Fixed interface between new ACLS and nttrans code.

Jeremy.

3 files changed, 587 insertions, 184 deletions

diff --git a/source/Makefile.in b/source/Makefile.in
index 0f5e0d9d311..f9720854026 100644
--- a/source/Makefile.in
+++ b/source/Makefile.in
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ SMBD_OBJ1 = smbd/server.o smbd/files.o smbd/chgpasswd.o smbd/connection.o \
             smbd/reply.o smbd/trans2.o smbd/uid.o \
 	    smbd/dosmode.o smbd/filename.o smbd/open.o smbd/close.o smbd/blocking.o \
 	    smbd/vfs.o smbd/vfs-wrap.o smbd/statcache.o \
-            lib/util_unixsd.o lib/msrpc-client.o lib/msrpc_use.o \
+            smbd/unix_acls.o lib/msrpc-client.o lib/msrpc_use.o \
             rpc_parse/parse_creds.o \
 	    smbd/process.o smbd/oplock.o smbd/service.o smbd/error.o \
 	    printing/printfsp.o
diff --git a/source/smbd/nttrans.c b/source/smbd/nttrans.c
index bb0436aab3b..6c677f3f4c6 100644
--- a/source/smbd/nttrans.c
+++ b/source/smbd/nttrans.c
@@ -1823,41 +1823,6 @@ name = %s\n", fsp->fsp_name ));
 }
 
 /****************************************************************************
- Reply to query a security descriptor from an fsp. If it succeeds it allocates
- the space for the return elements and returns True.
-****************************************************************************/
-
-static size_t get_nt_acl(files_struct *fsp, SEC_DESC **ppdesc)
-{
-  SMB_STRUCT_STAT sbuf;
-  mode_t mode;
-
-    if(fsp->is_directory || fsp->fd == -1) {
-      if(dos_stat(fsp->fsp_name, &sbuf) != 0) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    } else {
-      if(fsp->conn->vfs_ops.fstat(fsp->fd,&sbuf) != 0) {
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-
-    if(fsp->is_directory) {
-      /*
-       * For directory ACLs we also add in the inherited permissions
-       * ACE entries. These are the permissions a file would get when
-       * being created in the directory.
-       */
-      mode = unix_mode( fsp->conn, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ARCHIVE, fsp->fsp_name);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	    mode = sbuf.st_mode;
-    }
-  return convertperms_unix_to_sd(&sbuf, fsp->is_directory, mode, ppdesc);
-}
-
-/****************************************************************************
  Reply to query a security descriptor - currently this is not implemented (it
  is planned to be though). Right now it just returns the same thing NT would
  when queried on a FAT filesystem. JRA.
@@ -1899,8 +1864,7 @@ static int call_nt_transact_query_security_desc(connection_struct *conn,
 
   if(max_data_count < sec_desc_size) {
 
-    free_sec_desc(psd);
-    safe_free(psd);
+    free_sec_desc(&psd);
 
     send_nt_replies(inbuf, outbuf, bufsize, 0xC0000000|NT_STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
                     params, 4, *ppdata, 0);
@@ -1913,8 +1877,7 @@ static int call_nt_transact_query_security_desc(connection_struct *conn,
 
   data = *ppdata = Realloc(*ppdata, sec_desc_size);
   if(data == NULL) {
-    free_sec_desc(psd);
-    safe_free(psd);
+    free_sec_desc(&psd);
     return(ERROR(ERRDOS,ERRnomem));
   }
 
@@ -1927,7 +1890,8 @@ static int call_nt_transact_query_security_desc(connection_struct *conn,
   prs_init(&pd, 0, 4, MARSHALL);
 
   /*
-   * copy the data out of the marshalled structure
+   * Setup the prs_struct to point at the memory we just
+   * allocated.
    */
 
   prs_give_memory( &pd, data, (uint32)sec_desc_size, False);
@@ -1936,11 +1900,8 @@ static int call_nt_transact_query_security_desc(connection_struct *conn,
    * Finally, linearize into the outgoing buffer.
    */
 
