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diff --git a/docs/textdocs/cifsntdomain.txt b/docs/textdocs/cifsntdomain.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..91d032b1695 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/textdocs/cifsntdomain.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1501 @@ +!== +!== cifsntdomain.txt for Samba release 2.2.0-alpha3 24 Mar 2001 +!== +NT Domain Authentication +------------------------ + +Authors: - Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton (lkcl@switchboard.net) +-------- - Paul Ashton (paul@argo.demon.co.uk) + - Duncan Stansfield (duncans@sco.com) + + Copyright (C) 1997 Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton + Copyright (C) 1997 Paul Ashton + Copyright (C) 1997 Duncan Stansfield + +Version: 0.024 (01Nov97) +-------- + +Distribution: Unlimited and encouraged, for the purposes of implementation +------------- and comments. Feedback welcomed by the authors. + +Liability: Absolutely none accepted implicitly or explicitly, direct +---------- or consequentially, for use, abuse, misuse, lack of use, + misunderstandings, mistakes, omissions, mis-information for + anything in or not in, related to or not related to, or + pertaining to this document, or anything else that a lawyer + can think of or not think of. + +Warning: Please bear in mind that an incorrect implementation of this +-------- protocol can cause NT workstation to fail irrevocably, for + which the authors accept no liability (see above). Please + contact your vendor if you have any problems. + +Sources: - Packet Traces from Netmonitor (Service Pack 1 and above) +-------- - Paul Ashton and Luke Leighton's other "NT Domain" doc. + - CIFS documentation - cifs6.txt + - CIFS documentation - cifsrap2.txt + +Original: http://mailhost.cb1.com/~lkcl/cifsntdomain.txt. +--------- (Controlled copy maintained by lkcl@switchboard.net) + +Credits: - Paul Ashton: loads of work with Net Monitor; +-------- understanding the NT authentication system; + reference implementation of the NT domain support on which + this document is originally based. + - Duncan Stansfield: low-level analysis of MSRPC Pipes. + - Linus Nordberg: producing c-code from Paul's crypto spec. + - Windows Sourcer development team + + +Contents: +--------- + + 1) Introduction + + 2) Structures and notes + + 2.1) Notes + 2.3) Enumerations + 2.3) Structures + + 3) Transact Named Pipe Header/Tail + + 3.1) MSRPC Pipes + 3.2) Header + 3.3) Tail + + 4) NTLSA Transact Named Pipe + + 4.1) LSA Open Policy + 4.2) LSA Query Info Policy + 4.3) LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains + 4.4) LSA Open Secret + 4.5) LSA Close + 4.6) LSA Lookup SIDS + 4.7) LSA Lookup Names + + 5) NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe + + 5.1) LSA Request Challenge + 5.2) LSA Authenticate 2 + 5.3) LSA Server Password Set + 5.4) LSA SAM Logon + 5.5) LSA SAM Logoff + + 6) \\MAILSLOT\NET\NTLOGON + + 6.1) Query for PDC + 6.2) SAM Logon + + 7) SRVSVC Transact Named Pipe + + 7.1) Net Share Enum + 7.2) Net Server Get Info + + +Appendix: +--------- + + A1) Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication + + A1.1) Definitions + A1.2) Protocol + A1.3) Comments + + A2) SIDs and RIDs + + A2.1) Well-known SIDs + + A2.1.1) Universal well-known SIDs + A2.1.2) NT well-known SIDs + + A2.2) Well-known RIDS + + A2.2.1) Well-known RID users + A2.2.2) Well-known RID groups + A2.2.3) Well-known RID aliases + + + +1) Introduction +--------------- + + +This document contains information to provide an NT workstation with login +services, without the need for an NT server. + +It should be possible to select a domain instead of a workgroup (in the NT +workstation's TCP/IP settings) and after the obligatory reboot, type in a +username, password, select a domain and successfully log in. I would +appreciate any feedback on your experiences with this process, and any +comments, corrections and additions to this document. + + +The packets described here can be easily derived from (and are probably +better understood using) Netmon.exe. You will need to use the version +of Netmon that matches your system, in order to correctly decode the +NETLOGON, lsarpc and srvsvc Transact pipes. This document is derived from +NT Service Pack 1 and its corresponding version of Netmon. It is intended +that an annotated packet trace be produced, which will likely be more +instructive than this document. + +Also needed, to fully implement NT Domain Login Services, is the +document describing the cryptographic part of the NT authentication. +This document is available from comp.protocols.smb; from the ntsecurity.net +digest and from the samba digest, amongst other sources. + +A copy is available from: + +http://ntbugtraq.rc.on.ca/SCRIPTS/WA.EXE?A2=ind9708&L=ntbugtraq&O=A&P=2935 +http://mailhost.cb1.com/~lkcl/crypt.html + + +A c-code implementation, provided by Linus Nordberg <linus@incolumitas.se> +of this protocol is available from: + +http://samba.org/cgi-bin/mfs/01/digest/1997/97aug/0391.html +http://mailhost.cb1.com/~lkcl/crypt.txt + + +Also used to provide debugging information is the Check Build version of +NT workstation, and enabling full debugging in NETLOGON. This is +achieved by setting the following REG_SZ registry key to 0x1ffffff: + +HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters + +- Incorrect direct editing of the registry can cause your machine to fail. + Then again, so can incorrect implementation of this protocol. + See "Liability:" above. + + +Bear in mind that each packet over-the-wire