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authorDenys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>2009-11-27 16:05:39 +0100
committerDenys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>2009-11-27 16:05:39 +0100
commit6e4495f7f13bd498f4f232b5e234e833a4573d73 (patch)
tree01f90f8ee44aba6fc100faec3c9167c38fbf5972 /src/Hooks
parentace66de86bf1ae744cc8e0381611c106edc0ae78 (diff)
downloadabrt-6e4495f7f13bd498f4f232b5e234e833a4573d73.tar.gz
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Hooks/CCpp.cpp: add MakeCompatCore = yes/no directive. Fixes rhbz#541707
Run tested Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/Hooks')
-rw-r--r--src/Hooks/CCpp.cpp220
1 files changed, 185 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/src/Hooks/CCpp.cpp b/src/Hooks/CCpp.cpp
index de74bdf9..bea24c57 100644
--- a/src/Hooks/CCpp.cpp
+++ b/src/Hooks/CCpp.cpp
@@ -17,7 +17,15 @@
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
- */
+*/
+
+/* Make all file ops "large" and make off_t 64-bit.
+ * No need to use O_LORGEFILE anywhere
+ */
+#define _LARGEFILE_SOURCE
+#define _LARGEFILE64_SOURCE
+#define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS 64
+
#include "abrtlib.h"
#include "DebugDump.h"
#include "ABRTException.h"
@@ -31,13 +39,12 @@
using namespace std;
-static char* get_executable(pid_t pid)
+static char* malloc_readlink(const char *linkname)
{
char buf[PATH_MAX + 1];
int len;
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "/proc/%u/exe", (int)pid);
- len = readlink(buf, buf, sizeof(buf)-1);
+ len = readlink(linkname, buf, sizeof(buf)-1);
if (len >= 0)
{
buf[len] = '\0';
@@ -46,6 +53,22 @@ static char* get_executable(pid_t pid)
return NULL;
}
+static char* get_executable(pid_t pid)
+{
+ char buf[sizeof("/proc/%u/exe") + sizeof(int)*3];
+
+ sprintf(buf, "/proc/%u/exe", (int)pid);
+ return malloc_readlink(buf);
+}
+
+static char* get_cwd(pid_t pid)
+{
+ char buf[sizeof("/proc/%u/cwd") + sizeof(int)*3];
+
+ sprintf(buf, "/proc/%u/cwd", (int)pid);
+ return malloc_readlink(buf);
+}
+
static char *append_escaped(char *start, const char *s)
{
char hex_char_buf[] = "\\x00";
@@ -135,18 +158,18 @@ static char* get_cmdline(pid_t pid)
static int daemon_is_ok()
{
- char pid[sizeof(pid_t)*3 + 2];
- char path[PATH_MAX];
- struct stat buff;
int fd = open(VAR_RUN_PID_FILE, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
{
return 0;
}
+
+ char pid[sizeof(pid_t)*3 + 2];
int len = read(fd, pid, sizeof(pid)-1);
close(fd);
if (len <= 0)
return 0;
+
pid[len] = '\0';
*strchrnul(pid, '\n') = '\0';
/* paranoia: we don't want to check /proc//stat or /proc///stat */
@@ -154,8 +177,10 @@ static int daemon_is_ok()
return 0;
/* TODO: maybe readlink and check that it is "xxx/abrt"? */
- snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%s/stat", pid);
- if (stat(path, &buff) == -1)
+ char path[sizeof("/proc/%s/stat") + sizeof(pid)];
+ sprintf(path, "/proc/%s/stat", pid);
+ struct stat sb;
+ if (stat(path, &sb) == -1)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -192,6 +217,10 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
error_msg_and_die("pid '%s' or uid '%s' are bogus", argv[2], argv[4]);
}
+
+ char *user_pwd = get_cwd(pid); /* may be NULL on error */
+ int core_fd = STDIN_FILENO;
+
if (!daemon_is_ok())
{
/* not an error, exit with exitcode 0 */
@@ -199,7 +228,7 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
"/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains a stale value, "
"consider resetting it to 'core'"
);
- return 0;
+ goto create_user_core;
}
try
@@ -225,9 +254,9 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
* On the contrary, mere files are ignored by abrtd.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/abrtd-coredump", dddir);
- int fd = xopen3(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
- off_t size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, fd);
- if (size < 0 || close(fd) != 0)
+ core_fd = xopen3(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
+ off_t size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, core_fd);
+ if (size < 0 || close(core_fd) != 0)
{
unlink(path);
/* copyfd_eof logs the error including errno string,
@@ -238,16 +267,6 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
return 0;
}
- /* rhbz#539551: "abrt going crazy when crashing process is respawned".
