diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'SAMBA_3_2_MERGE/source/smbd/chgpasswd.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | SAMBA_3_2_MERGE/source/smbd/chgpasswd.c | 1007 |
1 files changed, 1007 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/SAMBA_3_2_MERGE/source/smbd/chgpasswd.c b/SAMBA_3_2_MERGE/source/smbd/chgpasswd.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..db091d03be8 --- /dev/null +++ b/SAMBA_3_2_MERGE/source/smbd/chgpasswd.c @@ -0,0 +1,1007 @@ +/* + Unix SMB/CIFS implementation. + Samba utility functions + Copyright (C) Andrew Tridgell 1992-1998 + Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett 2001-2004 + + This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by + the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or + (at your option) any later version. + + This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + GNU General Public License for more details. + + You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. +*/ + +/* These comments regard the code to change the user's unix password: */ + +/* fork a child process to exec passwd and write to its + * tty to change a users password. This is running as the + * user who is attempting to change the password. + */ + +/* + * This code was copied/borrowed and stolen from various sources. + * The primary source was the poppasswd.c from the authors of POPMail. This software + * was included as a client to change passwords using the 'passwd' program + * on the remote machine. + * + * This code has been hacked by Bob Nance (nance@niehs.nih.gov) and Evan Patterson + * (patters2@niehs.nih.gov) at the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences + * and rights to modify, distribute or incorporate this change to the CAP suite or + * using it for any other reason are granted, so long as this disclaimer is left intact. + */ + +/* + This code was hacked considerably for inclusion in Samba, primarily + by Andrew.Tridgell@anu.edu.au. The biggest change was the addition + of the "password chat" option, which allows the easy runtime + specification of the expected sequence of events to change a + password. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +extern struct passdb_ops pdb_ops; + +static NTSTATUS check_oem_password(const char *user, + uchar password_encrypted_with_lm_hash[516], + const uchar old_lm_hash_encrypted[16], + uchar password_encrypted_with_nt_hash[516], + const uchar old_nt_hash_encrypted[16], + SAM_ACCOUNT **hnd, char *new_passwd, + int new_passwd_size); + +#if ALLOW_CHANGE_PASSWORD + +static int findpty(char **slave) +{ + int master; + static fstring line; + DIR *dirp; + const char *dpname; + +#if defined(HAVE_GRANTPT) + /* Try to open /dev/ptmx. If that fails, fall through to old method. */ + if ((master = sys_open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR, 0)) >= 0) + { + grantpt(master); + unlockpt(master); + *slave = (char *)ptsname(master); + if (*slave == NULL) + { + DEBUG(0, + ("findpty: Unable to create master/slave pty pair.\n")); + /* Stop fd leak on error. */ + close(master); + return -1; + } + else + { + DEBUG(10, + ("findpty: Allocated slave pty %s\n", *slave)); + return (master); + } + } +#endif /* HAVE_GRANTPT */ + + fstrcpy(line, "/dev/ptyXX"); + + dirp = opendir("/dev"); + if (!dirp) + return (-1); + while ((dpname = readdirname(dirp)) != NULL) + { + if (strncmp(dpname, "pty", 3) == 0 && strlen(dpname) == 5) + { + DEBUG(3, + ("pty: try to open %s, line was %s\n", dpname, + line)); + line[8] = dpname[3]; + line[9] = dpname[4]; + if ((master = sys_open(line, O_RDWR, 0)) >= 0) + { + DEBUG(3, ("pty: opened %s\n", line)); + line[5] = 't'; + *slave = line; + closedir(dirp); + return (master); + } + } + } + closedir(dirp); + return (-1); +} + +static int dochild(int master, const char *slavedev, const struct passwd *pass, + const char *passwordprogram, BOOL as_root) +{ + int slave; + struct termios stermios; + gid_t gid; + uid_t uid; + + if (pass == NULL) + { + DEBUG(0, + ("dochild: user doesn't exist in the UNIX password database.