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authorKarolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>2011-02-27 18:28:29 +0100
committerKarolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org>2011-02-27 18:28:29 +0100
commit724e44eed299c618066dec411530aa9f156119ec (patch)
tree143e8ac3903ebff1b46382c5b0e89fc74a5d8eac /source/winbindd/winbindd.c
parent23ec2b1a988fff922864a03b6061c6bc2e584ce0 (diff)
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Fix denial of service - memory corruption.
CVE-2011-0719 Fix bug #7949 (DoS in Winbind and smbd with many file descriptors open). All current released versions of Samba are vulnerable to a denial of service caused by memory corruption. Range checks on file descriptors being used in the FD_SET macro were not present allowing stack corruption. This can cause the Samba code to crash or to loop attempting to select on a bad file descriptor set. A connection to a file share, or a local account is needed to exploit this problem, either authenticated or unauthenticated (guest connection). Currently we do not believe this flaw is exploitable beyond a crash or causing the code to loop, but on the advice of our security reviewers we are releasing fixes in case an exploit is discovered at a later date.
Diffstat (limited to 'source/winbindd/winbindd.c')
-rw-r--r--source/winbindd/winbindd.c12
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/source/winbindd/winbindd.c b/source/winbindd/winbindd.c
index 1d618e26317..6b5c251bf6b 100644
--- a/source/winbindd/winbindd.c
+++ b/source/winbindd/winbindd.c
@@ -836,7 +836,8 @@ static void process_loop(void)
listen_sock = open_winbindd_socket();
listen_priv_sock = open_winbindd_priv_socket();
- if (listen_sock == -1 || listen_priv_sock == -1) {
+ if (listen_sock < 0 || listen_sock >= FD_SETSIZE ||
+ listen_priv_sock < 0 || listen_priv_sock >= FD_SETSIZE) {
perror("open_winbind_socket");
exit(1);
}
@@ -861,6 +862,9 @@ static void process_loop(void)
FD_ZERO(&r_fds);
FD_ZERO(&w_fds);
+
+ /* We check the range for listen_sock and
+ listen_priv_sock above. */
FD_SET(listen_sock, &r_fds);
FD_SET(listen_priv_sock, &r_fds);
@@ -890,6 +894,12 @@ static void process_loop(void)
}
for (ev = fd_events; ev; ev = ev->next) {
+ if (ev->fd < 0 || ev->fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ /* Ignore here - event_add_to_select_args
+ should make this impossible. */
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (ev->flags & EVENT_FD_READ) {
FD_SET(ev->fd, &r_fds);
maxfd = MAX(ev->fd, maxfd);