From 8bd173f72327aa905ed1ab979b612edd5509c209 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rainer Gerhards
To create a self-signed certificate, use the following commands with GnuTLS (which is currently the only supported TLS library, what may change in the future):
+[root@rgf9dev sample]# certtool --generate-privkey --outfile ca-key.pem
+Generating a 1024 bit RSA private key...
+[root@rgf9dev sample]# certtool --generate-self-signed --load-privkey ca-key.pem --outfile ca.pem
+[root@rgf9dev sample]# certtool --generate-self-signed --load-privkey ca-key.pem --outfile ca.pem
+Generating a self signed certificate...
+Please enter the details of the certificate's distinguished name. Just press enter to ignore a field.
+Country name (2 chars): US
+Organization name: SomeOrg
+Organizational unit name: SomeOU
+Locality name: Somewhere
+State or province name: CA
+Common name: someName (not necessarily DNS!)
+UID:
+This field should not be used in new certificates.
+E-mail:
+Enter the certificate's serial number (decimal):
+
+
+Activation/Expiration time.
+The certificate will expire in (days): 3650
+
+
+Extensions.
+Does the certificate belong to an authority? (Y/N): y
+Path length constraint (decimal, -1 for no constraint):
+Is this a TLS web client certificate? (Y/N):
+Is this also a TLS web server certificate? (Y/N):
+Enter the e-mail of the subject of the certificate: someone@example.net
+Will the certificate be used to sign other certificates? (Y/N): y
+Will the certificate be used to sign CRLs? (Y/N):
+Will the certificate be used to sign code? (Y/N):
+Will the certificate be used to sign OCSP requests? (Y/N):
+Will the certificate be used for time stamping? (Y/N):
+Enter the URI of the CRL distribution point:
+X.509 Certificate Information:
+ Version: 3
+ Serial Number (hex): 485a365e
+ Validity:
+ Not Before: Thu Jun 19 10:35:12 UTC 2008
+ Not After: Sun Jun 17 10:35:25 UTC 2018
+ Subject: C=US,O=SomeOrg,OU=SomeOU,L=Somewhere,ST=CA,CN=someName (not necessarily DNS!)
+ Subject Public Key Algorithm: RSA
+ Modulus (bits 1024):
+ d9:9c:82:46:24:7f:34:8f:60:cf:05:77:71:82:61:66
+ 05:13:28:06:7a:70:41:bf:32:85:12:5c:25:a7:1a:5a
+ 28:11:02:1a:78:c1:da:34:ee:b4:7e:12:9b:81:24:70
+ ff:e4:89:88:ca:05:30:0a:3f:d7:58:0b:38:24:a9:b7
+ 2e:a2:b6:8a:1d:60:53:2f:ec:e9:38:36:3b:9b:77:93
+ 5d:64:76:31:07:30:a5:31:0c:e2:ec:e3:8d:5d:13:01
+ 11:3d:0b:5e:3c:4a:32:d8:f3:b3:56:22:32:cb:de:7d
+ 64:9a:2b:91:d9:f0:0b:82:c1:29:d4:15:2c:41:0b:97
+ Exponent:
+ 01:00:01
+ Extensions:
+ Basic Constraints (critical):
+ Certificate Authority (CA): TRUE
+ Subject Alternative Name (not critical):
+ RFC822name: someone@example.net
+ Key Usage (critical):
+ Certificate signing.
+ Subject Key Identifier (not critical):
+ fbfe968d10a73ae5b70d7b434886c8f872997b89
+Other Information:
+ Public Key Id:
+ fbfe968d10a73ae5b70d7b434886c8f872997b89
+
+Is the above information ok? (Y/N): y
+
+
+Signing certificate...
+[root@rgf9dev sample]# chmod 400 ca-key.pem
+[root@rgf9dev sample]# ls -l
+total 8
+-r-------- 1 root root 887 2008-06-19 12:33 ca-key.pem
+-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1029 2008-06-19 12:36 ca.pem
+[root@rgf9dev sample]#
+
+Be sure to safeguard ca-key.pem! Nobody except the CA itself +needs to have it. If some third party obtains it, you security is broken!
