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authorGerald Carter <jerry@samba.org>2004-08-17 13:48:52 +0000
committerGerald Carter <jerry@samba.org>2004-08-17 13:48:52 +0000
commitfd1468b85e17b46c9ec4402ef37f4683a045a97f (patch)
tree2f5ba0d153449b10b9128d9f4e6868643683be74
parent06c47874b300f61f721d05769959b3d34ff11d12 (diff)
downloadsamba-fd1468b85e17b46c9ec4402ef37f4683a045a97f.tar.gz
samba-fd1468b85e17b46c9ec4402ef37f4683a045a97f.tar.xz
samba-fd1468b85e17b46c9ec4402ef37f4683a045a97f.zip
r1861: syncing the DOS client fix, volker's vfs module, & updating release notes some more
-rw-r--r--WHATSNEW.txt38
-rw-r--r--source/modules/vfs_afsacl.c370
-rw-r--r--source/param/loadparm.c5
-rw-r--r--source/smbd/reply.c4
-rw-r--r--source/utils/net_groupmap.c6
5 files changed, 363 insertions, 60 deletions
diff --git a/WHATSNEW.txt b/WHATSNEW.txt
index 558656aec02..24622d1ce94 100644
--- a/WHATSNEW.txt
+++ b/WHATSNEW.txt
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
=============================
Release Notes for Samba 3.0.6
- Aug XX, 2004
+ Aug 18, 2004
=============================
This is the latest stable release of Samba. This is the version
@@ -93,6 +93,42 @@ to implement this restriction).
Changes
#######
+Changes since 3.0.6rc2
+----------------------
+
+o Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
+ * Ensure we return the same ACL revision on the wire that
+ W2K3 does.
+ * BUG 1578: Hardcode replacement for invalid characters as '_'
+ (based on fix from Alexander E. Patrakov <patrakov@ums.usu.ru>).
+ * Fix hashed password history for LDAP backends.
+ * Enforce logon hours restrictions if confiogured (based on code
+ from Richard Renard <rrenard@idealx.com>).
+ * BUG 1606: Force smbd to disable sendfile with DOS clients
+ and ensure that the chained header is filled in for ...&X
+ commands.
+
+
+o Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
+ o prevent infinite recusion in reopen_logs() when expanding
+ the smb.conf variable %I.
+
+
+o Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
+ o Improved NT->AFS ACL mapping VFS module.
+
+
+o Lars Mueller <lmuelle@suse.de>
+ o Fix compiler warnings in the kerberos client code.
+
+
+o James Peach <jpeach@sgi.com>
+ * Prevent smbd from attempting to use sendfile at all if it is not
+ supported by the server's OS.
+ * Allow SWAT to search for index.html when searving html files
+ in a directory.
+
+
Changes since 3.0.5
-------------------
diff --git a/source/modules/vfs_afsacl.c b/source/modules/vfs_afsacl.c
index 01b3fcb2b90..cd10dc71c2e 100644
--- a/source/modules/vfs_afsacl.c
+++ b/source/modules/vfs_afsacl.c
@@ -74,7 +74,11 @@ static BOOL init_afs_acl(struct afs_acl *acl)
static void free_afs_acl(struct afs_acl *acl)
{
- talloc_destroy(acl->ctx);
+ if (acl->ctx != NULL)
+ talloc_destroy(acl->ctx);
+ acl->ctx = NULL;
+ acl->num_aces = 0;
+ acl->acelist = NULL;
}
static struct afs_ace *clone_afs_ace(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct afs_ace *ace)
@@ -191,6 +195,14 @@ static void add_afs_ace(struct afs_acl *acl,
{
struct afs_ace *ace;
+ for (ace = acl->acelist; ace != NULL; ace = ace->next) {
+ if ((ace->positive == positive) &&
+ (strequal(ace->name, name))) {
+ ace->rights |= rights;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