\n")); + return False; + } + + gid = pass->pw_gid; + uid = pass->pw_uid; + + gain_root_privilege(); + + /* Start new session - gets rid of controlling terminal. */ + if (setsid() < 0) + { + DEBUG(3, + ("Weirdness, couldn't let go of controlling terminal\n")); + return (False); + } + + /* Open slave pty and acquire as new controlling terminal. */ + if ((slave = sys_open(slavedev, O_RDWR, 0)) < 0) + { + DEBUG(3, ("More weirdness, could not open %s\n", slavedev)); + return (False); + } +#ifdef I_PUSH + ioctl(slave, I_PUSH, "ptem"); + ioctl(slave, I_PUSH, "ldterm"); +#elif defined(TIOCSCTTY) + if (ioctl(slave, TIOCSCTTY, 0) < 0) + { + DEBUG(3, ("Error in ioctl call for slave pty\n")); + /* return(False); */ + } +#endif + + /* Close master. */ + close(master); + + /* Make slave stdin/out/err of child. */ + + if (sys_dup2(slave, STDIN_FILENO) != STDIN_FILENO) + { + DEBUG(3, ("Could not re-direct stdin\n")); + return (False); + } + if (sys_dup2(slave, STDOUT_FILENO) != STDOUT_FILENO) + { + DEBUG(3, ("Could not re-direct stdout\n")); + return (False); + } + if (sys_dup2(slave, STDERR_FILENO) != STDERR_FILENO) + { + DEBUG(3, ("Could not re-direct stderr\n")); + return (False); + } + if (slave > 2) + close(slave); + + /* Set proper terminal attributes - no echo, canonical input processing, + no map NL to CR/NL on output. */ + + if (tcgetattr(0, &stermios) < 0) + { + DEBUG(3, + ("could not read default terminal attributes on pty\n")); + return (False); + } + stermios.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK | ECHONL); + stermios.c_lflag |= ICANON; +#ifdef ONLCR + stermios.c_oflag &= ~(ONLCR); +#endif + if (tcsetattr(0, TCSANOW, &stermios) < 0) + { + DEBUG(3, ("could not set attributes of pty\n")); + return (False); + } + + /* make us completely into the right uid */ + if (!as_root) + { + become_user_permanently(uid, gid); + } + + DEBUG(10, + ("Invoking '%s' as password change program.\n", + passwordprogram)); + + /* execl() password-change application */ + if (execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", passwordprogram, NULL) < 0) + { + DEBUG(3, ("Bad status returned from %s\n", passwordprogram)); + return (False); + } + return (True); +} + +static int expect(int master, char *issue, char *expected) +{ + pstring buffer; + int attempts, timeout, nread, len; + BOOL match = False; + + for (attempts = 0; attempts < 2; attempts++) { + if (!strequal(issue, ".")) { + if (lp_passwd_chat_debug()) + DEBUG(100, ("expect: sending [%s]\n", issue)); + + if ((len = write(master, issue, strlen(issue))) != strlen(issue)) { + DEBUG(2,("expect: (short) write returned %d\n", len )); + return False; + } + } + + if (strequal(expected, ".")) + return True; + + /* Initial timeout. */ + timeout = lp_passwd_chat_timeout() * 1000; + nread = 0; + buffer[nread] = 0; + + while ((len = read_socket_with_timeout(master, buffer + nread, 1, + sizeof(buffer) - nread - 1, + timeout)) > 0) { + nread += len; + buffer[nread] = 0; + + { + /* Eat leading/trailing whitespace before match. */ + pstring str; + pstrcpy( str, buffer); + trim_char( str, ' ', ' '); + + if ((match = (unix_wild_match(expected, str) == 0))) { + /* Now data has started to return, lower timeout. */ + timeout = lp_passwd_chat_timeout() * 100; + } + } + } + + if (lp_passwd_chat_debug()) + DEBUG(100, ("expect: expected [%s] received [%s] match %s\n", + expected, buffer, match ? "yes" : "no" )); + + if (match) + break; + + if (len < 0) { + DEBUG(2, ("expect: %s\n", strerror(errno))); + return False; + } + } + + DEBUG(10,("expect: returning %s\n", match ? "True" : "False" )); + return match; +} + +static void pwd_sub(char *buf) +{ + all_string_sub(buf, "\\n", "\n", 0); + all_string_sub(buf, "\\r", "\r", 0); + all_string_sub(buf, "\\s", " ", 0); + all_string_sub(buf, "\\t", "\t", 0); +} + +static int talktochild(int master, const char *seq) +{ + int count = 0; + fstring issue, expected; + + fstrcpy(issue, "."); + + while (next_token(&seq, expected, NULL, sizeof(expected))) + { + pwd_sub(expected); + count++; + + if (!expect(master, issue, expected)) + { + DEBUG(3, ("Response %d incorrect\n", count)); + return False; + } + + if (!next_token(&seq, issue, NULL, sizeof(issue))) + fstrcpy(issue, "."); + + pwd_sub(issue); + } + if (!strequal(issue, ".")) { + /* we have one final issue to send */ + fstrcpy(expected, "."); + if (!expect(master, issue, expected)) + return False; + } + + return (count > 0); +} + +static BOOL chat_with_program(char *passwordprogram, struct passwd *pass, + char *chatsequence, BOOL as_root) +{ + char *slavedev; + int master; + pid_t pid, wpid; + int wstat; + BOOL chstat = False; + + if (pass == NULL) { + DEBUG(0, ("chat_with_program: user doesn't exist in the UNIX password database.\n")); + return False; + } + + /* allocate a pseudo-terminal device */ + if ((master = findpty(&slavedev)) < 0) { + DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Cannot Allocate pty for password change: %s\n", pass->pw_name)); + return (False); + } + + /* + * We need to temporarily stop CatchChild from eating + * SIGCLD signals as it also eats the exit status code. JRA. + */ + + CatchChildLeaveStatus(); + + if ((pid = sys_fork()) < 0) { + DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Cannot fork() child for password change: %s\n", pass->pw_name)); + close(master); + CatchChild(); + return (False); + } + + /* we now have a pty */ + if (pid > 0) { /* This is the parent process */ + if ((chstat = talktochild(master, chatsequence)) == False) { + DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Child failed to change password: %s\n", pass->pw_name)); + kill(pid, SIGKILL); /* be sure to end this process */ + } + + while ((wpid = sys_waitpid(pid, &wstat, 0)) < 0) { + if (errno == EINTR) { + errno = 0; + continue; + } + break; + } + + if (wpid < 0) { + DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: The process is no longer waiting!\n\n")); + close(master); + CatchChild(); + return (False); + } + + /* + * Go back to ignoring children. + */ + CatchChild(); + + close(master); + + if (pid != wpid) { + DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: We were waiting for the wrong process ID\n")); + return (False); + } + if (WIFEXITED(wstat) && (WEXITSTATUS(wstat) != 0)) { + DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: The process exited with status %d \ +while we were waiting\n", WEXITSTATUS(wstat))); + return (False); + } +#if defined(WIFSIGNALLED) && defined(WTERMSIG) + else if (WIFSIGNALLED(wstat)) { + DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: The process was killed by signal %d \ +while we were waiting\n", WTERMSIG(wstat))); + return (False); + } +#endif + } else { + /* CHILD */ + + /* + * Lose any oplock capabilities. + */ + oplock_set_capability(False, False); + + /* make sure it doesn't freeze */ + alarm(20); + + if (as_root) + become_root(); + + DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Dochild for user %s (uid=%d,gid=%d) (as_root = %s)\n", pass->pw_name, + (int)getuid(), (int)getgid(), BOOLSTR(as_root) )); + chstat = dochild(master, slavedev, pass, passwordprogram, as_root); + + if (as_root) + unbecome_root(); + + /* + * The child should never return from dochild() .... + */ + + DEBUG(0, ("chat_with_program: Error: dochild() returned %d\n", chstat)); + exit(1); + } + + if (chstat) + DEBUG(3, ("chat_with_program: Password change %ssuccessful for user %s\n", + (chstat ? "" : "un"), pass->pw_name)); + return (chstat); +} + +BOOL chgpasswd(const char *name, const struct passwd *pass, + const char *oldpass, const char *newpass, BOOL as_root) +{ + pstring passwordprogram; + pstring chatsequence; + size_t i; + size_t len; + + if (!oldpass) { + oldpass = ""; + } + + DEBUG(3, ("chgpasswd: Password change (as_root=%s) for user: %s\n", BOOLSTR(as_root), name)); + +#if DEBUG_PASSWORD + DEBUG(100, ("chgpasswd: Passwords: old=%s new=%s\n", oldpass, newpass)); +#endif + + /* Take the passed information and test it for minimum criteria */ + + /* Password is same as old password */ + if (strcmp(oldpass, newpass) == 0) { + /* don't allow same password */ + DEBUG(2, ("chgpasswd: Password Change: %s, New password is same as old\n", name)); /* log the attempt */ + return (False); /* inform the user */ + } + + /* + * Check the old and new passwords don't contain any control + * characters. + */ + + len = strlen(oldpass); + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (iscntrl((int)oldpass[i])) { + DEBUG(0, ("chgpasswd: oldpass contains control characters (disallowed).