Copyright (c) 2008 Rainer Gerhards and diff --git a/doc/tls_cert_errmsgs.html b/doc/tls_cert_errmsgs.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d002174c --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/tls_cert_errmsgs.html @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ + +
Written by Rainer +Gerhards (2008-06-17)
+ +This page covers error message you may see when setting up + + + + +rsyslog with TLS. Please note that many +of the message stem back to the TLS library being used. In those cases, there is +not always a good explanation available in rsyslog alone. +
A single error typically results in two or more message being emitted: (at +least) one is the actual error cause, followed by usually one message with additional +information (like certificate contents). In a typical system, these message should +immediately follow each other in your log. Kepp in mind that they are reported +as syslog.err, so you need to capture these to actually see errors (the default +rsyslog.conf's shipped by many systems will do that, recording them e.g. in +/etc/messages). +
Sample:
+
+not permitted to talk to peer, certificate invalid: insecure algorithm
+
+
This message may occur during connection setup. It indicates that the remote peer's +certificate can not be accepted. The reason for this is given in the message part that +is shown in red. Please note that this red part directly stems back to the TLS library, +so rsyslog does acutally not have any more information about the reason. +
With GnuTLS, the following reasons have been seen in practice: +
The certificate contains information on which encryption algorithms are to be used. +This information is entered when the certificate is created. +Some older alogrithms are no longer secure and the TLS library does not accept +them. Thus the connection request failed. The cure is to use a certificate with sufficiently secure +alogorithms. +
Please note that noi encryption algorithm is totally secure. It only is secure based +on our current knowledge AND on computing power available. As computers get more and more +powerful, previously secure algorithms become insecure over time. As such, algorithms +considered secure today may not be accepted by the TLS library in the future. +
So in theory, after a system upgrade, a connection request may fail with the "insecure +algorithm" failure without any change in rsyslog configuration or certificates. This could be +caused by a new perception of the TLS library of what is secure and what not. +
Sample: unexpected GnuTLS error -64 in nsd_gtls.c:517: Error while reading file.
+
This error points to an encoding error witht the pem file in question. It means "base 64 encoding error". +From my experience, it can be caused by a couple of things, some of them not obvious: +
Sample:
+
+info on invalid cert: peer provided 1 certificate(s). Certificate 1 info: certificate valid from Wed Jun 18 11:45:44 2008 to Sat Jun 16 11:45:53 2018; Certificate public key: RSA; DN: C=US,O=Sample Corp,OU=Certs,L=Somehwere,ST=CA,CN=somename; Issuer DN: C=US,O=Sample Corp,OU=Certs,L=Somewhere,ST=CA,CN=somename,EMAIL=xxx@example.com; SAN:DNSname: machine.example.net;
+
+
This is not an error message in itself. It always follows the actual error message and +tells you what is seen in the peer's certificate. This is done to give you a chance to evaluate +the certificate and better understand why the initial error message was issued. +
Please note that you can NOT diagnose problems based on this message alone. It follows +in a number of error cases and does not pinpoint any problems by itself. +
Copyright (c) 2008 Rainer +Gerhards and +Adiscon.
+Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this +document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version +1.2 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; +with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover +Texts. A copy of the license can be viewed at +http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html.
+ diff --git a/doc/tls_cert_machine.html b/doc/tls_cert_machine.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f7868caa --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/tls_cert_machine.html @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ + +Written by Rainer +Gerhards (2008-06-18)
+ +In this step, we generate certificates for each of the machines. Please note +that both clients and servers need certificates. The certificate identifies each +machine to the remote peer. The DNSName specified inside the certificate can + + + + +be specified inside the $<object>PermittedPeer config statements. +
For now, we assume that that a single person (or group) is responsible for the whole +rsyslog system and thus it is OK if that single person is in posession of all +machine's private keys. This simplification permits us to use a somewhat less +complicated way of generating the machine certificates. So, we generate both the private +and public key on the CA (which is NOT a server!) and then copy them over to the +respective machines. +
If the roles of machine and CA administrators are split, the private key must +be generated by the machine administrator. This is done via a certificate request. +This request is then sent to the CA admin, which in turn generates the certificate +(containing the public key). The CA admin then sends back the certificate to the +machine admin, who installs it. That way, the CA admin never get's hold of the +machine's private key. Instructions for this mode will be given in a later revision +of this document. +
In any case, it is vital that the machine's private key is protected. Anybody +able to obtain that private key can imporsonate as the machine to which it belongs, thus +breaching your security. +
+[root@rgf9dev sample]# certtool --generate-privkey --outfile key.pem
+Generating a 1024 bit RSA private key...
+[root@rgf9dev sample]# certtool --generate-request --load-privkey key.pem --outfile request.pem
+Generating a PKCS #10 certificate request...
+Country name (2 chars): US
+Organization name: SomeOrg
+Organizational unit name: SomeOU
+Locality name: Somewhere
+State or province name: CA
+Common name: machine.example.net
+UID:
+Enter a challenge password:
+[root@rgf9dev sample]# certtool --generate-certificate --load-request request.pem --outfile cert.pem --load-ca-certificate ca.pem --load-ca-privkey ca-key.pem
+Generating a signed certificate...
