This patch removes all of the files from the samba tree that should now
be provided by the cifs-utils package. It also drops a
"README.cifs-utils" into the topdir with a URL to the main cifs-utils
webpage. This is for people who don't want the lists and might be taken
by surprise by the change. That's optional, but I think it's a good idea
for a least a release or two.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>

cifs.upcall calls smb_krb5_unparse_name with a NULL talloc context.
Older versions of this function though will conditionally use
SMB_REALLOC instead of TALLOC_REALLOC when a NULL context is passed
in. To make it more consistent, just spawn a talloc context that
we can pass into this function.

Resolves:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=565446
https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6868

Reported-by: Ludek Finstrle <luf@seznam.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>

Jeremy

mount.cifs has been the subject of several "security" fire drills due to
distributions installing it as a setuid root program. This program has
not been properly audited for security and the Samba team highly
recommends that it not be installed as a setuid root program at this
time.

To make that abundantly clear, this patch forcibly disables the ability
for mount.cifs to run as a setuid root program. People are welcome to
trivially patch this out, but they do so at their own peril.

A security audit and redesign of this program is in progress and we hope
that we'll be able to remove this in the near future.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>

It's apparently possible to corrupt the mtab if you pass embedded
newlines to addmntent. Apparently tabs are also a problem with certain
earlier glibc versions. Backslashes are also a minor issue apparently,
but we can't reasonably filter those.

Make sure that neither the devname or mountpoint contain any problematic
characters before allowing the mount to proceed.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>

It's possible to trick mount.cifs into mounting onto the wrong directory
by replacing the mountpoint with a symlink to a directory. mount.cifs
attempts to check the validity of the mountpoint, but there's still a
possible race between those checks and the mount(2) syscall.

To guard against this, chdir to the mountpoint very early, and only deal
with it as "." from then on out.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>

This seems to be the only way to deal with mixed heimdal/MIT setups during
merged build.

Guenther

Guenther

Guenther