will have its origin in an +API call. Therefore, there are likely to be structures, enumerations +and defines that are usefully documented elsewhere. + + +This document is by no means complete or authoritative. Missing sections +include, but are not limited to: + +- the meaning (and use by NT) of SIDs and RIDs. + +- mappings of RIDs to usernames (and vice-versa). + +- what a User ID is and what a Group ID is. + +- the exact meaning/definition of various magic constants or enumerations. + +- the reply error code and use of that error code when a workstation + becomes a member of a domain (to be described later). Failure to + return this error code will make the workstation report that it is + already a member of the domain. + +- the cryptographic side of the NetrServerPasswordSet command, which would + allow the workstation to change its password. This password is used to + generate the long-term session key. [It is possible to reject this + command, and keep the default workstation password]. + + +2) Notes and Structures +----------------------- + + +2.1) Notes +---------- + +- In the SMB Transact pipes, some "Structures", described here, appear to be + 4-byte aligned with the SMB header, at their start. Exactly which + "Structures" need aligning is not precisely known or documented. + +- In the UDP NTLOGON Mailslots, some "Structures", described here, appear to be + 2-byte aligned with the start of the mailslot, at their start. + +- Domain SID is of the format S-revision-version-auth1-auth2...authN. + e.g S-1-5-123-456-789-123-456. the 5 could be a sub-revision. + +- any undocumented buffer pointers must be non-zero if the string buffer it + refers to contains characters. exactly what value they should be is unknown. + 0x0000 0002 seems to do the trick to indicate that the buffer exists. a + NULL buffer pointer indicates that the string buffer is of zero length. + If the buffer pointer is NULL, then it is suspected that the structure it + refers to is NOT put into (or taken out of) the SMB data stream. This is + empirically derived from, for example, the LSA SAM Logon response packet, + where if the buffer pointer is NULL, the user information is not inserted + into the data stream. Exactly what happens with an array of buffer pointers + is not known, although an educated guess can be made. + +- an array of structures (a container) appears to have a count and a pointer. + if the count is zero, the pointer is also zero. no further data is put + into or taken out of the SMB data stream. if the count is non-zero, then + the pointer is also non-zero. immediately following the pointer is the + count again, followed by an array of container sub-structures. the count + appears a third time after the last sub-structure. + + +2.2) Enumerations +----------------- + +- MSRPC Header type. command number in the msrpc packet header + + MSRPC_Request: 0x00 + MSRPC_Response: 0x02 + MSRPC_Bind: 0x0B + MSRPC_BindAck: 0x0C + +- MSRPC Packet info. the meaning of these flags is undocumented + + FirstFrag: 0x01 + LastFrag: 0x02 + NotaFrag: 0x04 + RecRespond: 0x08 + NoMultiplex: 0x10 + NotForIdemp: 0x20 + NotforBcast: 0x40 + NoUuid: 0x80 + + +2.3) Structures +--------------- + +- sizeof VOID* is 32 bits. + +- sizeof char is 8 bits. + +- UTIME is 32 bits, indicating time in seconds since 01jan1970. documented + in cifs6.txt (section 3.5 page, page 30). + +- NTTIME is 64 bits. documented in cifs6.txt (section 3.5 page, page 30). + +- DOM_SID (domain SID structure) : + + UINT32 num of sub-authorities in domain SID + UINT8 SID revision number + UINT8 num of sub-authorities in domain SID + UINT8[6] 6 bytes for domain SID - Identifier Authority. + UINT16[n_subauths] domain SID sub-authorities + + Note: the domain SID is documented elsewhere. + +- STR (string) : + + char[] null-terminated string of ascii characters. + +- UNIHDR (unicode string header) : + + UINT16 length of unicode string + UINT16 max length of unicode string + UINT32 4 - undocumented. + +- UNIHDR2 (unicode string header plus buffer pointer) : + + UNIHDR unicode string header + VOID* undocumented buffer pointer + +- UNISTR (unicode string) : + + UINT16[] null-terminated string of unicode characters. + +- NAME (length-indicated unicode string) : + + UINT32 length of unicode string + UINT16[] null-terminated string of unicode characters. + +- UNISTR2 (aligned unicode string) : + + UINT8[] padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned + with the start of the SMB header. + UINT32 max length of unicode string + UINT32 0 - undocumented + UINT32 length of unicode string + UINT16[] string of uncode characters. + +- OBJ_ATTR (object attributes) : + + UINT32 0x18 - length (in bytes) including the length field. + VOID* 0 - root directory (pointer) + VOID* 0 - object name (pointer) + UINT32 0 - attributes (undocumented) + VOID* 0 - security descriptior (pointer) + UINT32 0 - security quality of service + +- POL_HND (LSA policy handle) : + + char[20] policy handle + +- DOM_SID2 (domain SID structure, SIDS stored in unicode) : + + UINT32 5 - SID type + UINT32 0 - undocumented + UNIHDR2 domain SID unicode string header + UNISTR domain SID unicode string + + Note: there is a conflict between the unicode string header and the + unicode string itself as to which to use to indicate string + length. this will need to be resolved. + + Note: the SID type indicates, for example, an alias; a well-known group etc. + this is documented somewhere. + +- DOM_RID (domain RID structure) : + + UINT32 5 - well-known SID. 1 - user SID (see ShowACLs) + UINT32 5 - undocumented + UINT32 domain RID + UINT32 0 - domain index out of above reference domains + + +- LOG_INFO (server, account, client structure) : + + Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case. + + Note: account name is the logon client name from the LSA Request Challenge, + with a $ on the end of it, in upper case. + + VOID* undocumented buffer pointer + UNISTR2 logon server unicode string + UNISTR2 account name unicode string + UINT16 sec_chan - security channel type + UNISTR2 logon client machine unicode string + +- CLNT_SRV (server, client names structure) : + + Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case. + + VOID* undocumented buffer pointer + UNISTR2 logon server unicode string + VOID* undocumented buffer pointer + UNISTR2 logon client machine unicode string + +- CREDS (credentials + time stamp) + + char[8] credentials + UTIME time stamp + +- CLNT_INFO2 (server, client structure, client credentials) : + + Note: whenever this structure appears in a request, you must take a copy + of the client-calculated credentials received, because they will be + used in subsequent credential checks. the presumed intention is to + maintain an authenticated request/response trail. + + CLNT_SRV client and server names + UINT8[] ???? padding, for 4-byte alignment with SMB header. + VOID* pointer to client credentials. + CREDS client-calculated credentials + client time + +- CLNT_INFO (server, account, client structure, client credentials) : + + Note: whenever this structure appears in a request, you must take a copy + of the client-calculated credentials received, because they will be + used in subsequent credential checks. the presumed intention is to + maintain an authenticated request/response trail. + + LOG_INFO logon account info + CREDS client-calculated credentials + client time + +- ID_INFO_1 (id info structure, auth level 1) : + + VOID* ptr_id_info_1 + UNIHDR domain name unicode header + UINT32 param control + UINT64 logon ID + UNIHDR user name unicode header + UNIHDR workgroup name unicode header + char[16] arc4 LM OWF Password + char[16] arc4 NT OWF Password + UNISTR2 domain name unicode string + UNISTR2 user name unicode string + UNISTR2 workstation name unicode string + +- SAM_INFO (sam logon/logoff id info structure) : + + Note: presumably, the return credentials is supposedly for the server to + verify that the credential chain hasn't been compromised. + + CLNT_INFO2 client identification/authentication info + VOID* pointer to return credentials. + CRED return credentials - ignored. + UINT16 logon level + UINT16 switch value + + switch (switch_value) + case 1: + { + ID_INFO_1 id_info_1; + } + +- GID (group id info) : + + UINT32 group id + UINT32 user attributes (only used by NT 3.1 and 3.51) + +- DOM_REF (domain reference info) : + + VOID* undocumented buffer pointer. + UINT32 num referenced domains? + VOID* undocumented domain name buffer pointer. + UINT32 32 - max number of entries + UINT32 4 - num referenced domains? + + UNIHDR2 domain name unicode string header + UNIHDR2[num_ref_doms-1] referenced domain unicode string headers + + UNISTR domain name unicode string + DOM_SID[num_ref_doms] referenced domain SIDs + +- DOM_INFO (domain info, levels 3 and 5 are the same)) : + + UINT8[] ??? padding to get 4-byte alignment with start of SMB header + UINT16 domain name string length * 2 + UINT16 domain name string length * 2 + VOID* undocumented domain name string buffer pointer + VOID* undocumented domain SID string buffer pointer + UNISTR2 domain name (unicode string) + DOM_SID domain SID + +- USER_INFO (user logon info) : + + Note: it would be nice to know what the 16 byte user session key is for. + + NTTIME logon time + NTTIME logoff time + NTTIME kickoff time + NTTIME password last set time + NTTIME password can change time + NTTIME password must change time + + UNIHDR username unicode string header + UNIHDR user's full name unicode string header + UNIHDR logon script unicode string header + UNIHDR profile path unicode string header + UNIHDR home directory unicode string header + UNIHDR home directory drive unicode string header + + UINT16 logon count + UINT16 bad password count + + UINT32 User ID + UINT32 Group ID + UINT32 num groups + VOID* undocumented buffer pointer to groups. + + UINT32 user flags + char[16] user session key + + UNIHDR logon server unicode string header + UNIHDR logon domain unicode string header + VOID* undocumented logon domain id pointer + char[40] 40 undocumented padding bytes. future expansion? + + UINT32 0 - num_other_sids? + VOID* NULL - undocumented pointer to other domain SIDs. + + UNISTR2 username unicode string + UNISTR2 user's full name unicode string + UNISTR2 logon script unicode string + UNISTR2 profile path unicode string + UNISTR2 home directory unicode string + UNISTR2 home directory drive unicode string + + UINT32 num groups + GID[num_groups] group info + + UNISTR2 logon server unicode string + UNISTR2 logon domain unicode string + + DOM_SID domain SID + DOM_SID[num_sids] other domain SIDs? + +- SH_INFO_1_PTR (pointers to level 1 share info strings): + +Note: see cifsrap2.txt section5, page 10. + + 0 for shi1_type indicates a Disk. + 1 for shi1_type indicates a Print Queue. + 2 for shi1_type indicates a Device. + 3 for shi1_type indicates an IPC pipe. + 0x8000 0000 (top bit set in shi1_type) indicates a hidden share. + + VOID* shi1_netname - pointer to net name + UINT32 shi1_type - type of share. 