ace = new_afs_ace(acl->ctx, positive, name, rights);
ace->next = acl->acelist;
@@ -331,40 +343,192 @@ static uint32 afs_to_nt_file_rights(uint32 rights)
return result;
}
-static uint32 afs_to_nt_dir_rights(uint32 rights)
+static void afs_to_nt_dir_rights(uint32 afs_rights, uint32 *nt_rights,
+ uint8 *flag)
{
- uint32 result = 0;
+ *nt_rights = 0;
+ *flag = SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT;
- if (rights & PRSFS_INSERT)
- result |= FILE_ADD_FILE | FILE_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY;
+ if (afs_rights & PRSFS_INSERT)
+ *nt_rights |= FILE_ADD_FILE | FILE_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY;
- if (rights & PRSFS_LOOKUP)
- result |= FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_READ_EA |
+ if (afs_rights & PRSFS_LOOKUP)
+ *nt_rights |= FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_READ_EA |
FILE_EXECUTE | FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES |
READ_CONTROL_ACCESS | SYNCHRONIZE_ACCESS;
- if (rights & PRSFS_WRITE)
- result |= FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES | FILE_WRITE_DATA |
+ if (afs_rights & PRSFS_WRITE)
+ *nt_rights |= FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES | FILE_WRITE_DATA |
FILE_APPEND_DATA | FILE_WRITE_EA;
- if ((rights & (PRSFS_INSERT|PRSFS_LOOKUP|PRSFS_DELETE)) ==
+ if ((afs_rights & (PRSFS_INSERT|PRSFS_LOOKUP|PRSFS_DELETE)) ==
(PRSFS_INSERT|PRSFS_LOOKUP|PRSFS_DELETE))
- result |= FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES | FILE_WRITE_EA |
+ *nt_rights |= FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES | FILE_WRITE_EA |
GENERIC_WRITE_ACCESS;
- if (rights & PRSFS_DELETE)
- result |= DELETE_ACCESS;
+ if (afs_rights & PRSFS_DELETE)
+ *nt_rights |= DELETE_ACCESS;
- if (rights & PRSFS_ADMINISTER)
- result |= FILE_DELETE_CHILD | WRITE_DAC_ACCESS |
+ if (afs_rights & PRSFS_ADMINISTER)
+ *nt_rights |= FILE_DELETE_CHILD | WRITE_DAC_ACCESS |
WRITE_OWNER_ACCESS;
- return result;
+ if ( (afs_rights & PRSFS_LOOKUP) ==
+ (afs_rights & (PRSFS_LOOKUP|PRSFS_READ)) ) {
+ /* Only lookup right */
+ *flag = SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT;
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
+
+#define AFS_FILE_RIGHTS (PRSFS_READ|PRSFS_WRITE|PRSFS_LOCK)
+#define AFS_DIR_RIGHTS (PRSFS_INSERT|PRSFS_LOOKUP|PRSFS_DELETE|PRSFS_ADMINISTER)
+
+static void split_afs_acl(struct afs_acl *acl,
+ struct afs_acl *dir_acl,
+ struct afs_acl *file_acl)
+{
+ struct afs_ace *ace;
+
+ init_afs_acl(dir_acl);
+ init_afs_acl(file_acl);
+
+ for (ace = acl->acelist; ace != NULL; ace = ace->next) {
+ if (ace->rights & AFS_FILE_RIGHTS) {
+ add_afs_ace(file_acl, ace->positive, ace->name,
+ ace->rights & AFS_FILE_RIGHTS);
+ }
+
+ if (ace->rights & AFS_DIR_RIGHTS) {
+ add_afs_ace(dir_acl, ace->positive, ace->name,
+ ace->rights & AFS_DIR_RIGHTS);
+ }
+ }
+ return;
+}
+
+static BOOL same_principal(struct afs_ace *x, struct afs_ace *y)
+{
+ return ( (x->positive == y->positive) &&
+ (sid_compare(&x->sid, &y->sid) == 0) );
}
-static uint32 nt_to_afs_dir_rights(uint32 rights)
+static void merge_afs_acls(struct afs_acl *dir_acl,
+ struct afs_acl *file_acl,
+ struct afs_acl *target)
+{
+ struct afs_ace *ace;
+
+ init_afs_acl(target);
+