-  if(!sec_io_desc( "sd data", psd, &pd, 1))
-  {
-    free_sec_desc(psd);
-    safe_free(psd);
-    prs_mem_free(&pd);
+  if(!sec_io_desc( "sd data", &psd, &pd, 1)) {
+    free_sec_desc(&psd);
     DEBUG(0,("call_nt_transact_query_security_desc: Error in marshalling \
 security descriptor.\n"));
     /*
@@ -1953,9 +1914,7 @@ security descriptor.\n"));
    * Now we can delete the security descriptor.
    */
 
-  prs_mem_free(&pd);
-  free_sec_desc(psd);
-  safe_free(psd);
+  free_sec_desc(&psd);
 
   send_nt_replies(inbuf, outbuf, bufsize, 0, params, 4, data, (int)sec_desc_size);
   return -1;
@@ -1974,15 +1933,10 @@ static int call_nt_transact_set_security_desc(connection_struct *conn,
   char *params= *ppparams;
   char *data = *ppdata;
   prs_struct pd;
-  SEC_DESC psd;
+  SEC_DESC *psd = NULL;
   uint32 total_data_count = (uint32)IVAL(inbuf, smb_nts_TotalDataCount);
-  uid_t user = (uid_t)-1;
-  gid_t grp = (gid_t)-1;
-  mode_t perms = 0;
-  SMB_STRUCT_STAT sbuf;
   files_struct *fsp = NULL;
   uint32 security_info_sent = 0;
-  BOOL got_dacl = False;
 
   if(!lp_nt_acl_support())
     return(UNIXERROR(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess));
@@ -2015,10 +1969,8 @@ static int call_nt_transact_set_security_desc(connection_struct *conn,
    * Finally, unmarshall from the data buffer.
    */
 
-  if(!sec_io_desc( "sd data", &psd, &pd, 1))
-  {
+  if(!sec_io_desc( "sd data", &psd, &pd, 1)) {
     free_sec_desc(&psd);
-    prs_mem_free(&pd);
     DEBUG(0,("call_nt_transact_set_security_desc: Error in unmarshalling \
 security descriptor.\n"));
     /*
@@ -2027,135 +1979,12 @@ security descriptor.\n"));
     return(UNIXERROR(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess));
   }
 
-  /*
-   * finished with the marshalling structure, already
-   */
-
-  prs_mem_free(&pd);
-
-  /*
-   * Get the current state of the file.
-   */
-
-  if(fsp->is_directory) {
-    if(dos_stat(fsp->fsp_name, &sbuf) != 0) {
-      free_sec_desc(&psd);
-      return(UNIXERROR(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess));
-    }
-  } else {
-
-    int ret;
-
-    if(fsp->fd == -1)
-      ret = conn->vfs_ops.stat(dos_to_unix(fsp->fsp_name,False), &sbuf);
-    else
-      ret = conn->vfs_ops.fstat(fsp->fd,&sbuf);
-
-    if(ret != 0) {
-      free_sec_desc(&psd);
-      return(UNIXERROR(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess));
-    }
-  }
-
-  /*
-   * Unpack the user/group/world id's and permissions.
-   */
-
-  if(!convertperms_sd_to_unix( &sbuf, &user, &grp, &perms, security_info_sent, &psd, fsp->is_directory)) {
-    free_sec_desc(&psd);
-    return(UNIXERROR(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess));
+  if (!set_nt_acl(fsp, psd)) {
+	free_sec_desc(&psd);
+	return(UNIXERROR(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess));
   }
 