0 - undocumented. + VOID* shi1_remark - pointer to comment. + +- SH_INFO_1_STR (level 1 share info strings) : + + UNISTR2 shi1_netname - unicode string of net name + UNISTR2 shi1_remark - unicode string of comment. + +- SHARE_INFO_1_CTR : + + share container with 0 entries: + + UINT32 0 - EntriesRead + UINT32 0 - Buffer + + share container with > 0 entries: + + UINT32 EntriesRead + UINT32 non-zero - Buffer + UINT32 EntriesRead + + SH_INFO_1_PTR[EntriesRead] share entry pointers + SH_INFO_1_STR[EntriesRead] share entry strings + + UINT8[] padding to get unicode string 4-byte + aligned with start of the SMB header. + UINT32 EntriesRead + UINT32 0 - padding + +- SERVER_INFO_101 : + +Note: see cifs6.txt section 6.4 - the fields described therein will be + of assistance here. for example, the type listed below is the + same as fServerType, which is described in 6.4.1. + + SV_TYPE_WORKSTATION 0x00000001 All workstations + SV_TYPE_SERVER 0x00000002 All servers + SV_TYPE_SQLSERVER 0x00000004 Any server running with SQL + server + SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_CTRL 0x00000008 Primary domain controller + SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_BAKCTRL 0x00000010 Backup domain controller + SV_TYPE_TIME_SOURCE 0x00000020 Server running the timesource + service + SV_TYPE_AFP 0x00000040 Apple File Protocol servers + SV_TYPE_NOVELL 0x00000080 Novell servers + SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_MEMBER 0x00000100 Domain Member + SV_TYPE_PRINTQ_SERVER 0x00000200 Server sharing print queue + SV_TYPE_DIALIN_SERVER 0x00000400 Server running dialin service. + SV_TYPE_XENIX_SERVER 0x00000800 Xenix server + SV_TYPE_NT 0x00001000 NT server + SV_TYPE_WFW 0x00002000 Server running Windows for + + SV_TYPE_SERVER_NT 0x00008000 Windows NT non DC server + SV_TYPE_POTENTIAL_BROWSER 0x00010000 Server that can run the browser + service + SV_TYPE_BACKUP_BROWSER 0x00020000 Backup browser server + SV_TYPE_MASTER_BROWSER 0x00040000 Master browser server + SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_MASTER 0x00080000 Domain Master Browser server + SV_TYPE_LOCAL_LIST_ONLY 0x40000000 Enumerate only entries marked + "local" + SV_TYPE_DOMAIN_ENUM 0x80000000 Enumerate Domains. The pszServer + and pszDomain parameters must be + NULL. + + UINT32 500 - platform_id + VOID* pointer to name + UINT32 5 - major version + UINT32 4 - minor version + UINT32 type (SV_TYPE_... bit field) + VOID* pointer to comment + + UNISTR2 sv101_name - unicode string of server name + UNISTR2 sv_101_comment - unicode string of server comment. + + UINT8[] padding to get unicode string 4-byte + aligned with start of the SMB header. + + + +3) MSRPC over Transact Named Pipe +--------------------------------- + +For details on the SMB Transact Named Pipe, see cifs6.txt + + +3.1) MSRPC Pipes +---------------- + +The MSRPC is conducted over an SMB Transact Pipe with a name of "\PIPE\". +You must first obtain a 16 bit file handle, by sending a SMBopenX with the +pipe name "\PIPE\srvsvc" for example. You can then perform an SMB Trans, +and must carry out an SMBclose on the file handle once you are finished. + +Trans Requests must be sent with two setup UINT16s, no UINT16 params (none +known about), and UINT8 data parameters sufficient to contain the MSRPC +header, and MSRPC data. The first UINT16 setup parameter must be either +0x0026 to indicate an RPC, or 0x0001 to indicate Set Named Pipe Handle +state. The second UINT16 parameter must be the file handle for the pipe, +obtained above. + +The Data section for an API Command of 0x0026 (RPC pipe) in the Trans +Request is the RPC Header, followed by the RPC Data. The Data section for +an API Command of 0x0001 (Set Named Pipe Handle state) is two bytes. The +only value seen for these two bytes is 0x00 0x43. + + +MSRPC Responses are sent as response data inside standard SMB Trans +responses, with the MSRPC Header, MSRPC Data and MSRPC tail. + + +It is suspected that the Trans Requests will need to be at least 2-byte +aligned (probably 4-byte). This is standard practice for SMBs. It is also +independent of the observed 4-byte alignments with the start of the MSRPC +header, including the 4-byte alignment between the MSRPC header and the +MSRPC data. + + +First, an SMBtconX connection is made to the IPC$ share. The connection +must be made using encrypted passwords, not clear-text. Then, an SMBopenX +is made on the pipe. Then, a Set Named Pipe Handle State must be sent, +after which the pipe is ready to accept API commands. Lastly, and SMBclose +is sent. + + +To be resolved: + + lkcl/01nov97 there appear to be two additional bytes after the null- + terminated \PIPE\ name for the RPC pipe. Values seen so far are + listed below: + + initial SMBopenX request: RPC API command 0x26 params: + + "\\PIPE\\lsarpc" 0x65 0x63; 0x72 0x70; 0x44 0x65; + "\\PIPE\\srvsvc" 0x73 0x76; 0x4E 0x00; 0x5C 0x43; + + +3.2) Header +----------- + +[section to be rewritten, following receipt of work by Duncan Stansfield] + + +Interesting note: if you set packed data representation to 0x0100 0000 +then all 4-byte and 2-byte word ordering is turned around! + +The start of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes begins with: + +00 UINT8 5 - RPC major version +01 UINT8 0 - RPC minor version +02 UINT8 2 - RPC response packet +03 UINT8 3 - (FirstFrag bit-wise or with LastFrag) +04 UINT32 0x1000 0000 - packed data representation +08 UINT16 fragment length - data size (bytes) inc header and tail. +0A UINT16 0 - authentication length +0C UINT32 call identifier. matches 12th UINT32 of incoming RPC data. +10 UINT32 allocation hint - data size (bytes) minus header and tail. +14 UINT16 0 - presentation