\n")); + return False; + } + } + + len = strlen(newpass); + for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { + if (iscntrl((int)newpass[i])) { + DEBUG(0, ("chgpasswd: newpass contains control characters (disallowed).\n")); + return False; + } + } + +#ifdef WITH_PAM + if (lp_pam_password_change()) { + BOOL ret; + + if (as_root) + become_root(); + + if (pass) { + ret = smb_pam_passchange(pass->pw_name, oldpass, newpass); + } else { + ret = smb_pam_passchange(name, oldpass, newpass); + } + + if (as_root) + unbecome_root(); + + return ret; + } +#endif + + /* A non-PAM password change just doen't make sense without a valid local user */ + + if (pass == NULL) { + DEBUG(0, ("chgpasswd: user %s doesn't exist in the UNIX password database.\n", name)); + return False; + } + + pstrcpy(passwordprogram, lp_passwd_program()); + pstrcpy(chatsequence, lp_passwd_chat()); + + if (!*chatsequence) { + DEBUG(2, ("chgpasswd: Null chat sequence - no password changing\n")); + return (False); + } + + if (!*passwordprogram) { + DEBUG(2, ("chgpasswd: Null password program - no password changing\n")); + return (False); + } + + if (as_root) { + /* The password program *must* contain the user name to work. Fail if not. */ + if (strstr_m(passwordprogram, "%u") == NULL) { + DEBUG(0,("chgpasswd: Running as root the 'passwd program' parameter *MUST* contain \ +the string %%u, and the given string %s does not.\n", passwordprogram )); + return False; + } + } + + pstring_sub(passwordprogram, "%u", name); + /* note that we do NOT substitute the %o and %n in the password program + as this would open up a security hole where the user could use + a new password containing shell escape characters */ + + pstring_sub(chatsequence, "%u", name); + all_string_sub(chatsequence, "%o", oldpass, sizeof(pstring)); + all_string_sub(chatsequence, "%n", newpass, sizeof(pstring)); + return (chat_with_program + (passwordprogram, pass, chatsequence, as_root)); +} + +#else /* ALLOW_CHANGE_PASSWORD */ + +BOOL chgpasswd(const char *name, const struct passwd *pass, + const char *oldpass, const char *newpass, BOOL as_root) +{ + DEBUG(0, ("chgpasswd: Unix Password changing not compiled in (user=%s)\n", name)); + return (False); +} +#endif /* ALLOW_CHANGE_PASSWORD */ + +/*********************************************************** + Code to check the lanman hashed password. +************************************************************/ + +BOOL check_lanman_password(char *user, uchar * pass1, + uchar * pass2, SAM_ACCOUNT **hnd) +{ + uchar unenc_new_pw[16]; + uchar unenc_old_pw[16]; + SAM_ACCOUNT *sampass = NULL; + uint16 acct_ctrl; + const uint8 *lanman_pw; + BOOL ret; + + become_root(); + ret = pdb_getsampwnam(sampass, user); + unbecome_root(); + + if (ret == False) { + DEBUG(0,("check_lanman_password: getsampwnam returned NULL\n")); + pdb_free_sam(&sampass); + return False; + } + + acct_ctrl = pdb_get_acct_ctrl (sampass); + lanman_pw = pdb_get_lanman_passwd (sampass); + + if (acct_ctrl & ACB_DISABLED) { + DEBUG(0,("check_lanman_password: account %s disabled.\n", user)); + pdb_free_sam(&sampass); + return False; + } + + if (lanman_pw == NULL) { + if (acct_ctrl & ACB_PWNOTREQ) { + /* this saves the pointer for the caller */ + *hnd = sampass; + return True; + } else { + DEBUG(0, ("check_lanman_password: no lanman password !