-  if (psd.dacl != NULL)
-    got_dacl = True;
-
   free_sec_desc(&psd);
-
-  /*
-   * Do we need to chown ?
-   */
-
-  if((user != (uid_t)-1 || grp != (uid_t)-1) && (sbuf.st_uid != user || sbuf.st_gid != grp)) {
-
-    DEBUG(3,("call_nt_transact_set_security_desc: chown %s. uid = %u, gid = %u.\n",
-          fsp->fsp_name, (unsigned int)user, (unsigned int)grp ));
-
-    if(dos_chown( fsp->fsp_name, user, grp) == -1) {
-      DEBUG(3,("call_nt_transact_set_security_desc: chown %s, %u, %u failed. Error = %s.\n",
-            fsp->fsp_name, (unsigned int)user, (unsigned int)grp, strerror(errno) ));
-      return(UNIXERROR(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess));
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Recheck the current state of the file, which may have changed.
-     * (suid/sgid bits, for instance)
-     */
-
-    if(fsp->is_directory) {
-      if(dos_stat(fsp->fsp_name, &sbuf) != 0) {
-        return(UNIXERROR(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess));
-      }
-    } else {
-
-      int ret;
-    
-      if(fsp->fd == -1)
-        ret = conn->vfs_ops.stat(dos_to_unix(fsp->fsp_name,False), &sbuf);
-      else
-        ret = conn->vfs_ops.fstat(fsp->fd,&sbuf);
-  
-      if(ret != 0)
-        return(UNIXERROR(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess));
-    }
-  }
-
-  /*
-   * Only change security if we got a DACL.
-   */
-
-  if((security_info_sent & DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION) && got_dacl) {
-
-    /*
-     * Check to see if we need to change anything.
-     * Enforce limits on modified bits *only*. Don't enforce masks
-	 * on bits not changed by the user.
-     */
-
-    if(fsp->is_directory) {
-
-      perms &= (lp_dir_security_mask(SNUM(conn)) | sbuf.st_mode);
-      perms |= (lp_force_dir_security_mode(SNUM(conn)) & ( perms ^ sbuf.st_mode ));
-
-    } else {
-
-      perms &= (lp_security_mask(SNUM(conn)) | sbuf.st_mode); 
-      perms |= (lp_force_security_mode(SNUM(conn)) & ( perms ^ sbuf.st_mode ));
-
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Preserve special bits.
-     */
-
-    perms |= (sbuf.st_mode & ~0777);
-
-    /*
-     * Do we need to chmod ?
-     */
-
-    if(sbuf.st_mode != perms) {
-
-      DEBUG(3,("call_nt_transact_set_security_desc: chmod %s. perms = 0%o.\n",
-            fsp->fsp_name, (unsigned int)perms ));
-
-      if(conn->vfs_ops.chmod(dos_to_unix(fsp->fsp_name, False), perms) == -1) {
-        DEBUG(3,("call_nt_transact_set_security_desc: chmod %s, 0%o failed. Error = %s.\n",
-              fsp->fsp_name, (unsigned int)perms, strerror(errno) ));
-        return(UNIXERROR(ERRDOS,ERRnoaccess));
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
   send_nt_replies(inbuf, outbuf, bufsize, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
   return -1;
 }
diff --git a/source/smbd/unix_acls.c b/source/smbd/unix_acls.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..706170b2649
--- /dev/null
+++ b/source/smbd/unix_acls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,574 @@
+#define OLD_NTDOMAIN 1
+/*
+   Unix SMB/Netbios implementation.
+   Version 1.9.
+   SMB NT Security Descriptor / Unix permission conversion.
+   Copyright (C) Jeremy Allison 1994-2000
+
+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+   (at your option) any later version.
+
+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+   GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+   Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Function to create owner and group SIDs from a SMB_STRUCT_STAT.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static void create_file_sids(SMB_STRUCT_STAT *psbuf, DOM_SID *powner_sid, DOM_SID *pgroup_sid)