context identifier +16 UINT8 0 - cancel count +17 UINT8 in replies: 0 - reserved; in requests: opnum - see #defines. +18 ...... start of data (goes on for allocation_hint bytes) + + +RPC_Packet for request, response, bind and bind acknowledgement. +{ + + UINT8 versionmaj # reply same as request (0x05) + UINT8 versionmin # reply same as request (0x00) + UINT8 type # one of the MSRPC_Type enums + UINT8 flags # reply same as request (0x00 for Bind, 0x03 for Request) + UINT32 representation # reply same as request (0x00000010) + UINT16 fraglength # the length of the data section of the SMB trans packet + UINT16 authlength + UINT32 callid # call identifier. (e.g. 0x00149594) + + * stub USE TvPacket # the remainder of the packet depending on the "type" +} + + +# the interfaces are numbered. as yet I haven't seen more than one interface +# used on the same pipe name +# srvsvc +# abstract (0x4B324FC8, 0x01D31670, 0x475A7812, 0x88E16EBF, 0x00000003) +# transfer (0x8A885D04, 0x11C91CEB, 0x0008E89F, 0x6048102B, 0x00000002) +RPC_Iface RW +{ + UINT8 byte[16] # 16 bytes of number + UINT32 version # the interface number +} + + +# the remainder of the packet after the header if "type" was Bind +# in the response header, "type" should be BindAck +RPC_ReqBind RW +{ + UINT16 maxtsize # maximum transmission fragment size (0x1630) + UINT16 maxrsize # max receive fragment size (0x1630) + UINT32 assocgid # associated group id (0x0) + UINT32 numelements # the number of elements (0x1) + UINT16 contextid # presentation context identifier (0x0) + UINT8 numsyntaxes # the number of syntaxes (has always been 1?)(0x1) + UINT8[] # 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header + + * abstractint USE RPC_Iface # num and vers. of interface client is using + * transferint USE RPC_Iface # num and vers. of interface to use for replies +} + + +RPC_Address RW +{ + UINT16 length # length of the string including null terminator + * port USE string # the string above in single byte, null terminated form +} + + +# the response to place after the header in the reply packet +RPC_ResBind RW +{ + UINT16 maxtsize # same as request + UINT16 maxrsize # same as request + UINT32 assocgid # zero + + * secondaddr USE RPC_Address # the address string, as described earlier + + UINT8[] # 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header + + UINT8 numresults # the number of results (0x01) + + UINT8[] # 4-byte alignment padding, against SMB header + UINT16 result # result (0x00 = accept) + UINT16 reason # reason (0x00 = no reason specified) + + * transfersyntax USE RPC_Iface # the transfer syntax from the request +} + + +# the remainder of the packet after the header for every other other +# request +RPC_ReqNorm RW +{ + UINT32 allochint # the size of the stub data in bytes + UINT16 prescontext # presentation context identifier (0x0) + UINT16 opnum # operation number (0x15) + + * stub USE TvPacket # a packet dependent on the pipe name + # (probably the interface) and the op number) +} + + +# response to a request +RPC_ResNorm RW +{ + UINT32 allochint # size of the stub data in bytes + UINT16 prescontext # presentation context identifier (same as request) + UINT8 cancelcount # cancel count? (0x0) + UINT8 reserved # 0 - one byte padding + + * stub USE TvPacket # the remainder of the reply +} + + +3.3) Tail +--------- + +The end of each of the NTLSA and NETLOGON named pipes ends with: + + ...... end of data + UINT32 return code + + + +3.4 RPC Bind / Bind Ack +----------------------- + +RPC Binds are the process of associating an RPC pipe (e.g \PIPE\lsarpc) +with a "transfer syntax" (see RPC_Iface structure). The purpose for doing +this is unknown. + +Note: The RPC_ResBind SMB Transact request is sent with two uint16 setup + parameters. The first is 0x0026; the second is the file handle + returned by the SMBopenX Transact response. + +Note: The RPC_ResBind members maxtsize, maxrsize and assocgid are the + same in the response as the same members in the RPC_ReqBind. The + RPC_ResBind member transfersyntax is the same in the response as + the + +Note: The RPC_ResBind response member secondaddr contains the name + of what is presumed to be the service behind the RPC pipe. The + mapping identified so far is: + + initial SMBopenX request: RPC_ResBind response: + + "\\PIPE\\srvsvc" "\\PIPE\\ntsvcs" + "\\PIPE\\samr" "\\PIPE\\lsass" + "\\PIPE\\lsarpc" "\\PIPE\\lsass" + "\\PIPE\\wkssvc" "\\PIPE\\wksvcs" + "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON" "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON" + +Note: The RPC_Packet fraglength member in both the Bind Request and Bind + Acknowledgment must contain the length of the entire RPC data, + including the RPC_Packet header. + +Request: + + RPC_Packet + RPC_ReqBind + +Response: + + RPC_Packet + RPC_ResBind + + + +4) NTLSA Transact Named Pipe +---------------------------- + +The sequence of actions taken on this pipe are: + +- Establish a connection to the IPC$ share (SMBtconX). use encrypted passwords. +- Open an RPC Pipe with the name "\\PIPE\\lsarpc". Store the file handle. +- Using the file handle, send a Set Named Pipe Handle state to 0x4300. +- Send an LSA Open Policy request. Store the Policy Handle. +- Using the Policy Handle, send LSA Query Info Policy requests, etc. +- Using the Policy Handle, send an LSA Close. +- Close the IPC$ share. + + +Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are: + +- LSA Open Policy: 0x2c +- LSA Query Info Policy: 0x07 +- LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains: 0x0d +- LSA Open Secret: 0xff +- LSA