\n")); + pdb_free_sam(&sampass); + return False; + } + } + + /* Get the new lanman hash. */ + D_P16(lanman_pw, pass2, unenc_new_pw); + + /* Use this to get the old lanman hash. */ + D_P16(unenc_new_pw, pass1, unenc_old_pw); + + /* Check that the two old passwords match. */ + if (memcmp(lanman_pw, unenc_old_pw, 16)) { + DEBUG(0,("check_lanman_password: old password doesn't match.\n")); + pdb_free_sam(&sampass); + return False; + } + + /* this saves the pointer for the caller */ + *hnd = sampass; + return True; +} + +/*********************************************************** + Code to change the lanman hashed password. + It nulls out the NT hashed password as it will + no longer be valid. + NOTE this function is designed to be called as root. Check the old password + is correct before calling. JRA. +************************************************************/ + +BOOL change_lanman_password(SAM_ACCOUNT *sampass, uchar *pass2) +{ + static uchar null_pw[16]; + uchar unenc_new_pw[16]; + BOOL ret; + uint16 acct_ctrl; + const uint8 *pwd; + + if (sampass == NULL) { + DEBUG(0,("change_lanman_password: no smb password entry.\n")); + return False; + } + + acct_ctrl = pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass); + pwd = pdb_get_lanman_passwd(sampass); + + if (acct_ctrl & ACB_DISABLED) { + DEBUG(0,("change_lanman_password: account %s disabled.\n", + pdb_get_username(sampass))); + return False; + } + + if (pwd == NULL) { + if (acct_ctrl & ACB_PWNOTREQ) { + uchar no_pw[14]; + memset(no_pw, '\0', 14); + E_P16(no_pw, null_pw); + + /* Get the new lanman hash. */ + D_P16(null_pw, pass2, unenc_new_pw); + } else { + DEBUG(0,("change_lanman_password: no lanman password !\n")); + return False; + } + } else { + /* Get the new lanman hash. */ + D_P16(pwd, pass2, unenc_new_pw); + } + + if (!pdb_set_lanman_passwd(sampass, unenc_new_pw, PDB_CHANGED)) { + return False; + } + + if (!pdb_set_nt_passwd (sampass, NULL, PDB_CHANGED)) { + return False; /* We lose the NT hash. Sorry. */ + } + + if (!pdb_set_pass_changed_now (sampass)) { + pdb_free_sam(&sampass); + /* Not quite sure what this one qualifies as, but this will do */ + return False; + } + + /* Now flush the sam_passwd struct to persistent storage */ + ret = pdb_update_sam_account (sampass); + + return ret; +} + +/*********************************************************** + Code to check and change the OEM hashed password. +************************************************************/ + +NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, + uchar password_encrypted_with_lm_hash[516], + const uchar old_lm_hash_encrypted[16], + uchar password_encrypted_with_nt_hash[516], + const uchar old_nt_hash_encrypted[16]) +{ + pstring new_passwd; + SAM_ACCOUNT *sampass = NULL; + NTSTATUS nt_status = check_oem_password(user, password_encrypted_with_lm_hash, + old_lm_hash_encrypted, + password_encrypted_with_nt_hash, + old_nt_hash_encrypted, + &sampass, new_passwd, sizeof(new_passwd)); + + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) + return nt_status; + + /* We've already checked the old password here.... */ + become_root(); + nt_status = change_oem_password(sampass, NULL, new_passwd, True); + unbecome_root(); + + memset(new_passwd, 0, sizeof(new_passwd)); + + pdb_free_sam(&sampass); + + return nt_status; +} + +/*********************************************************** + Decrypt and verify a user password change. + + The 516 byte long buffers are encrypted with the old NT and + old LM passwords, and if the NT passwords are present, both + buffers contain a unicode string. + + After decrypting the buffers, check the password is correct by + matching the old hashed passwords with the passwords in the passdb. + +************************************************************/ + +static NTSTATUS check_oem_password(const char *user, + uchar password_encrypted_with_lm_hash[516], + const uchar old_lm_hash_encrypted[16], + uchar password_encrypted_with_nt_hash[516], + const uchar old_nt_hash_encrypted[16], + SAM_ACCOUNT **hnd, char *new_passwd, + int new_passwd_size) +{ + static uchar null_pw[16]; + static