+{
+  extern DOM_SID global_sam_sid;
+
+  sid_copy(powner_sid, &global_sam_sid);
+  sid_copy(pgroup_sid, &global_sam_sid);
+  sid_append_rid(powner_sid, pdb_uid_to_user_rid(psbuf->st_uid));
+  sid_append_rid(pgroup_sid, pdb_gid_to_group_rid(psbuf->st_gid));
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Map unix perms to NT.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static SEC_ACCESS map_unix_perms( int *pacl_type, mode_t perm, int r_mask, int w_mask, int x_mask, BOOL is_directory)
+{
+	SEC_ACCESS sa;
+	uint32 nt_mask = 0;
+
+	*pacl_type = SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED;
+
+	if((perm & (r_mask|w_mask|x_mask)) == (r_mask|w_mask|x_mask)) {
+		nt_mask = UNIX_ACCESS_RWX;
+	} else if((perm & (r_mask|w_mask|x_mask)) == 0) {
+		nt_mask = UNIX_ACCESS_NONE;
+	} else {
+		nt_mask |= (perm & r_mask) ? UNIX_ACCESS_R : 0;
+		if(is_directory)
+			nt_mask |= (perm & w_mask) ? UNIX_ACCESS_W : 0;
+		else
+			nt_mask |= (perm & w_mask) ? UNIX_ACCESS_W : 0;
+		nt_mask |= (perm & x_mask) ? UNIX_ACCESS_X : 0;
+	}
+	init_sec_access(&sa,nt_mask);
+	return sa;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Validate a SID.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static BOOL validate_unix_sid( DOM_SID *psid, uint32 *prid, DOM_SID *sd_sid)
+{
+  extern DOM_SID global_sam_sid;
+  DOM_SID sid;
+
+  if(!sd_sid) {
+    DEBUG(5,("validate_unix_sid: sid missing.\n"));
+    return False;
+  }
+
+  sid_copy(psid, sd_sid);
+  sid_copy(&sid, sd_sid);
+
+  if(!sid_split_rid(&sid, prid)) {
+    DEBUG(5,("validate_unix_sid: cannot get RID from sid.\n"));
+    return False;
+  }
+
+  if(!sid_equal( &sid, &global_sam_sid)) {
+    DEBUG(5,("validate_unix_sid: sid is not ours.\n"));
+    return False;
+  }
+
+  return True;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Map NT perms to UNIX.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+#define FILE_SPECIFIC_READ_BITS (FILE_READ_DATA|FILE_READ_EA|FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES)
+#define FILE_SPECIFIC_WRITE_BITS (FILE_WRITE_DATA|FILE_APPEND_DATA|FILE_WRITE_EA|FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES)
+#define FILE_SPECIFIC_EXECUTE_BITS (FILE_EXECUTE)
+
+static mode_t map_nt_perms( SEC_ACCESS sec_access, int type)
+{
+  mode_t mode = 0;
+
+  switch(type) {
+  case S_IRUSR:
+    if(sec_access.mask & GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS)
+      mode = S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR;
+    else {
+      mode |= (sec_access.mask & (GENERIC_READ_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_READ_BITS)) ? S_IRUSR : 0;
+      mode |= (sec_access.mask & (GENERIC_WRITE_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_WRITE_BITS)) ? S_IWUSR : 0;
+      mode |= (sec_access.mask & (GENERIC_EXECUTE_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_EXECUTE_BITS)) ? S_IXUSR : 0;
+    }
+    break;
+  case S_IRGRP:
+    if(sec_access.mask & GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS)
+      mode = S_IRGRP|S_IWGRP|S_IXGRP;
+    else {
+      mode |= (sec_access.mask & (GENERIC_READ_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_READ_BITS)) ? S_IRGRP : 0;
+      mode |= (sec_access.mask & (GENERIC_WRITE_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_WRITE_BITS)) ? S_IWGRP : 0;
+      mode |= (sec_access.mask & (GENERIC_EXECUTE_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_EXECUTE_BITS)) ? S_IXGRP : 0;
