe == NULL) { + DEBUG(2,("bind_rpc_pipe: pipe name %s unsupported\n", hdr_ba->addr.str)); + return False; + } +#endif /* JERRY */ + + /* check the transfer syntax */ + if ((hdr_ba->transfer.version != transfer->version) || + (memcmp(&hdr_ba->transfer.uuid, &transfer->uuid, sizeof(transfer->uuid)) !=0)) { + DEBUG(2,("bind_rpc_pipe: transfer syntax differs\n")); + return False; + } + + /* lkclXXXX only accept one result: check the result(s) */ + if (hdr_ba->res.num_results != 0x1 || hdr_ba->res.result != 0) { + DEBUG(2,("bind_rpc_pipe: bind denied results: %d reason: %x\n", + hdr_ba->res.num_results, hdr_ba->res.reason)); + } + + DEBUG(5,("bind_rpc_pipe: accepted!\n")); + return True; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Create and send the third packet in an RPC auth. +****************************************************************************/ + +static BOOL rpc_send_auth_reply(struct cli_state *cli, prs_struct *rdata, uint32 rpc_call_id) +{ + prs_struct rpc_out; + ssize_t ret; + + prs_init(&rpc_out, RPC_HEADER_LEN + RPC_HDR_AUTHA_LEN, /* need at least this much */ + cli->mem_ctx, MARSHALL); + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(create_rpc_bind_resp(cli, rpc_call_id, + &rpc_out))) { + return False; + } + + if ((ret = cli_write(cli, cli->nt_pipe_fnum, 0x8, prs_data_p(&rpc_out), + 0, (size_t)prs_offset(&rpc_out))) != (ssize_t)prs_offset(&rpc_out)) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_send_auth_reply: cli_write failed. Return was %d\n", (int)ret)); + prs_mem_free(&rpc_out); + return False; + } + + prs_mem_free(&rpc_out); + return True; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Do an rpc bind. +****************************************************************************/ + +static BOOL rpc_pipe_bind(struct cli_state *cli, int pipe_idx, const char *my_name) +{ + RPC_IFACE abstract; + RPC_IFACE transfer; + prs_struct rpc_out; + prs_struct rdata; + uint32 rpc_call_id; + char buffer[MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN]; + + if ( (pipe_idx < 0) || (pipe_idx >= PI_MAX_PIPES) ) + return False; + + DEBUG(5,("Bind RPC Pipe[%x]: %s\n", cli->nt_pipe_fnum, pipe_names[pipe_idx].client_pipe)); + + if (!valid_pipe_name(pipe_idx, &abstract, &transfer)) + return False; + + prs_init(&rpc_out, 0, cli->mem_ctx, MARSHALL); + + /* + * Use the MAX_PDU_FRAG_LEN buffer to store the bind request. + */ + + prs_give_memory( &rpc_out, buffer, sizeof(buffer), False); + + rpc_call_id = get_rpc_call_id(); + + if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP) { + NTSTATUS nt_status; + fstring password; + + DEBUG(5, ("NTLMSSP authenticated pipe selected\n")); + + nt_status = ntlmssp_client_start(&cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state); + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) + return False; + + /* Currently the NTLMSSP code does not implement NTLM2 correctly for signing or sealing */ + + cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state->neg_flags &= ~NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_NTLM2; + + nt_status = ntlmssp_set_username(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state, + cli->user_name); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) + return False; + + nt_status = ntlmssp_set_domain(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state, + cli->domain); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) + return False; + + if (cli->pwd.null_pwd) { + nt_status = ntlmssp_set_password(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state, + NULL); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) + return False; + } else { + pwd_get_cleartext(&cli->pwd, password); + nt_status = ntlmssp_set_password(cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state, + password); + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) + return False; + } + + if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SIGN) { + cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN; + } + + if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_SEAL) { + cli->ntlmssp_pipe_state->neg_flags |= NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SEAL; + } + } else if (cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC) { + cli->auth_info.seq_num = 0; + } + + /* Marshall the outgoing data. */ + create_rpc_bind_req(cli, &rpc_out, rpc_call_id, + &abstract, &transfer, + global_myname(), cli->domain); + + /* Initialize the incoming data struct. */ + prs_init(&rdata, 0, cli->mem_ctx, UNMARSHALL); + + /* send data on \PIPE\. receive a response */ + if (rpc_api_pipe(cli, &rpc_out, &rdata, RPC_BINDACK)) { + RPC_HDR_BA hdr_ba; + + DEBUG(5, ("rpc_pipe_bind: rpc_api_pipe returned OK.