+ for (ace = dir_acl->acelist; ace != NULL; ace = ace->next) {
+ struct afs_ace *file_ace;
+ BOOL found = False;
+
+ for (file_ace = file_acl->acelist;
+ file_ace != NULL;
+ file_ace = file_ace->next) {
+ if (!same_principal(ace, file_ace))
+ continue;
+
+ add_afs_ace(target, ace->positive, ace->name,
+ ace->rights | file_ace->rights);
+ found = True;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!found)
+ add_afs_ace(target, ace->positive, ace->name,
+ ace->rights);
+ }
+
+ for (ace = file_acl->acelist; ace != NULL; ace = ace->next) {
+ struct afs_ace *dir_ace;
+ BOOL already_seen = False;
+
+ for (dir_ace = dir_acl->acelist;
+ dir_ace != NULL;
+ dir_ace = dir_ace->next) {
+ if (!same_principal(ace, dir_ace))
+ continue;
+ already_seen = True;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!already_seen)
+ add_afs_ace(target, ace->positive, ace->name,
+ ace->rights);
+ }
+}
+
+#define PERMS_READ 0x001200a9
+#define PERMS_CHANGE 0x001301bf
+#define PERMS_FULL 0x001f01ff
+
+static struct static_dir_ace_mapping {
+ uint8 type;
+ uint8 flags;
+ uint32 mask;
+ uint32 afs_rights;
+} ace_mappings[] = {
+
+ /* Full control */
+ { 0, SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT,
+ PERMS_FULL, 127 /* rlidwka */ },
+
+ /* Change (write) */
+ { 0, SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT,
+ PERMS_CHANGE, 63 /* rlidwk */ },
+
+ /* Read (including list folder content) */
+ { 0, SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT,
+ PERMS_READ, 9 /* rl */ },
+
+ /* Read without list folder content -- same as "l" */
+ { 0, SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT,
+ 0x00120089, 8 /* l */ },
+
+ /* List folder */
+ { 0, SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT,
+ PERMS_READ, 8 /* l */ },
+
+ /* FULL without inheritance -- in all cases here we also get
+ the corresponding INHERIT_ONLY ACE in the same ACL */
+ { 0, 0, PERMS_FULL, 127 /* rlidwka */ },
+
+ /* FULL inherit only -- counterpart to previous one */
+ { 0, SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY,
+ PERMS_FULL | GENERIC_RIGHT_WRITE_ACCESS, 127 /* rlidwka */ },
+
+ /* CHANGE without inheritance -- in all cases here we also get
+ the corresponding INHERIT_ONLY ACE in the same ACL */
+ { 0, 0, PERMS_CHANGE, 63 /* rlidwk */ },
+
+ /* CHANGE inherit only -- counterpart to previous one */
+ { 0, SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT|SEC_ACE_FLAG_INHERIT_ONLY,
+ PERMS_CHANGE | GENERIC_RIGHT_WRITE_ACCESS, 63 /* rlidwk */ },
+
+ /* End marker, hopefully there's no afs right 9999 :-) */
+ { 0, 0, 0, 9999 }
+};
+
+static uint32 nt_to_afs_dir_rights(const char *filename, const SEC_ACE *ace)
{
uint32 result = 0;
+ uint32 rights = ace->info.mask;
+ uint8 flags = ace->flags;
+
+ struct static_dir_ace_mapping *m;
+
+ for (m = &ace_mappings[0]; m->afs_rights != 9999; m++) {
+ if ( (ace->type == m->type) &&
+ (ace->flags == m->flags) &&
+ (ace->info.mask == m->mask) )
+ return m->afs_rights;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(1, ("AFSACL FALLBACK: 0x%X 0x%X 0x%X %s\n",
+ ace->type, ace->flags, ace->info.mask, filename));
if (rights & (GENERIC_ALL_ACCESS|WRITE_DAC_ACCESS)) {
result |= PRSFS_READ | PRSFS_WRITE | PRSFS_INSERT |
@@ -373,12 +537,33 @@ static uint32 nt_to_afs_dir_rights(uint32 rights)