+    }
+    break;
+  case S_IROTH:
+    if(sec_access.mask & GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS)
+      mode = S_IROTH|S_IWOTH|S_IXOTH;
+    else {
+      mode |= (sec_access.mask & (GENERIC_READ_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_READ_BITS)) ? S_IROTH : 0;
+      mode |= (sec_access.mask & (GENERIC_WRITE_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_WRITE_BITS)) ? S_IWOTH : 0;
+      mode |= (sec_access.mask & (GENERIC_EXECUTE_ACCESS|FILE_SPECIFIC_EXECUTE_BITS)) ? S_IXOTH : 0;
+    }
+    break;
+  }
+
+  return mode;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Unpack a SEC_DESC into a owner, group and set of UNIX permissions.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+static BOOL unpack_nt_permissions(SMB_STRUCT_STAT *psbuf, uid_t *puser, gid_t *pgrp, mode_t *pmode,
+                                  uint32 security_info_sent, SEC_DESC *psd, BOOL is_directory)
+{
+  extern DOM_SID global_sid_World;
+  DOM_SID owner_sid;
+  DOM_SID grp_sid;
+  DOM_SID file_owner_sid;
+  DOM_SID file_grp_sid;
+  uint32 owner_rid;
+  uint32 grp_rid;
+  SEC_ACL *dacl = psd->dacl;
+  BOOL all_aces_are_inherit_only = (is_directory ? True : False);
+  int i;
+
+  *pmode = 0;
+  *puser = (uid_t)-1;
+  *pgrp = (gid_t)-1;
+
+  if(security_info_sent == 0) {
+    DEBUG(0,("unpack_nt_permissions: no security info sent !\n"));
+    return False;
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * Windows 2000 sends the owner and group SIDs as the logged in
+   * user, not the connected user. But it still sends the file
+   * owner SIDs on an ACL set. So we need to check for the file
+   * owner and group SIDs as well as the owner SIDs. JRA.
+   */
+ 
+  create_file_sids(psbuf, &file_owner_sid, &file_grp_sid);
+
+  /*
+   * Validate the owner and group SID's.
+   */
+
+  memset(&owner_sid, '\0', sizeof(owner_sid));
+  memset(&grp_sid, '\0', sizeof(grp_sid));
+
+  DEBUG(5,("unpack_nt_permissions: validating owner_sid.\n"));
+
+  /*
+   * Don't immediately fail if the owner sid cannot be validated.
+   * This may be a group chown only set.
+   */
+
+  if(!validate_unix_sid( &owner_sid, &owner_rid, psd->owner_sid))
+    DEBUG(3,("unpack_nt_permissions: unable to validate owner sid.\n"));
+  else if(security_info_sent & OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION)
+    *puser = pdb_user_rid_to_uid(owner_rid);
+
+  /*
+   * Don't immediately fail if the group sid cannot be validated.
+   * This may be an owner chown only set.
+   */
+
+  if(!validate_unix_sid( &grp_sid, &grp_rid, psd->grp_sid))
+    DEBUG(3,("unpack_nt_permissions: unable to validate group sid.\n"));
+  else if(security_info_sent & GROUP_SECURITY_INFORMATION)
+    *pgrp = pdb_user_rid_to_gid(grp_rid);
+
+  /*
+   * If no DACL then this is a chown only security descriptor.
+   */
+
+  if(!(security_info_sent & DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION) || !dacl) {
+    *pmode = 0;
+    return True;
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * Now go through the DACL and ensure that
+   * any owner/group sids match.
+   */
+
+  for(i = 0; i < dacl->num_aces; i++) {
+    DOM_SID ace_sid;
+    SEC_ACE *psa = &dacl->ace[i];
+
+    if((psa->type != SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED) &&
+       (psa->type != SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_DENIED)) {
+      DEBUG(3,("unpack_nt_permissions: unable to set anything but an ALLOW or DENY ACE.\n"));
+      return False;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Ignore or remove bits we don't care about on a directory ACE.
