doc/ns_gtls.html


1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
<html><head><title>gtls Network Stream Driver</title>

</head>
<body>
<h1>gtls Network Stream Driver</h1>
<p>This <a href="netstream.html">network stream
driver</a> implements a TLS protected transport via the <a href="http://www.gnu.org/software/gnutls/" target="_blank">GnuTLS
library</a>.</p>
<p><b>Available since:</b> 3.19.0 (suggested minimum 3.19.8 and above)</p>
<p style="font-weight: bold;">Supported Driver Modes</p>
<ul>
<li>0 - unencrypted trasmission (just like <a href="ns_ptcp.html">ptcp</a> driver)</li>
<li>1 - TLS-protected operation</li>
</ul>
Note: mode 0 does not provide any benefit over the ptcp driver. This
mode exists for technical reasons, but should not be used. It may be
removed in the future.<br>
<span style="font-weight: bold;">Supported Authentication
Modes</span><br>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-weight: bold;">anon</span>
- anonymous authentication as
described in IETF's draft-ietf-syslog-transport-tls-12 Internet draft</li>
<li><span style="font-weight: bold;">x509/fingerprint</span>
- certificate fingerprint authentication as
described in IETF's draft-ietf-syslog-transport-tls-12 Internet draft</li>
<li><span style="font-weight: bold;">x509/certvalid</span>
- certificate validation only</li>
<li><span style="font-weight: bold;">x509/name</span>
- certificate validation and subject name authentication as
described in IETF's draft-ietf-syslog-transport-tls-12 Internet draft
</li>
</ul>
Note: "anon" does not permit to authenticate the remote peer. As such,
this mode is vulnerable to man in the middle attacks as well as
unauthorized access. It is recommended NOT to use this mode.</p>
<p>x509/certvalid is a nonstandard mode. It validates the remote
peers certificate, but does not check the subject name. This is 
weak authentication that may be useful in scenarios where multiple
devices are deployed and it is sufficient proof of authenticy when
their certificates are signed by the CA the server trusts. This is
better than anon authentication, but still not recommended.
<b>Known Problems</b><br>
<p>Even in x509/fingerprint mode, both the client and sever
certificate currently must be signed by the same root CA. This is an
artifact of the underlying GnuTLS library and the way we use it. It is
expected that we can resolve this issue in the future.</p>
<p>[<a href="rsyslog_conf.html">rsyslog.conf overview</a>]
[<a href="manual.html">manual index</a>] [<a href="http://www.rsyslog.com/">rsyslog site</a>]
</p>
<p><font size="2">This documentation is part of the
<a href="http://www.rsyslog.com/">rsyslog</a>
project.<br>
Copyright © 2008 by <a href="http://www.gerhards.net/rainer">Rainer
Gerhards</a> and
<a href="http://www.adiscon.com/">Adiscon</a>.
Released under the GNU GPL version 3 or higher.</font></p>
</body></html>