uchar null_ntpw[16]; + SAM_ACCOUNT *sampass = NULL; + char *password_encrypted; + const char *encryption_key; + const uint8 *lanman_pw, *nt_pw; + uint16 acct_ctrl; + uint32 new_pw_len; + uchar new_nt_hash[16]; + uchar old_nt_hash_plain[16]; + uchar new_lm_hash[16]; + uchar old_lm_hash_plain[16]; + char no_pw[2]; + BOOL ret; + + BOOL nt_pass_set = (password_encrypted_with_nt_hash && old_nt_hash_encrypted); + BOOL lm_pass_set = (password_encrypted_with_lm_hash && old_lm_hash_encrypted); + + *hnd = NULL; + + pdb_init_sam(&sampass); + + become_root(); + ret = pdb_getsampwnam(sampass, user); + unbecome_root(); + + if (ret == False) { + DEBUG(0, ("check_oem_password: getsmbpwnam returned NULL\n")); + pdb_free_sam(&sampass); + return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER; + } + + acct_ctrl = pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass); + + if (acct_ctrl & ACB_DISABLED) { + DEBUG(2,("check_lanman_password: account %s disabled.\n", user)); + pdb_free_sam(&sampass); + return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED; + } + + if (acct_ctrl & ACB_PWNOTREQ && lp_null_passwords()) { + /* construct a null password (in case one is needed */ + no_pw[0] = 0; + no_pw[1] = 0; + nt_lm_owf_gen(no_pw, null_ntpw, null_pw); + lanman_pw = null_pw; + nt_pw = null_pw; + + } else { + /* save pointers to passwords so we don't have to keep looking them up */ + if (lp_lanman_auth()) { + lanman_pw = pdb_get_lanman_passwd(sampass); + } else { + lanman_pw = NULL; + } + nt_pw = pdb_get_nt_passwd(sampass); + } + + if (nt_pw && nt_pass_set) { + /* IDEAL Case: passwords are in unicode, and we can + * read use the password encrypted with the NT hash + */ + password_encrypted = password_encrypted_with_nt_hash; + encryption_key = nt_pw; + } else if (lanman_pw && lm_pass_set) { + /* password may still be in unicode, but use LM hash version */ + password_encrypted = password_encrypted_with_lm_hash; + encryption_key = lanman_pw; + } else if (nt_pass_set) { + DEBUG(1, ("NT password change supplied for user %s, but we have no NT password to check it with\n", + user)); + pdb_free_sam(&sampass); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } else if (lm_pass_set) { + DEBUG(1, ("LM password change supplied for user %s, but we have no LanMan password to check it with\n", + user)); + pdb_free_sam(&sampass); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } else { + DEBUG(1, ("password change requested for user %s, but no password supplied!\n", + user)); + pdb_free_sam(&sampass); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + + /* + * Decrypt the password with the key + */ + SamOEMhash( password_encrypted, encryption_key, 516); + + if ( !decode_pw_buffer(password_encrypted, new_passwd, new_passwd_size, &new_pw_len, + nt_pass_set ? STR_UNICODE : STR_ASCII)) { + pdb_free_sam(&sampass); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + + /* + * To ensure we got the correct new password, hash it and + * use it as a key to test the passed old password. + */ + + if (nt_pass_set) { + /* NT passwords, verify the NT hash. */ + + /* Calculate the MD4 hash (NT compatible) of the password */ + memset(new_nt_hash, '\0', 16); + E_md4hash(new_passwd, new_nt_hash); + + if (nt_pw) { + /* + * Now use new_nt_hash as the key to see if the old + * password matches. + */ + D_P16(new_nt_hash, old_nt_hash_encrypted, old_nt_hash_plain); + + if (memcmp(nt_pw, old_nt_hash_plain, 16)) { + DEBUG(0,("check_oem_password: old lm password doesn't match.\n")); + pdb_free_sam(&sampass); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + + /* We could check the LM password here, but there is + * little point, we already know the password is + * correct, and the LM password might not even be + * present. */ + + /* Further, LM hash generation algorithms + * differ with charset, so we could + * incorrectly fail a perfectly valid password + * change */ +#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD + DEBUG(100, + ("check_oem_password: password %s ok\n", new_passwd)); +#endif + *hnd = sampass; + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + if (lanman_pw) { + /* + * Now use new_nt_hash as the key to see if the old + * LM password matches. + */ + D_P16(new_nt_hash, old_lm_hash_encrypted, old_lm_hash_plain); + + if (memcmp(lanman_pw, old_lm_hash_plain, 16)) { + DEBUG(0,("check_oem_password: old lm password doesn't match.