+     */
+
+    if(is_directory) {
+      if(psa->flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY) {
+        DEBUG(3,("unpack_nt_permissions: ignoring inherit only ACE.\n"));
+        continue;
+      }
+
+      /*
+       * At least one of the ACE entries wasn't inherit only.
+       * Flag this so we know the returned mode is valid.
+       */
+
+      all_aces_are_inherit_only = False;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Windows 2000 sets these flags even on *file* ACE's. This is wrong
+     * but we can ignore them for now. Revisit this when we go to POSIX
+     * ACLs on directories.
+     */
+
+    psa->flags &= ~(SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT);
+
+    if(psa->flags != 0) {
+      DEBUG(1,("unpack_nt_permissions: unable to set ACE flags (%x).\n", 
+            (unsigned int)psa->flags));
+      return False;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * The security mask may be UNIX_ACCESS_NONE which should map into
+     * no permissions (we overload the WRITE_OWNER bit for this) or it
+     * should be one of the ALL/EXECUTE/READ/WRITE bits. Arrange for this
+     * to be so. Any other bits override the UNIX_ACCESS_NONE bit.
+     */
+
+    psa->info.mask &= (GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS|GENERIC_EXECUTE_ACCESS|GENERIC_WRITE_ACCESS|
+                     GENERIC_READ_ACCESS|UNIX_ACCESS_NONE|FILE_ALL_ATTRIBUTES);
+
+    if(psa->info.mask != UNIX_ACCESS_NONE)
+      psa->info.mask &= ~UNIX_ACCESS_NONE;
+
+    sid_copy(&ace_sid, &psa->sid);
+
+    if(sid_equal(&ace_sid, &file_owner_sid)) {
+      /*
+       * Map the desired permissions into owner perms.
+       */
+
+      if(psa->type == SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED)
+        *pmode |= map_nt_perms( psa->info, S_IRUSR);
+      else
+        *pmode &= ~(map_nt_perms( psa->info, S_IRUSR));
+
+    } else if( sid_equal(&ace_sid, &file_grp_sid)) {
+      /*
+       * Map the desired permissions into group perms.
+       */
+
+      if(psa->type == SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED)
+        *pmode |= map_nt_perms( psa->info, S_IRGRP);
+      else
+        *pmode &= ~(map_nt_perms( psa->info, S_IRGRP));
+
+    } else if( sid_equal(&ace_sid, &global_sid_World)) {
+      /*
+       * Map the desired permissions into other perms.
+       */
+
+      if(psa->type == SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED)
+        *pmode |= map_nt_perms( psa->info, S_IROTH);
+      else
+        *pmode &= ~(map_nt_perms( psa->info, S_IROTH));
+
+    } else {
+      DEBUG(0,("unpack_nt_permissions: unknown SID used in ACL.\n"));
+      return False;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (is_directory && all_aces_are_inherit_only) {
+    /*
+     * Windows 2000 is doing one of these weird 'inherit acl'
+     * traverses to conserve NTFS ACL resources. Just pretend
+     * there was no DACL sent. JRA.
+     */
+
+    DEBUG(10,("unpack_nt_permissions: Win2k inherit acl traverse. Ignoring DACL.\n"));
+    free_sec_acl(&psd->dacl);
+  }
+
+  return True;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Reply to query a security descriptor from an fsp. If it succeeds it allocates
+ the space for the return elements and returns the size needed to return the
+ security descriptor. This should be the only external function needed for
+ the UNIX style get ACL.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+size_t get_nt_acl(files_struct *fsp, SEC_DESC **ppdesc)
+{
+  extern DOM_SID global_sid_World;
