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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html><head><title>TLS (SSL) Encrypting syslog</title>
<meta name="KEYWORDS" content="syslog encryption, rsyslog, secure syslog, tcp, reliable, howto, ssl, tls">
</head>
<body>
<h1>Encrypting Syslog Traffic with TLS (SSL)</h1>
<p><small><i>Written by <a href="http://www.adiscon.com/en/people/rainer-gerhards.php">Rainer
Gerhards</a> (2008-05-06)</i></small></p>
<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p><i><b>In this paper, I describe how to encrypt <a href="http://www.monitorware.com/en/topics/syslog/">syslog</a>
messages on the network.</b> Encryption
is vital to keep the confidiental content of syslog messages secure. I
describe the overall
approach and provide an HOWTO do it with <a href="http://www.rsyslog.com">rsyslog's</a> TLS
features. </i></p><p>Please
note that TLS is the more secure successor of SSL. While people often
talk about "SSL encryption" they actually mean "TLS encryption". So
don't look any further if you look for how to SSL-encrypt syslog. You
have found the right spot.<i></i></p>
<h2>Background</h2>
<p><b>Traditional syslog is a clear-text protocol. That
means anyone with a sniffer can have a peek at your data.</b> In
some environments, this is no problem at all. In others, it is a huge
setback, probably even preventing deployment of syslog solutions.
Thankfully, there are easy ways to encrypt syslog
communication. </p>
The traditional approach involves <a href="rsyslog_stunnel.html">running
a wrapper like stunnel around the syslog session</a>. This works
quite well and is in widespread use. However, it is not thightly
coupled with the main syslogd and some, even severe, problems can
result from this (follow a mailing list thread that describes <a href="http://lists.adiscon.net/pipermail/rsyslog/2008-March/000580.html">total
loss of syslog messages due to stunnel mode</a> and the <a href="http://rgerhards.blogspot.com/2008/04/on-unreliability-of-plain-tcp-syslog.html">unreliability
of TCP syslog</a>).
<p><a href="gssapi.html">Rsyslog supports syslog via
GSSAP</a>I since long to overcome these limitatinos. However,
syslog via GSSAPI is a rsyslog-exclusive transfer mode and it requires
a proper Kerberos environment. As such, it isn't a really universal
solution. The <a href="http://www.ietf.org/">IETF</a> has begun standardizing syslog over plain tcp over
TLS for a while now. While I am not fully satisfied with the results so
far, this obviously has the potential to become the long-term
solution. The Internet Draft in question, syslog-transport-tls has been
dormant for some time but is now (May of 2008) again being worked on. I
expect it to turn into a RFC within the next 12 month (but don't take
this for granted ;)). I didn't want to wait for it, because there
obviously is need for TLS syslog right now (and, honestly, I have waited long enough...). Consequently, I have
implemented the current draft, with some interpretations I made (there
will be a compliance doc soon). So in essence, a TLS-protected syslog
transfer mode is available right now. As a side-note, Rsyslog is the world's first
implementation of syslog-transport-tls.</p>
<p>Please note that in theory it should be compatible with other,
non IETF syslog-transport-tls implementations. If you would like to run
it with something else, please let us know so that we can create a
compatibility list (and implement compatbility where it doesn't yet
exist). </p>
<h2>Overall System Setup</h2>
<p>Encryption requires a reliable stream. So It will not work
over UDP syslog. In rsyslog, network transports utilize a so-called
"network stream layer" (netstream for short). This layer provides a
unified view of the transport to the application layer. The plain TCP
syslog sender and receiver are the upper layer. The driver layer
currently consists of the "ptcp" and "gtls" library plugins. "ptcp"
stands for "plain tcp" and is used for unencrypted message transfer. It
is also used internally by the gtls driver, so it must always be
present on a system. The "gtls" driver is for GnutTLS, a TLS library.