- * Do we want to protect against or ameliorate this? How? Ideas:
- * (1) nice ourself?
- * (2) check total size of dump dir, if it overflows, either abort dump
- * or delete oldest/biggest dumps? [abort would be simpler,
- * abrtd already does "delete on overflow" thing]
- * (3) detect parallel dumps in progress and back off
- * (pause/renice further/??)
- */
-
char* cmdline = get_cmdline(pid); /* never NULL */
const char *signame = strsignal(atoi(signal_str));
char *reason = xasprintf("Process was terminated by signal %s (%s)", signal_str, signame ? signame : signal_str);
@@ -264,18 +283,19 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
snprintf(path + len, sizeof(path) - len, "/"FILENAME_COREDUMP);
/* We need coredumps to be readable by all, because
- * process producing backtraces is run under the same UID
+ * when abrt daemon processes coredump,
+ * process producing backtrace is run under the same UID
* as the crashed process.
* Thus 644, not 600 */
- int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
- if (fd < 0)
+ core_fd = open(path, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
+ if (core_fd < 0)
{
dd.Delete();
dd.Close();
perror_msg_and_die("can't open '%s'", path);
}
- off_t size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, fd);
- if (size < 0 || close(fd) != 0)
+ off_t size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, core_fd);
+ if (size < 0 || fsync(core_fd) != 0)
{
unlink(path);
dd.Delete();
@@ -284,6 +304,8 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("error saving coredump to %s", path);
}
+ lseek(core_fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
+ /* note: core_fd is still open, we may use it later to copy core to user's dir */
free(executable);
free(cmdline);
log("saved core dump of pid %u to %s (%llu bytes)", (int)pid, path, (long long)size);
@@ -297,29 +319,74 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
*/
dd.Close();
- /* Get it from abrt.conf */
+ /* Parse abrt.conf and plugins/CCpp.conf */
unsigned setting_MaxCrashReportsSize = 0;
+ bool setting_MakeCompatCore = false;
+ bool abrt_conf = true;
FILE *fp = fopen(CONF_DIR"/abrt.conf", "r");
if (fp)
{
char line[256];
- while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp) != NULL)
+ while (1)
{
+ if (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp) == NULL)
+ {
+ /* Next .conf file plz */
+ if (abrt_conf)
+ {
+ abrt_conf = false;
+ fp = fopen(CONF_DIR"/plugins/CCpp.conf", "r");
+ if (fp)
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ unsigned len = strlen(line);
+ if (len > 0 && line[len-1] == '\n')
+ line[--len] = '\0';
const char *p = skip_whitespace(line);
- if (strncmp(p, "MaxCrashReportsSize", sizeof("MaxCrashReportsSize")-1) == 0)
+#undef DIRECTIVE
+#define DIRECTIVE "MaxCrashReportsSize"
+ if (strncmp(p, DIRECTIVE, sizeof(DIRECTIVE)-1) == 0)
{
- p = skip_whitespace(p + sizeof("MaxCrashReportsSize")-1);
+ p = skip_whitespace(p + sizeof(DIRECTIVE)-1);
if (*p != '=')
continue;
p = skip_whitespace(p + 1);
if (isdigit(*p))
- setting_MaxCrashReportsSize = (unsigned long)atoi(p);
+ /* x1.25: go a bit up, so that usual in-daemon trimming
+ * kicks in first, and we don't "fight" with it. */
+ setting_MaxCrashReportsSize = (unsigned long)atoi(p) * 5 / 4;
continue;
}
- /* add more 'if (strncmp(p, "xx", sizeof("xx")-1) == 0)' here... */
+#undef DIRECTIVE
+#define DIRECTIVE "MakeCompatCore"
+ if (strncmp(p, DIRECTIVE, sizeof(DIRECTIVE)-1) == 0)
+ {
+ p = skip_whitespace(p + sizeof(DIRECTIVE)-1);
+ if (*p != '=')
+ continue;
+ p = skip_whitespace(p + 1);
+ setting_MakeCompatCore = string_to_bool(p);
+ continue;
+ }
+#undef DIRECTIVE
+ /* add more 'if (strncmp(p, DIRECTIVE, sizeof(DIRECTIVE)-1) == 0)' here... */
}
fclose(fp);
}
+
+ /* rhbz#539551: "abrt going crazy when crashing process is respawned".