+  SMB_STRUCT_STAT sbuf;
+  SEC_ACE ace_list[6];
+  DOM_SID owner_sid;
+  DOM_SID group_sid;
+  size_t sec_desc_size;
+  SEC_ACL *psa = NULL;
+  SEC_ACCESS owner_access;
+  int owner_acl_type;
+  SEC_ACCESS group_access;
+  int grp_acl_type;
+  SEC_ACCESS other_access;
+  int other_acl_type;
+  int num_acls = 0;
+ 
+  *ppdesc = NULL;
+
+  if(!lp_nt_acl_support()) {
+    sid_copy( &owner_sid, &global_sid_World);
+    sid_copy( &group_sid, &global_sid_World);
+  } else {
+
+    if(fsp->is_directory || fsp->fd == -1) {
+      if(dos_stat(fsp->fsp_name, &sbuf) != 0) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    } else {
+      if(fsp->conn->vfs_ops.fstat(fsp->fd,&sbuf) != 0) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Get the owner, group and world SIDs.
+     */
+
+    create_file_sids(&sbuf, &owner_sid, &group_sid);
+
+    /*
+     * Create the generic 3 element UNIX acl.
+     */
+
+    owner_access = map_unix_perms(&owner_acl_type, sbuf.st_mode,
+							S_IRUSR, S_IWUSR, S_IXUSR, fsp->is_directory);
+    group_access = map_unix_perms(&grp_acl_type, sbuf.st_mode,
+							S_IRGRP, S_IWGRP, S_IXGRP, fsp->is_directory);
+    other_access = map_unix_perms(&other_acl_type, sbuf.st_mode,
+							S_IROTH, S_IWOTH, S_IXOTH, fsp->is_directory);
+
+    if(owner_access.mask)
+      init_sec_ace(&ace_list[num_acls++], &owner_sid, owner_acl_type,
+                   owner_access, 0);
+
+    if(group_access.mask)
+      init_sec_ace(&ace_list[num_acls++], &group_sid, grp_acl_type,
+                   group_access, 0);
+
+    if(other_access.mask)
+      init_sec_ace(&ace_list[num_acls++], &global_sid_World, other_acl_type,
+                   other_access, 0);
+
+    if(fsp->is_directory) {
+      /*
+       * For directory ACLs we also add in the inherited permissions
+       * ACE entries. These are the permissions a file would get when
+       * being created in the directory.
+       */
+      mode_t mode = unix_mode( fsp->conn, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_ARCHIVE, fsp->fsp_name);
+
+      owner_access = map_unix_perms(&owner_acl_type, mode,
+                            S_IRUSR, S_IWUSR, S_IXUSR, fsp->is_directory);
+      group_access = map_unix_perms(&grp_acl_type, mode,
+                            S_IRGRP, S_IWGRP, S_IXGRP, fsp->is_directory);
+      other_access = map_unix_perms(&other_acl_type, mode,
+                            S_IROTH, S_IWOTH, S_IXOTH, fsp->is_directory);
+
+      if(owner_access.mask)
+        init_sec_ace(&ace_list[num_acls++], &owner_sid, owner_acl_type,
+                     owner_access, SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY);
+
+      if(group_access.mask)
+        init_sec_ace(&ace_list[num_acls++], &group_sid, grp_acl_type,
+                     group_access, SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY);
+
+      if(other_access.mask)
+        init_sec_ace(&ace_list[num_acls++], &global_sid_World, other_acl_type,
+                     other_access, SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY);
+    }
+
+    if(num_acls)
+      if((psa = make_sec_acl( 3, num_acls, ace_list)) == NULL) {
+        DEBUG(0,("get_nt_acl: Unable to malloc space for acl.\n"));
+        return 0;
+      }
+  }
+
+  *ppdesc = make_standard_sec_desc( &owner_sid, &group_sid, psa, &sec_desc_size);
+
+  if(!*ppdesc) {
+    DEBUG(0,("get_nt_acl: Unable to malloc space for security descriptor.\n"));
+    sec_desc_size = 0;
+  }
+
+  free_sec_acl(&psa);
+
+  return sec_desc_size;
+}