\n")); + + if(!smb_io_rpc_hdr_ba("", &hdr_ba, &rdata, 0)) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_pipe_bind: Failed to unmarshall RPC_HDR_BA.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&rdata); + return False; + } + + if(!check_bind_response(&hdr_ba, pipe_idx, &transfer)) { + DEBUG(2,("rpc_pipe_bind: check_bind_response failed.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&rdata); + return False; + } + + cli->max_xmit_frag = hdr_ba.bba.max_tsize; + cli->max_recv_frag = hdr_ba.bba.max_rsize; + + /* + * If we're doing NTLMSSP auth we need to send a reply to + * the bind-ack to complete the 3-way challenge response + * handshake. + */ + + if ((cli->pipe_auth_flags & AUTH_PIPE_NTLMSSP) + && !rpc_send_auth_reply(cli, &rdata, rpc_call_id)) { + DEBUG(0,("rpc_pipe_bind: rpc_send_auth_reply failed.\n")); + prs_mem_free(&rdata); + return False; + } + prs_mem_free(&rdata); + return True; + } + + return False; +} + +/**************************************************************************** + Open a session. + ****************************************************************************/ + +BOOL cli_nt_session_open(struct cli_state *cli, const int pipe_idx) +{ + int fnum; + + /* At the moment we can't have more than one pipe open over + a cli connection. )-: */ + + SMB_ASSERT(cli->nt_pipe_fnum == 0); + + /* The pipe index must fall within our array */ + + SMB_ASSERT((pipe_idx >= 0) && (pipe_idx < PI_MAX_PIPES)); + + if (cli->capabilities & CAP_NT_SMBS) { + if ((fnum = cli_nt_create(cli, &pipe_names[pipe_idx].client_pipe[5], DESIRED_ACCESS_PIPE)) == -1) { + DEBUG(0,("cli_nt_session_open: cli_nt_create failed on pipe %s to machine %s. Error was %s\n", + &pipe_names[pipe_idx].client_pipe[5], cli->desthost, cli_errstr(cli))); + return False; + } + + cli->nt_pipe_fnum = (uint16)fnum; + } else { + if ((fnum = cli_open(cli, pipe_names[pipe_idx].client_pipe, O_CREAT|O_RDWR, DENY_NONE)) == -1) { + DEBUG(1,("cli_nt_session_open: cli_open failed on pipe %s to machine %s. Error was %s\n", + pipe_names[pipe_idx].client_pipe, cli->desthost, cli_errstr(cli))); + return False; + } + + cli->nt_pipe_fnum = (uint16)fnum; + + /**************** Set Named Pipe State ***************/ + if (!rpc_pipe_set_hnd_state(cli, pipe_names[pipe_idx].client_pipe, 0x4300)) { + DEBUG(0,("cli_nt_session_open: pipe hnd state failed. Error was %s\n", + cli_errstr(cli))); + cli_close(cli, cli->nt_pipe_fnum); + cli->nt_pipe_fnum = 0; + return False; + } + } + + /******************* bind request on pipe *****************/ + + if (!rpc_pipe_bind(cli, pipe_idx, global_myname())) { + DEBUG(2,("cli_nt_session_open: rpc bind to %s failed\n", + get_pipe_name_from_index(pipe_idx))); + cli_close(cli, cli->nt_pipe_fnum); + cli->nt_pipe_fnum = 0; + return False; + } + + cli->pipe_idx = pipe_idx; + + /* + * Setup the remote server name prefixed by \ and the machine account name. + */ + + fstrcpy(cli->srv_name_slash, "\\\\"); + fstrcat(cli->srv_name_slash, cli->desthost); + strupper_m(cli->srv_name_slash); + + fstrcpy(cli->clnt_name_slash, "\\\\"); + fstrcat(cli->clnt_name_slash, global_myname()); + strupper_m(cli->clnt_name_slash); + + fstrcpy(cli->mach_acct, global_myname()); + fstrcat(cli->mach_acct, "$"); + strupper_m(cli->mach_acct); + + /* Remember which pipe we're talking to */ + fstrcpy(cli->pipe_name, pipe_names[pipe_idx].client_pipe); + + return True; +} + + +/**************************************************************************** + Open a session to the NETLOGON pipe using schannel. + + (Assumes that the netlogon pipe is already open) + ****************************************************************************/ + +NTSTATUS cli_nt_establish_netlogon(struct cli_state *cli, int sec_chan, + const