+ * Do we want to protect against or ameliorate this? How? Ideas:
+ * (1) nice ourself?
+ * (2) check total size of dump dir, if it overflows, either abort dump
+ * or delete oldest/biggest dumps? [abort would be simpler,
+ * abrtd already does "delete on overflow" thing]
+ * (3) detect parallel dumps in progress and back off
+ * (pause/renice further/??)
+ */
+
if (setting_MaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
string worst_dir;
@@ -336,7 +403,9 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
}
}
- return 0;
+ if (!setting_MakeCompatCore)
+ return 0;
+ /* fall through to creating user core */
}
catch (CABRTException& e)
{
@@ -346,5 +415,86 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
error_msg_and_die("%s", e.what());
}
+
+ create_user_core:
+ /* Write a core file for user */
+
+ /* man core:
+ * There are various circumstances in which a core dump file
+ * is not produced:
+ *
+ * [skipped obvious ones]
+ * The process does not have permission to write the core file.
+ * ...if a file with the same name exists and is not writable
+ * or is not a regular file (e.g., it is a directory or a symbolic link).
+ *
+ * A file with the same name already exists, but there is more
+ * than one hard link to that file.
+ *
+ * The file system where the core dump file would be created is full;
+ * or has run out of inodes; or is mounted read-only;
+ * or the user has reached their quota for the file system.
+ *
+ * The RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_FSIZE resource limits for the process
+ * are set to zero.
+ * [shouldn't it be checked by kernel? 2.6.30.9-96 doesn't, still
+ * calls us even if "ulimit -c 0"]
+ *
+ * The binary being executed by the process does not have
+ * read permission enabled. [how we can check it here?]
+ *
+ * The process is executing a set-user-ID (set-group-ID) program
+ * that is owned by a user (group) other than the real
+ * user (group) ID of the process. [TODO?]
+ * (However, see the description of the prctl(2) PR_SET_DUMPABLE operation,
+ * and the description of the /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable file in proc(5).)
+ */
+
+ errno = 0;
+ if (setuid(uid) != 0
+ || user_pwd == NULL
+ || chdir(user_pwd) != 0
+ ) {
+ perror_msg_and_die("can't cd to %s", user_pwd);
+ }
+
+ /* Mimic "core.PID" if requested */
+ char core_basename[sizeof("core.%u") + sizeof(int)*3] = "core";
+ char buf[] = "0\n";
+ int fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/core_uses_pid", O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ {
+ read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ if (strcmp(buf, "1\n") == 0)
+ {
+ sprintf(core_basename, "core.%u", (int)pid);
+ }
+
+ /* Do not O_TRUNC: if later checks fail, we do not want to have file already modified here */
+ errno = 0;
+ int usercore_fd = open(core_basename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_NOFOLLOW, 0600); /* kernel makes 0600 too */
+ struct stat sb;
+ if (usercore_fd < 0
+ || fstat(usercore_fd, &sb) != 0
+ || !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)
+ || sb.st_nlink != 1
+ /* || kernel internal dumper checks this too: if (inode->i_uid != current->fsuid) <fail>, need to mimic? */
+ ) {
+ perror_msg("%s/%s is not a regular file with link count 1", user_pwd, core_basename);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (ftruncate(usercore_fd, 0) != 0
+ || copyfd_eof(core_fd, usercore_fd) < 0
+ || close(usercore_fd) != 0
+ ) {
+ perror_msg("write error writing %s/%s", user_pwd, core_basename);
+ unlink(core_basename);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ log("saved core dump of pid %u to %s/%s", (int)pid, user_pwd, core_basename);
+
return 0;
}