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ Reply to set a security descriptor on an fsp. If it succeeds it returns
+ This should be the only external function needed for the UNIX style set ACL.
+****************************************************************************/
+
+BOOL set_nt_acl(files_struct *fsp, SEC_DESC *pdesc)
+{
+  uid_t user = (uid_t)-1;
+  gid_t grp = (gid_t)-1;
+  mode_t perms = 0;
+  SMB_STRUCT_STAT sbuf;  
+  BOOL got_dacl = False;
+
+  /*
+   * Get the current state of the file.
+   */
+
+  if(fsp->is_directory) {
+    if(dos_stat(fsp->fsp_name, &sbuf) != 0)
+      return False;
+  } else {
+
+    int ret;
+
+    if(fsp->fd == -1)
+      ret = conn->vfs_ops.stat(dos_to_unix(fsp->fsp_name,False), &sbuf);
+    else
+      ret = conn->vfs_ops.fstat(fsp->fd,&sbuf);
+
+    if(ret != 0)
+      return False;
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * Unpack the user/group/world id's and permissions.
+   */
+
+  if (!unpack_nt_permissions( &sbuf, &user, &grp, &perms, security_info_sent, psd, fsp->is_directory))
+    return False;
+
+  if (psd->dacl != NULL)
+    got_dacl = True;
+
+  /*
+   * Do we need to chown ?
+   */
+
+  if((user != (uid_t)-1 || grp != (uid_t)-1) && (sbuf.st_uid != user || sbuf.st_gid != grp)) {
+
+    DEBUG(3,("call_nt_transact_set_security_desc: chown %s. uid = %u, gid = %u.\n",
+          fsp->fsp_name, (unsigned int)user, (unsigned int)grp ));
+
+    if(dos_chown( fsp->fsp_name, user, grp) == -1) {
+      DEBUG(3,("call_nt_transact_set_security_desc: chown %s, %u, %u failed. Error = %s.\n",
+            fsp->fsp_name, (unsigned int)user, (unsigned int)grp, strerror(errno) ));
+      return False;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Recheck the current state of the file, which may have changed.
+     * (suid/sgid bits, for instance)
+     */
+
+    if(fsp->is_directory) {
+      if(dos_stat(fsp->fsp_name, &sbuf) != 0) {
+        return False;
+      }
+    } else {
+
+      int ret;
+    
+      if(fsp->fd == -1)
+        ret = conn->vfs_ops.stat(dos_to_unix(fsp->fsp_name,False), &sbuf);
+      else
+        ret = conn->vfs_ops.fstat(fsp->fd,&sbuf);
+  
+      if(ret != 0)
+        return False;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * Only change security if we got a DACL.
+   */
+
+  if((security_info_sent & DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION) && got_dacl) {
+
+    /*
+     * Check to see if we need to change anything.
+     * Enforce limits on modified bits *only*. Don't enforce masks
+	 * on bits not changed by the user.
+     */
+
+    if(fsp->is_directory) {
+
+      perms &= (lp_dir_security_mask(SNUM(conn)) | sbuf.st_mode);
+      perms |= (lp_force_dir_security_mode(SNUM(conn)) & ( perms ^ sbuf.st_mode ));
+
+    } else {
+
+      perms &= (lp_security_mask(SNUM(conn)) | sbuf.st_mode); 
+      perms |= (lp_force_security_mode(SNUM(conn)) & ( perms ^ sbuf.st_mode ));
+
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Preserve special bits.
+     */
+
+    perms |= (sbuf.st_mode & ~0777);
+
+    /*
+     * Do we need to chmod ?
+     */
+
+    if(sbuf.st_mode != perms) {
+
+      DEBUG(3,("call_nt_transact_set_security_desc: chmod %s. perms = 0%o.\n",
+            fsp->fsp_name, (unsigned int)perms ));
+
+      if(conn->vfs_ops.chmod(dos_to_unix(fsp->fsp_name, False), perms) == -1) {
+        DEBUG(3,("call_nt_transact_set_security_desc: chmod %s, 0%o failed. Error = %s.\n",
+              fsp->fsp_name, (unsigned int)perms, strerror(errno) ));
+        return False;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return True;
+}
+#undef OLD_NTDOMAIN