+Enter the certificate's serial number (decimal):
+
+
+Activation/Expiration time.
+The certificate will expire in (days): 1000
+
+
+Extensions.
+Does the certificate belong to an authority? (Y/N): n
+Is this a TLS web client certificate? (Y/N): y
+Is this also a TLS web server certificate? (Y/N): y
+Enter the dnsName of the subject of the certificate: machine.example.net
+Will the certificate be used for signing (DHE and RSA-EXPORT ciphersuites)? (Y/N):
+Will the certificate be used for encryption (RSA ciphersuites)? (Y/N):
+X.509 Certificate Information:
+ Version: 3
+ Serial Number (hex): 485a3819
+ Validity:
+ Not Before: Thu Jun 19 10:42:54 UTC 2008
+ Not After: Wed Mar 16 10:42:57 UTC 2011
+ Subject: C=US,O=SomeOrg,OU=SomeOU,L=Somewhere,ST=CA,CN=machine.example.net
+ Subject Public Key Algorithm: RSA
+ Modulus (bits 1024):
+ b2:4e:5b:a9:48:1e:ff:2e:73:a1:33:ee:d8:a2:af:ae
+ 2f:23:76:91:b8:39:94:00:23:f2:6f:25:ad:c9:6a:ab
+ 2d:e6:f3:62:d8:3e:6e:8a:d6:1e:3f:72:e5:d8:b9:e0
+ d0:79:c2:94:21:65:0b:10:53:66:b0:36:a6:a7:cd:46
+ 1e:2c:6a:9b:79:c6:ee:c6:e2:ed:b0:a9:59:e2:49:da
+ c7:e3:f0:1c:e0:53:98:87:0d:d5:28:db:a4:82:36:ed
+ 3a:1e:d1:5c:07:13:95:5d:b3:28:05:17:2a:2b:b6:8e
+ 8e:78:d2:cf:ac:87:13:15:fc:17:43:6b:15:c3:7d:b9
+ Exponent:
+ 01:00:01
+ Extensions:
+ Basic Constraints (critical):
+ Certificate Authority (CA): FALSE
+ Key Purpose (not critical):
+ TLS WWW Client.
+ TLS WWW Server.
+ Subject Alternative Name (not critical):
+ DNSname: machine.example.net
+ Subject Key Identifier (not critical):
+ 0ce1c3dbd19d31fa035b07afe2e0ef22d90b28ac
+ Authority Key Identifier (not critical):
+ fbfe968d10a73ae5b70d7b434886c8f872997b89
+Other Information:
+ Public Key Id:
+ 0ce1c3dbd19d31fa035b07afe2e0ef22d90b28ac
+
+Is the above information ok? (Y/N): y
+
+
+Signing certificate...
+[root@rgf9dev sample]# rm -f request.pem
+[root@rgf9dev sample]# ls -l
+total 16
+-r-------- 1 root root 887 2008-06-19 12:33 ca-key.pem
+-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1029 2008-06-19 12:36 ca.pem
+-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1074 2008-06-19 12:43 cert.pem
+-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 887 2008-06-19 12:40 key.pem
+[root@rgf9dev sample]# # it may be a good idea to rename the files to indicate where they belong to
+[root@rgf9dev sample]# mv cert.pem machine-cert.pem
+[root@rgf9dev sample]# mv key.pem machine-key.pem
+[root@rgf9dev sample]#
+
+Provide the machine with: +
This is how the relevant part of rsyslog.conf looks on the target machine: +
+
+
+$DefaultNetstreamDriverCAFile /home/rger/proj/rsyslog/sample/ca.pem
+$DefaultNetstreamDriverCertFile /home/rger/proj/rsyslog/sample/machine-cert.pem
+$DefaultNetstreamDriverKeyFile /home/rger/proj/rsyslog/sample/machine-key.pem
+
Never provide anyone with ca-key.pem! Also, make sure +nobody but the machine in question gets hold of key.pem. +
Copyright (c) 2008 Rainer +Gerhards and +Adiscon.
+Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this +document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version +1.2 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; +with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover +Texts. A copy of the license can be viewed at +http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html.
+ diff --git a/doc/tls_cert_scenario.html b/doc/tls_cert_scenario.html index 82527d66..dced5393 100644 --- a/doc/tls_cert_scenario.html +++ b/doc/tls_cert_scenario.html @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ Gerhards (2008-06-17)