\n")); + pdb_free_sam(&sampass); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } +#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD + DEBUG(100, + ("check_oem_password: password %s ok\n", new_passwd)); +#endif + *hnd = sampass; + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + } + + if (lanman_pw && lm_pass_set) { + + E_deshash(new_passwd, new_lm_hash); + + /* + * Now use new_lm_hash as the key to see if the old + * password matches. + */ + D_P16(new_lm_hash, old_lm_hash_encrypted, old_lm_hash_plain); + + if (memcmp(lanman_pw, old_lm_hash_plain, 16)) { + DEBUG(0,("check_oem_password: old lm password doesn't match.\n")); + pdb_free_sam(&sampass); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_PASSWORD + DEBUG(100, + ("check_oem_password: password %s ok\n", new_passwd)); +#endif + *hnd = sampass; + return NT_STATUS_OK; + } + + /* should not be reached */ + pdb_free_sam(&sampass); + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +} + +/*********************************************************** + Code to change the oem password. Changes both the lanman + and NT hashes. Old_passwd is almost always NULL. + NOTE this function is designed to be called as root. Check the old password + is correct before calling. JRA. +************************************************************/ + +NTSTATUS change_oem_password(SAM_ACCOUNT *hnd, char *old_passwd, char *new_passwd, BOOL as_root) +{ + struct passwd *pass; + + BOOL ret; + uint32 min_len; + + if (time(NULL) < pdb_get_pass_can_change_time(hnd)) { + DEBUG(1, ("user %s cannot change password now, must wait until %s\n", + pdb_get_username(hnd), http_timestring(hnd->mem_ctx, pdb_get_pass_can_change_time(hnd)))); + return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION; + } + + if (account_policy_get(AP_MIN_PASSWORD_LEN, &min_len) && (strlen(new_passwd) < min_len)) { + DEBUG(1, ("user %s cannot change password - password too short\n", + pdb_get_username(hnd))); + DEBUGADD(1, (" account policy min password len = %d\n", min_len)); + return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION; +/* return NT_STATUS_PWD_TOO_SHORT; */ + } + + /* Take the passed information and test it for minimum criteria */ + /* Minimum password length */ + if (strlen(new_passwd) < lp_min_passwd_length()) { + /* too short, must be at least MINPASSWDLENGTH */ + DEBUG(1, ("Password Change: user %s, New password is shorter than minimum password length = %d\n", + pdb_get_username(hnd), lp_min_passwd_length())); + return NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION; +/* return NT_STATUS_PWD_TOO_SHORT; */ + } + + pass = Get_Pwnam(pdb_get_username(hnd)); + if (!pass) { + DEBUG(1, ("check_oem_password: Username does not exist in system !?!\n")); + } + + /* + * If unix password sync was requested, attempt to change + * the /etc/passwd database first. Return failure if this cannot + * be done. + * + * This occurs before the oem change, because we don't want to + * update it if chgpasswd failed. + * + * Conditional on lp_unix_password_sync() because we don't want + * to touch the unix db unless we have admin permission. + */ + + if(lp_unix_password_sync() && + !chgpasswd(pdb_get_username(hnd), pass, old_passwd, new_passwd, as_root)) { + return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + + if (!pdb_set_plaintext_passwd (hnd, new_passwd)) { + return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + + /* Now write it into the file. */ + ret = pdb_update_sam_account (hnd); + + if (!ret) { + return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; + } + + return NT_STATUS_OK; +} |