}
if (rights & (GENERIC_READ_ACCESS|FILE_READ_DATA)) {
- result |= PRSFS_READ | PRSFS_LOOKUP;
+ result |= PRSFS_LOOKUP;
+ if (flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT) {
+ result |= PRSFS_READ;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rights & (GENERIC_WRITE_ACCESS|FILE_WRITE_DATA)) {
+ result |= PRSFS_INSERT | PRSFS_DELETE;
+ if (flags & SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT) {
+ result |= PRSFS_WRITE | PRSFS_LOCK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+static uint32 nt_to_afs_file_rights(const char *filename, const SEC_ACE *ace)
+{
+ uint32 result = 0;
+ uint32 rights = ace->info.mask;
+
+ if (rights & (GENERIC_READ_ACCESS|FILE_READ_DATA)) {
+ result |= PRSFS_READ;
}
if (rights & (GENERIC_WRITE_ACCESS|FILE_WRITE_DATA)) {
- result |= PRSFS_WRITE | PRSFS_INSERT | PRSFS_DELETE |
- PRSFS_LOCK;
+ result |= PRSFS_WRITE | PRSFS_LOCK;
}
return result;
@@ -424,6 +609,8 @@ static size_t afs_to_nt_acl(struct afs_acl *afs_acl,
while (afs_ace != NULL) {
uint32 nt_rights;
+ uint8 flag = SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT |
+ SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT;
if (afs_ace->type == SID_NAME_UNKNOWN) {
DEBUG(10, ("Ignoring unknown name %s\n",
@@ -433,15 +620,14 @@ static size_t afs_to_nt_acl(struct afs_acl *afs_acl,
}
if (fsp->is_directory)
- nt_rights = afs_to_nt_dir_rights(afs_ace->rights);
+ afs_to_nt_dir_rights(afs_ace->rights, &nt_rights,
+ &flag);
else
nt_rights = afs_to_nt_file_rights(afs_ace->rights);
init_sec_access(&mask, nt_rights);
init_sec_ace(&nt_ace_list[good_aces++], &(afs_ace->sid),
- SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, mask,
- SEC_ACE_FLAG_OBJECT_INHERIT |
- SEC_ACE_FLAG_CONTAINER_INHERIT);
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED, mask, flag);
afs_ace = afs_ace->next;
}
@@ -462,8 +648,35 @@ static size_t afs_to_nt_acl(struct afs_acl *afs_acl,
return sd_size;
}
-static BOOL nt_to_afs_acl(uint32 security_info_sent,
+static BOOL mappable_sid(const DOM_SID *sid)
+{
+ DOM_SID domain_sid;
+
+ if (sid_compare(sid, &global_sid_Builtin_Administrators) == 0)
+ return True;
+
+ if (sid_compare(sid, &global_sid_World) == 0)
+ return True;
+
+ if (sid_compare(sid, &global_sid_Authenticated_Users) == 0)
+ return True;
+
+ if (sid_compare(sid, &global_sid_Builtin_Backup_Operators) == 0)
+ return True;
+
+ string_to_sid(&domain_sid, "S-1-5-21");
+
+ if (sid_compare_domain(sid, &domain_sid) == 0)
+ return True;
+
+ return False;
+}
+
+static BOOL nt_to_afs_acl(const char *filename,
+ uint32 security_info_sent,
struct security_descriptor_info *psd,
+ uint32 (*nt_to_afs_rights)(const char *filename,
+ const SEC_ACE *ace),
struct afs_acl *afs_acl)
{
SEC_ACL *dacl;
@@ -491,6 +704,12 @@ static BOOL nt_to_afs_acl(uint32 security_info_sent,
return False;
}
+ if (!mappable_sid(&ace->trustee)) {
+ DEBUG(10, ("Ignoring unmappable SID %s\n",
+ sid_string_static(&ace->trustee)));
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (sid_compare(&ace->trustee,
&global_sid_Builtin_Administrators) == 0) {
@@ -516,19 +735,14 @@ static BOOL nt_to_afs_acl(uint32 security_info_sent,
if (!lookup_sid(&ace->trustee,
dom_name, name, &name_type)) {
- DEBUG(3, ("Could not lookup sid %s\n",
- sid_string_static(&ace->trustee)));
