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author | Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org> | 2011-02-27 18:28:29 +0100 |
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committer | Karolin Seeger <kseeger@samba.org> | 2011-02-27 18:28:29 +0100 |
commit | 724e44eed299c618066dec411530aa9f156119ec (patch) | |
tree | 143e8ac3903ebff1b46382c5b0e89fc74a5d8eac /source/winbindd/winbindd.c | |
parent | 23ec2b1a988fff922864a03b6061c6bc2e584ce0 (diff) | |
download | samba-724e44eed299c618066dec411530aa9f156119ec.tar.gz samba-724e44eed299c618066dec411530aa9f156119ec.tar.xz samba-724e44eed299c618066dec411530aa9f156119ec.zip |
Fix denial of service - memory corruption.
CVE-2011-0719
Fix bug #7949 (DoS in Winbind and smbd with many file descriptors open).
All current released versions of Samba are vulnerable to
a denial of service caused by memory corruption. Range
checks on file descriptors being used in the FD_SET macro
were not present allowing stack corruption. This can cause
the Samba code to crash or to loop attempting to select
on a bad file descriptor set.
A connection to a file share, or a local account is needed
to exploit this problem, either authenticated or unauthenticated
(guest connection).
Currently we do not believe this flaw is exploitable
beyond a crash or causing the code to loop, but on the
advice of our security reviewers we are releasing fixes
in case an exploit is discovered at a later date.
Diffstat (limited to 'source/winbindd/winbindd.c')
-rw-r--r-- | source/winbindd/winbindd.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/source/winbindd/winbindd.c b/source/winbindd/winbindd.c index 1d618e26317..6b5c251bf6b 100644 --- a/source/winbindd/winbindd.c +++ b/source/winbindd/winbindd.c @@ -836,7 +836,8 @@ static void process_loop(void) listen_sock = open_winbindd_socket(); listen_priv_sock = open_winbindd_priv_socket(); - if (listen_sock == -1 || listen_priv_sock == -1) { + if (listen_sock < 0 || listen_sock >= FD_SETSIZE || + listen_priv_sock < 0 || listen_priv_sock >= FD_SETSIZE) { perror("open_winbind_socket"); exit(1); } @@ -861,6 +862,9 @@ static void process_loop(void) FD_ZERO(&r_fds); FD_ZERO(&w_fds); + + /* We check the range for listen_sock and + listen_priv_sock above. */ FD_SET(listen_sock, &r_fds); FD_SET(listen_priv_sock, &r_fds); @@ -890,6 +894,12 @@ static void process_loop(void) } for (ev = fd_events; ev; ev = ev->next) { + if (ev->fd < 0 || ev->fd >= FD_SETSIZE) { + /* Ignore here - event_add_to_select_args + should make this impossible. */ + continue; + } + if (ev->flags & EVENT_FD_READ) { FD_SET(ev->fd, &r_fds); maxfd = MAX(ev->fd, maxfd); |