It is used for encrypted message transfer. In the future, additional
drivers will become available (most importantly, we would like to
include a driver for NSS).</p>
<p>What you need to do to build an encrypted syslog channel is to
simply use the proper netstream drivers on both the client and the
server. Client, in the sense of this document, is the rsyslog system
that is sending syslog messages to a remote (central) loghost, which is
called the server. In short, the setup is as follows:</p>
<p><b>Client</b></p>
<ul>
<li>forwards messages via plain tcp syslog using gtls netstream
driver to central sever on port 10514<br>
</li>
</ul>
<p><b>Server</b></p>
<ul>
<li>accept incoming messages via plain tcp syslog using gtls
netstream driver on port 10514</li>
</ul>
<h2>Setting up the system</h2>
<h3>Server Setup</h3>
<p>At the server, you need to have a digital certificate. That
certificate enables SSL operation, as it provides the necessary crypto
keys being used to secure the connection. There is a set of default
certificates in ./contrib/gnutls. These are key.pem and cert.pem. These
are good for testing. If you use it in production,
it is very easy to break into your secure channel as everybody is able
to get hold of your private key. So it is a good idea to
generate the key and certificate yourself.</p>
<p>You also need a root CA certificate. Again, there is a sample
CA certificate in ./contrib/gnutls, named ca.cert. It is suggested to
generate your own.</p>
<p>To configure the server, you need to tell it where are its
certificate files, to use the gtls driver and start up a listener. This
is done as follows:<br>
</p>
<blockquote><code></code>
<pre># make gtls driver the default<br>$DefaultNetstreamDriver gtls<br><br># certificate files<br>$DefaultNetstreamDriverCAFile /path/to/contrib/gnutls/ca.pem<br>$DefaultNetstreamDriverCertFile /path/to/contrib/gnutls/cert.pem<br>$DefaultNetstreamDriverKeyFile /path/to/contrib/gnutls/key.pem<br><br>$ModLoad /home/rger/proj/rsyslog/plugins/imtcp/.libs/imtcp # load listener<br><br>$InputTCPServerStreamDriverMode 1 # run driver in TLS-only mode<br>$InputTCPServerRun 10514 # start up listener at port 10514<br></pre>
</blockquote>
This is all you need to do. You can use the rest of your rsyslog.conf
together with this configuration. The way messages are received does
not interfer with any other option, so you are able to do anything else
you like without any restrictions.
<p>Restart (or HUP) rsyslogd. The server should now be fully
operational.</p>
<h3>Client Setup</h3>
<p>The client setup is equally simple. You need less
certificates, just the CA cert. </p>
<blockquote>
<pre># certificate files - just CA for a client<br>$DefaultNetstreamDriverCAFile /path/to/contrib/gnutls/ca.pem<br><br># set up the action<br>$DefaultNetstreamDriver gtls # use gtls netstream driver<br>$ActionSendStreamDriverMode 1 # require TLS for the connection<br>*.* @@(o)server.example.net:10514 # send (all) messages<br><br></pre>
</blockquote>
<p>Note that we use the regular TCP forwarding syntax (@@) here.
There is nothing special, because the encryption is handled by the
netstream driver. So I have just forwarded every message (*.*) for
simplicity - you can use any of rsyslog's filtering capabilities (like
epxression-based filters or regular expressions). Note that the "(o)"
part is not strictly necessary. It selects octet-based framing, which
provides compatiblity to IETF's syslog-transport-tls draft. Besides
compatibility, this is also a more reliable transfer mode, so I suggest
to always use it.</p>
<h3>Done</h3>
<p>After
following these steps, you should have a working secure
syslog forwarding system. To verify, you can type "logger test" or a
similar "smart" command on the client. It should show up in the
respective server log file. If you dig out your sniffer, you should see
that the traffic on the wire is actually protected.</p><h3>Limitations</h3>
<p>The current implementation has a number of limitations. These are
being worked on. Most importantly, neither the client nor the server
are authenticated. So while the message transfer is encrypted, you can
not be sure which peer you are talking to. Please note that this is a
limitation found in most real-world SSL syslog systems. Of course, that
is not an excuse for not yet providing this feature - but it tells you
that it is acceptable and can be worked around by proper firewalling,
ACLs and other organizational measures. Mutual authentication will be
added shortly to rsyslog.</p><p>Secondly, the plain tcp syslog listener
can currently listen to a single port, in a single mode. So if you use
a TLS-based listener, you can not run unencrypted syslog on the same
instance at the same time. A work-around is to run a second rsyslogd
instance. This limitation, too, is scheduled to be removed soon.</p><p>The
RELP transport can currently not be protected by TLS. A work-around is
to use stunnel. TLS support for RELP will be added once plain TCP
syslog has sufficiently matured.</p><h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>With minumal effort, you can set up a secure logging
infrastructure employing TLS encrypted syslog message transmission.</p>
<h3>Feedback requested</h3>
<p>I would appreciate feedback on this tutorial. If you have
additional ideas, comments or find bugs (I *do* bugs - no way... ;)),
please
<a href="mailto:rgerhards@adiscon.com">let me know</a>.</p>
<h2>Revision History</h2>
<ul>
<li>2008-05-06 * <a href="http://www.gerhards.net/rainer">Rainer
Gerhards</a> * Initial Version created</li></ul>
<h2>Copyright</h2>
<p>Copyright (c) 2008 <a href="http://www.adiscon.com/en/people/rainer-gerhards.php">Rainer
Gerhards</a> and
<a href="http://www.adiscon.com/en/">Adiscon</a>.</p>
<p> Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this
document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version
1.2 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation;
with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover
Texts. A copy of the license can be viewed at
<a href="http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html">http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html</a>.</p>
</body></html>
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