Lookup SIDs: 0xfe +- LSA Lookup Names: 0xfd +- LSA Close: 0x00 + + +4.1) LSA Open Policy +-------------------- + +Note: The policy handle can be anything you like. + +Request: + + VOID* buffer pointer + UNISTR2 server name - unicode string starting with two '\'s + OBJ_ATTR object attributes + UINT32 1 - desired access + +Response: + + POL_HND LSA policy handle + + return 0 - indicates success + + +4.2) LSA Query Info Policy +-------------------------- + +Note: The info class in response must be the same as that in the request. + +Request: + + POL_HND LSA policy handle + UINT16 info class (also a policy handle?) + +Response: + + VOID* undocumented buffer pointer + UINT16 info class (same as info class in request). + + switch (info class) + case 3: + case 5: + { + DOM_INFO domain info, levels 3 and 5 (are the same). + } + + return 0 - indicates success + + +4.3) LSA Enumerate Trusted Domains +---------------------------------- + +Request: + + no extra data + +Response: + + UINT32 0 - enumeration context + UINT32 0 - entries read + UINT32 0 - trust information + + return 0x8000 001a - "no trusted domains" success code + + +4.4) LSA Open Secret +-------------------- + +Request: + + no extra data + +Response: + + UINT32 0 - undocumented + UINT32 0 - undocumented + UINT32 0 - undocumented + UINT32 0 - undocumented + UINT32 0 - undocumented + + return 0x0C00 0034 - "no such secret" success code + + +4.5) LSA Close +-------------- + +Request: + + POL_HND policy handle to be closed + +Response: + + POL_HND 0s - closed policy handle (all zeros) + + return 0 - indicates success + + +4.6) LSA Lookup SIDS +-------------------- + +Note: num_entries in response must be same as num_entries in request. + +Request: + + POL_HND LSA policy handle + UINT32 num_entries + VOID* undocumented domain SID buffer pointer + VOID* undocumented domain name buffer pointer + VOID*[num_entries] undocumented domain SID pointers to be looked up. + DOM_SID[num_entries] domain SIDs to be looked up. + char[16] completely undocumented 16 bytes. + +Response: + + DOM_REF domain reference response + + UINT32 num_entries (listed above) + VOID* undocumented buffer pointer + + UINT32 num_entries (listed above) + DOM_SID2[num_entries] domain SIDs (from Request, listed above). + + UINT32 num_entries (listed above) + + return 0 - indicates success + + +4.7) LSA Lookup Names +--------------------- + +Note: num_entries in response must be same as num_entries in request. + +Request: + + POL_HND LSA policy handle + UINT32 num_entries + UINT32 num_entries + VOID* undocumented domain SID buffer pointer + VOID* undocumented domain name buffer pointer + NAME[num_entries] names to be looked up. + char[] undocumented bytes - falsely translated SID structure? + +Response: + + DOM_REF domain reference response + + UINT32 num_entries (listed above) + VOID* undocumented buffer pointer + + UINT32 num_entries (listed above) + DOM_RID[num_entries] domain SIDs (from Request, listed above). + + UINT32 num_entries (listed above) + + return 0 - indicates success + + + +5) NETLOGON rpc Transact Named Pipe +----------------------------------- + +The sequence of actions taken on this pipe are: + +- Establish a connection to the IPC$ share (SMBtconX). use encrypted passwords. +- Open an RPC Pipe with the name "\\PIPE\\NETLOGON". Store the file handle. +- Using the file handle, send a Set Named Pipe Handle state to 0x4300. +- Create Client Challenge. Send LSA Request Challenge. Store Server Challenge. +- Calculate Session Key. Send an LSA Auth 2 Challenge. Store Auth2 Challenge. +- Calc/Verify Client Creds. Send LSA Srv PW Set. Calc/Verify Server Creds. +- Calc/Verify Client Creds. Send LSA SAM Logon . Calc/Verify Server Creds. +- Calc/Verify Client Creds. Send LSA SAM Logoff. Calc/Verify Server Creds. +- Close the IPC$ share. + + +Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are: + +- LSA Request Challenge: 0x04 +- LSA Server Password Set: 0x06 +- LSA SAM Logon: 0x02 +- LSA SAM Logoff: 0x03 +- LSA Auth 2: 0x0f +- LSA Logon Control: 0x0e + + +5.1) LSA Request Challenge +-------------------------- + +Note: logon server name starts with two '\' characters and is upper case. + +Note: logon client is the machine, not the user. + +Note: the initial LanManager password hash, against which the challenge + is issued, is the machine name itself (lower case). there will be + calls issued (LSA Server Password Set) which will change this, later. + refusing these calls allows you to always deal with the same password + (i.e the LM# of the machine name in lower case). + +Request: + + VOID* undocumented buffer pointer + UNISTR2 logon server unicode string + UNISTR2 logon client unicode string + char[8] client challenge + +Response: + + char[8] server challenge + + return 0 - indicates success + + + +5.2) LSA Authenticate 2 +----------------------- + +Note: in between request and response, calculate the client credentials, + and check them against the client-calculated credentials (this + process uses the previously received client credentials). + +Note: neg_flags in the response is the same as that in the request. + +Note: you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received + here, because they will be used in subsequent authentication packets. + +Request: + + LOG_INFO client identification info + + char[8] client-calculated credentials + UINT8[] padding to 4-byte align with start of SMB header. + UINT32 neg_flags - negotiated flags (usual value is 0x0000 01ff) + +Response: + + char[8] server credentials. + UINT32 neg_flags - same as neg_flags in