- return False;
- }
-
- if (strcmp(dom_name, lp_workgroup()) != 0) {
- DEBUG(3, ("Got SID for domain %s, not mine\n",
- dom_name));
- return False;
+ DEBUG(1, ("AFSACL: Could not lookup SID %s on file %s\n",
+ sid_string_static(&ace->trustee), filename));
+ continue;
}
if ( (name_type == SID_NAME_USER) ||
- (name_type == SID_NAME_DOM_GRP) ) {
+ (name_type == SID_NAME_DOM_GRP) ||
+ (name_type == SID_NAME_ALIAS) ) {
fstring only_username;
fstrcpy(only_username, name);
fstr_sprintf(name, "%s%s%s",
@@ -539,7 +753,7 @@ static BOOL nt_to_afs_acl(uint32 security_info_sent,
}
add_afs_ace(afs_acl, True, name,
- nt_to_afs_dir_rights(ace->info.mask));
+ nt_to_afs_rights(filename, ace));
}
return True;
@@ -630,51 +844,99 @@ static void merge_unknown_aces(struct afs_acl *src, struct afs_acl *dst)
}
}
-static BOOL afs_set_nt_acl(files_struct *fsp, uint32 security_info_sent,
+static BOOL afs_set_nt_acl(vfs_handle_struct *handle, files_struct *fsp,
+ uint32 security_info_sent,
struct security_descriptor_info *psd)
{
struct afs_acl old_afs_acl, new_afs_acl;
+ struct afs_acl dir_acl, file_acl;
char acl_string[2049];
struct afs_iob iob;
- int ret;
+ int ret = -1;
+ pstring name;
+ const char *fileacls;
+
+ fileacls = lp_parm_const_string(SNUM(handle->conn), "afsacl", "fileacls",
+ "yes");
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(old_afs_acl);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(new_afs_acl);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(dir_acl);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(file_acl);
+
+ pstr_sprintf(name, fsp->fsp_name);
if (!fsp->is_directory) {
- /* AFS only supports ACLs on directories... */
- return False;
+ char *p = strrchr(name, '/');
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(3, ("No / in file string\n"));
+ return False;
+ }
+ *p = '\0';
}
- if (!afs_get_afs_acl(fsp->fsp_name, &old_afs_acl)) {
+ if (!afs_get_afs_acl(name, &old_afs_acl)) {
DEBUG(3, ("Could not get old ACL of %s\n", fsp->fsp_name));
- return False;
+ goto done;
}
- if (!nt_to_afs_acl(security_info_sent, psd, &new_afs_acl)) {
- free_afs_acl(&old_afs_acl);
- return False;
+ split_afs_acl(&old_afs_acl, &dir_acl, &file_acl);
+
+ if (fsp->is_directory) {
+
+ if (!strequal(fileacls, "yes")) {
+ /* Throw away file acls, we depend on the
+ * inheritance ACEs that also give us file
+ * permissions */
+ free_afs_acl(&file_acl);
+ }
+
+ free_afs_acl(&dir_acl);
+ if (!nt_to_afs_acl(fsp->fsp_name, security_info_sent, psd,
+ nt_to_afs_dir_rights, &dir_acl))
+ goto done;
+ } else {
+ if (strequal(fileacls, "no")) {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (strequal(fileacls, "ignore")) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ free_afs_acl(&file_acl);
+ if (!nt_to_afs_acl(fsp->fsp_name, security_info_sent, psd,
+ nt_to_afs_file_rights, &file_acl))
+ goto done;
}
+ merge_afs_acls(&dir_acl, &file_acl, &new_afs_acl);
+
merge_unknown_aces(&old_afs_acl, &new_afs_acl);
unparse_afs_acl(&new_afs_acl, acl_string);
- free_afs_acl(&old_afs_acl);
- free_afs_acl(&new_afs_acl);
-
iob.in = acl_string;
iob.in_size = 1+strlen(iob.in);
iob.out = NULL;
iob.out_size = 0;
- DEBUG(10, ("trying to set acl '%s' on file %s\n",
- iob.in, fsp->fsp_name));
+ DEBUG(10, ("trying to set acl '%s' on file %s\n", iob.in, name));