uchar trust_password[16]) +{ + NTSTATUS result; + uint32 neg_flags = NETLOGON_NEG_AUTH2_FLAGS; + int fnum; + + cli_nt_netlogon_netsec_session_close(cli); + + if (lp_client_schannel() != False) + neg_flags |= NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL; + + result = cli_nt_setup_creds(cli, sec_chan, trust_password, + &neg_flags, 2); + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) { + cli_nt_session_close(cli); + return result; + } + + if ((lp_client_schannel() == True) && + ((neg_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL) == 0)) { + + DEBUG(3, ("Server did not offer schannel\n")); + cli_nt_session_close(cli); + return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + } + + if ((lp_client_schannel() == False) || + ((neg_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL) == 0)) { + return NT_STATUS_OK; + + /* keep the existing connection to NETLOGON open */ + + } + + /* Server offered schannel, so try it. */ + + memcpy(cli->auth_info.sess_key, cli->sess_key, + sizeof(cli->auth_info.sess_key)); + + cli->saved_netlogon_pipe_fnum = cli->nt_pipe_fnum; + + cli->pipe_auth_flags = AUTH_PIPE_NETSEC; + cli->pipe_auth_flags |= AUTH_PIPE_SIGN; + cli->pipe_auth_flags |= AUTH_PIPE_SEAL; + + if (cli->capabilities & CAP_NT_SMBS) { + + /* The secure channel connection must be opened on the same + session (TCP connection) as the one the challenge was + requested from. */ + if ((fnum = cli_nt_create(cli, PIPE_NETLOGON_PLAIN, + DESIRED_ACCESS_PIPE)) == -1) { + DEBUG(0,("cli_nt_create failed to %s machine %s. " + "Error was %s\n", + PIPE_NETLOGON, cli->desthost, + cli_errstr(cli))); + return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + } + + cli->nt_pipe_fnum = (uint16)fnum; + } else { + if ((fnum = cli_open(cli, PIPE_NETLOGON, + O_CREAT|O_RDWR, DENY_NONE)) == -1) { + DEBUG(0,("cli_open failed on pipe %s to machine %s. " + "Error was %s\n", + PIPE_NETLOGON, cli->desthost, + cli_errstr(cli))); + return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + } + + cli->nt_pipe_fnum = (uint16)fnum; + + /**************** Set Named Pipe State ***************/ + if (!rpc_pipe_set_hnd_state(cli, PIPE_NETLOGON, 0x4300)) { + DEBUG(0,("Pipe hnd state failed. Error was %s\n", + cli_errstr(cli))); + cli_close(cli, cli->nt_pipe_fnum); + return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + } + } + + if (!rpc_pipe_bind(cli, PI_NETLOGON, global_myname())) { + DEBUG(2,("rpc bind to %s failed\n", PIPE_NETLOGON)); + cli_close(cli, cli->nt_pipe_fnum); + return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + } + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + + +NTSTATUS cli_nt_setup_netsec(struct cli_state *cli, int sec_chan, int auth_flags, + const uchar trust_password[16]) +{ + NTSTATUS result; + uint32 neg_flags = NETLOGON_NEG_AUTH2_FLAGS; + cli->pipe_auth_flags = 0; + + if (lp_client_schannel() == False) { + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + if (!cli_nt_session_open(cli, PI_NETLOGON)) { + DEBUG(0, ("Could not initialise %s\n", + get_pipe_name_from_index(PI_NETLOGON))); + return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + } + + if (lp_client_schannel() != False) + neg_flags |= NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL; + + neg_flags |= NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL; + + result = cli_nt_setup_creds(cli, sec_chan, trust_password, + &neg_flags, 2); + + if (!(neg_flags & NETLOGON_NEG_SCHANNEL) + && lp_client_schannel() == True) { + DEBUG(1, ("Could not negotiate SCHANNEL with the DC!\n")); + result = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL; + } + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) { + ZERO_STRUCT(cli->auth_info.sess_key); + ZERO_STRUCT(cli->sess_key); + cli->pipe_auth_flags = 0; + cli_nt_session_close(cli); + return result; + } + + memcpy(cli->auth_info.sess_key, cli->sess_key, + sizeof(cli->auth_info.sess_key)); + + cli->saved_netlogon_pipe_fnum = cli->nt_pipe_fnum; + cli->nt_pipe_fnum = 0; + + /* doing schannel, not per-user auth */ + cli->pipe_auth_flags = auth_flags; + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} + +const char *cli_pipe_get_name(struct cli_state *cli) +{ + return cli->pipe_name; +} + + |