request. + + return 0 - indicates success. failure value unknown. + + +5.3) LSA Server Password Set +---------------------------- + +Note: the new password is suspected to be a DES encryption using the old + password to generate the key. + +Note: in between request and response, calculate the client credentials, + and check them against the client-calculated credentials (this + process uses the previously received client credentials). + +Note: the server credentials are constructed from the client-calculated + credentials and the client time + 1 second. + +Note: you must take a copy of the client-calculated credentials received + here, because they will be used in subsequent authentication packets. + +Request: + + CLNT_INFO client identification/authentication info + char[] new password - undocumented. + +Response: + + CREDS server credentials. server time stamp appears to be ignored. + + return 0 - indicates success; 0xC000 006a indicates failure + + +5.4) LSA SAM Logon +------------------ + +Note: valid_user is True iff the username and password hash are valid for + the requested domain. + +Request: + + SAM_INFO sam_id structure + +Response: + + VOID* undocumented buffer pointer + CREDS server credentials. server time stamp appears to be ignored. + + if (valid_user) + { + UINT16 3 - switch value indicating USER_INFO structure. + VOID* non-zero - pointer to USER_INFO structure + USER_INFO user logon information + + UINT32 1 - Authoritative response; 0 - Non-Auth? + + return 0 - indicates success + } + else + { + UINT16 0 - switch value. value to indicate no user presumed. + VOID* 0x0000 0000 - indicates no USER_INFO structure. + + UINT32 1 - Authoritative response; 0 - Non-Auth? + + return 0xC000 0064 - NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER. + } + + +5.5) LSA SAM Logoff +-------------------- + +Note: presumably, the SAM_INFO structure is validated, and a (currently + undocumented) error code returned if the Logoff is invalid. + +Request: + + SAM_INFO sam_id structure + +Response: + + VOID* undocumented buffer pointer + CREDS server credentials. server time stamp appears to be ignored. + + return 0 - indicates success. undocumented failure indication. + + +6) \\MAILSLOT\NET\NTLOGON +------------------------- + +Note: mailslots will contain a response mailslot, to which the response + should be sent. the target NetBIOS name is REQUEST_NAME<20>, where + REQUEST_NAME is the name of the machine that sent the request. + + +6.1) Query for PDC +------------------ + +Note: NTversion, LMNTtoken, LM20token in response are the same as those + given in the request. + +Request: + + UINT16 0x0007 - Query for PDC + STR machine name + STR response mailslot + UINT8[] padding to 2-byte align with start of mailslot. + UNISTR machine name + UINT32 NTversion + UINT16 LMNTtoken + UINT16 LM20token + +Response: + + UINT16 0x000A - Respose to Query for PDC + STR machine name (in uppercase) + UINT8[] padding to 2-byte align with start of mailslot. + UNISTR machine name + UNISTR domain name + UINT32 NTversion (same as received in request) + UINT16 LMNTtoken (same as received in request) + UINT16 LM20token (same as received in request) + + +6.2) SAM Logon +-------------- + +Note: machine name in response is preceded by two '\' characters. + +Note: NTversion, LMNTtoken, LM20token in response are the same as those + given in the request. + +Note: user name in the response is presumably the same as that in the request. + +Request: + + UINT16 0x0012 - SAM Logon + UINT16 request count + UNISTR machine name + UNISTR user name + STR response mailslot + UINT32 alloweable account + UINT32 domain SID size + char[sid_size] domain SID, of sid_size bytes. + UINT8[] ???? padding to 4? 2? -byte align with start of mailslot. + UINT32 NTversion + UINT16 LMNTtoken + UINT16 LM20token + +Response: + + UINT16 0x0013 - Response to SAM Logon + UNISTR machine name + UNISTR user name - workstation trust account + UNISTR domain name + UINT32 NTversion + UINT16 LMNTtoken + UINT16 LM20token + + + +7) SRVSVC Transact Named Pipe +----------------------------- + + +Defines for this pipe, identifying the query are: + +- Net Share Enum : 0x0f +- Net Server Get Info : 0x15 + + +7.1) Net Share Enum +------------------ + +Note: share level and switch value in the response are presumably the + same as those in the request. + +Note: cifsrap2.txt (section 5) may be of limited assistance here. + +Request: + + VOID* pointer (to server name?) + UNISTR2 server name + + UINT8[] padding to get unicode string 4-byte aligned + with the start of the SMB header. + + UINT32 share level + UINT32 switch value + + VOID* pointer to SHARE_INFO_1_CTR + SHARE_INFO_1_CTR share info with 0 entries + + UINT32 preferred maximum length (0xffff ffff) + +Response: + + UINT32 share level + UINT32 switch value + + VOID* pointer to SHARE_INFO_1_CTR + SHARE_INFO_1_CTR share info (only added if share info ptr is non-zero) + + return 0 - indicates success + + +7.2) Net Server Get Info +------------------ + +Note: level is the same value as in the request. + +Request: + + UNISTR2 server name + UINT32 switch level + +Response: + + UINT32 switch level + VOID* pointer to SERVER_INFO_101 + + SERVER_INFO_101 server info (only added if server info ptr is non-zero) + + return 0 - indicates success + + + +Appendix +-------- + +A1) Cryptographic side of NT Domain Authentication +-------------------------------------------------- + + +A1.1) Definitions +----------------- + +Add(A1,A2): Intel byte ordered addition of corresponding 4 byte words +in arrays A1 and A2 + +E(K,D): DES ECB