- ret = afs_syscall(AFSCALL_PIOCTL, fsp->fsp_name, VIOCSETAL,
- (char *)&iob, 0);
+ ret = afs_syscall(AFSCALL_PIOCTL, name, VIOCSETAL, (char *)&iob, 0);
if (ret != 0) {
DEBUG(10, ("VIOCSETAL returned %d\n", ret));
}
+ done:
+ free_afs_acl(&dir_acl);
+ free_afs_acl(&file_acl);
+ free_afs_acl(&old_afs_acl);
+ free_afs_acl(&new_afs_acl);
+
return (ret == 0);
}
@@ -698,7 +960,7 @@ BOOL afsacl_fset_nt_acl(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
int fd, uint32 security_info_sent,
SEC_DESC *psd)
{
- return afs_set_nt_acl(fsp, security_info_sent, psd);
+ return afs_set_nt_acl(handle, fsp, security_info_sent, psd);
}
BOOL afsacl_set_nt_acl(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
@@ -706,7 +968,7 @@ BOOL afsacl_set_nt_acl(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
const char *name, uint32 security_info_sent,
SEC_DESC *psd)
{
- return afs_set_nt_acl(fsp, security_info_sent, psd);
+ return afs_set_nt_acl(handle, fsp, security_info_sent, psd);
}
/* VFS operations structure */
diff --git a/source/param/loadparm.c b/source/param/loadparm.c
index 4150f57e55d..2750cc7edab 100644
--- a/source/param/loadparm.c
+++ b/source/param/loadparm.c
@@ -4320,6 +4320,11 @@ int lp_maxprintjobs(int snum)
BOOL lp_use_sendfile(int snum)
{
+ extern int Protocol;
+ /* Using sendfile blows the brains out of any DOS or Win9x TCP stack... JRA. */
+ if (Protocol < PROTOCOL_NT1) {
+ return False;
+ }
return (_lp_use_sendfile(snum) && (get_remote_arch() != RA_WIN95) && !srv_is_signing_active());
}
diff --git a/source/smbd/reply.c b/source/smbd/reply.c
index 4125d71b840..74872eeea9f 100644
--- a/source/smbd/reply.c
+++ b/source/smbd/reply.c
@@ -1735,7 +1735,7 @@ void send_file_readbraw(connection_struct *conn, files_struct *fsp, SMB_OFF_T st
* reply_readbraw has already checked the length.
*/
- if ((nread > 0) && (lp_write_cache_size(SNUM(conn)) == 0) && lp_use_sendfile(SNUM(conn)) ) {
+ if (chain_size ==0 && (nread > 0) && (lp_write_cache_size(SNUM(conn)) == 0) && lp_use_sendfile(SNUM(conn)) ) {
DATA_BLOB header;
_smb_setlen(outbuf,nread);
@@ -2075,7 +2075,7 @@ int send_file_readX(connection_struct *conn, char *inbuf,char *outbuf,int length
* on a train in Germany :-). JRA.
*/
- if ((CVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv0) == 0xFF) && lp_use_sendfile(SNUM(conn)) &&
+ if (chain_size ==0 && (CVAL(inbuf,smb_vwv0) == 0xFF) && lp_use_sendfile(SNUM(conn)) &&
(lp_write_cache_size(SNUM(conn)) == 0) ) {
SMB_STRUCT_STAT sbuf;
DATA_BLOB header;
diff --git a/source/utils/net_groupmap.c b/source/utils/net_groupmap.c
index a3a13e1dd88..0ad1d519531 100644
--- a/source/utils/net_groupmap.c
+++ b/source/utils/net_groupmap.c
@@ -712,11 +712,11 @@ int net_help_groupmap(int argc, const char **argv)
"\n Update a group mapping\n");
d_printf("net groupmap delete"\
"\n Remove a group mapping\n");
- d_printf("net groupmap addmember"\
+ d_printf("net groupmap addmem"\
"\n Add a foreign alias member\n");
- d_printf("net groupmap delmember"\
+ d_printf("net groupmap delmem"\
"\n Delete a foreign alias member\n");
- d_printf("net groupmap listmembers"\
+ d_printf("net groupmap listmem"\
"\n List foreign group members\n");
d_printf("net groupmap memberships"\
"\n List foreign group memberships\n");