encryption of 8 byte data D using 7 byte key K + +lmowf(): Lan man hash + +ntowf(): NT hash + +PW: md4(machine_password) == md4(lsadump $machine.acc) == +pwdump(machine$) (initially) == md4(lmowf(unicode(machine))) + +ARC4(K,Lk,D,Ld): ARC4 encryption of data D of length Ld with key K of +length Lk + +v[m..n(,l)]: subset of v from bytes m to n, optionally padded with +zeroes to length l + +Cred(K,D): E(K[7..7,7],E(K[0..6],D)) computes a credential + +Time(): 4 byte current time + +Cc,Cs: 8 byte client and server challenges Rc,Rs: 8 byte client and +server credentials + + +A1.2) Protocol +-------------- + +C->S ReqChal,Cc S->C Cs + +C & S compute session key Ks = E(PW[9..15],E(PW[0..6],Add(Cc,Cs))) + +C: Rc = Cred(Ks,Cc) C->S Authenticate,Rc S: Rs = Cred(Ks,Cs), +assert(Rc == Cred(Ks,Cc)) S->C Rs C: assert(Rs == Cred(Ks,Cs)) + +On joining the domain the client will optionally attempt to change its +password and the domain controller may refuse to update it depending +on registry settings. This will also occur weekly afterwards. + +C: Tc = Time(), Rc' = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc) C->S ServerPasswordSet,Rc',Tc, +arc4(Ks[0..7,16],lmowf(randompassword()) C: Rc = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1) S: +assert(Rc' == Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc)), Ts = Time() S: Rs' = Cred(Ks,Rs+Tc+1) +S->C Rs',Ts C: assert(Rs' == Cred(Ks,Rs+Tc+1)) S: Rs = Rs' + +User: U with password P wishes to login to the domain (incidental data +such as workstation and domain omitted) + +C: Tc = Time(), Rc' = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc) C->S NetLogonSamLogon,Rc',Tc,U, +arc4(Ks[0..7,16],16,ntowf(P),16), arc4(Ks[0..7,16],16,lmowf(P),16) S: +assert(Rc' == Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc)) assert(passwords match those in SAM) S: +Ts = Time() + +S->C Cred(Ks,Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1)),userinfo(logon script,UID,SIDs,etc) C: +assert(Rs == Cred(Ks,Cred(Rc+Tc+1)) C: Rc = Cred(Ks,Rc+Tc+1) + + +A1.3) Comments +-------------- + +On first joining the domain the session key could be computed by +anyone listening in on the network as the machine password has a well +known value. Until the machine is rebooted it will use this session +key to encrypt NT and LM one way functions of passwords which are +password equivalents. Any user who logs in before the machine has been +rebooted a second time will have their password equivalent exposed. Of +course the new machine password is exposed at this time anyway. + +None of the returned user info such as logon script, profile path and +SIDs *appear* to be protected by anything other than the TCP checksum. + +The server time stamps appear to be ignored. + +The client sends a ReturnAuthenticator in the SamLogon request which I +can't find a use for. However its time is used as the timestamp +returned by the server. + +The password OWFs should NOT be sent over the network reversibly +encrypted. They should be sent using ARC4(Ks,md4(owf)) with the server +computing the same function using the owf values in the SAM. + + +A2) SIDs and RIDs +----------------- + +SIDs and RIDs are well documented elsewhere. + +A SID is an NT Security ID (see DOM_SID structure). They are of the form: + + S-revision-NN-SubAuth1-SubAuth2-SubAuth3... + S-revision-0xNNNNNNNNNNNN-SubAuth1-SubAuth2-SubAuth3... + +currently, the SID revision is 1. +The Sub-Authorities are known as Relative IDs (RIDs). + + +A2.1) Well-known SIDs +--------------------- + + +A2.1.1) Universal well-known SIDs +--------------------------------- + + Null SID S-1-0-0 + World S-1-1-0 + Local S-1-2-0 + Creator Owner ID S-1-3-0 + Creator Group ID S-1-3-1 + Creator Owner Server ID S-1-3-2 + Creator Group Server ID S-1-3-3 + + (Non-unique IDs) S-1-4 + + +A2.1.2) NT well-known SIDs +-------------------------- + + NT Authority S-1-5 + Dialup S-1-5-1 + + Network S-1-5-2 + Batch S-1-5-3 + Interactive S-1-5-4 + Service S-1-5-6 + AnonymousLogon S-1-5-7 (aka null logon session) + Proxy S-1-5-8 + ServerLogon S-1-5-8 (aka domain controller account) + + (Logon IDs) S-1-5-5-X-Y + + (NT non-unique IDs) S-1-5-0x15-... + + (Built-in domain) s-1-5-0x20 + + + +A2.2) Well-known RIDS +--------------------- + +A RID is a sub-authority value, as part of either a SID, or in the case +of Group RIDs, part of the DOM_GID structure, in the USER_INFO_1 +structure, in the LSA SAM Logon response. + + +A2.2.1) Well-known RID users +---------------------------- + + DOMAIN_USER_RID_ADMIN 0x0000 01F4 + DOMAIN_USER_RID_GUEST 0x0000 01F5 + + + +A2.2.2) Well-known RID groups +---------------------------- + + DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_ADMINS 0x0000 0200 + DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_USERS 0x0000 0201 + DOMAIN_GROUP_RID_GUESTS 0x0000 0202 + + + +A2.2.3) Well-known RID aliases +------------------------------ + + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS 0x0000 0220 + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_USERS 0x0000 0221 + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_GUESTS 0x0000 0222 + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_POWER_USERS 0x0000 0223 + + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ACCOUNT_OPS 0x0000 0224 + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_SYSTEM_OPS 0x0000 0225 + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_PRINT_OPS 0x0000 0226 + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_BACKUP_OPS 0x0000 0227 + + DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_REPLICATOR 0x0000 0228 + + |