From 04305e4aff8b0533dc05f9f6f1a34d0796bd985f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Ahmed S. Darwish" Date: Sat, 19 Apr 2008 09:59:43 +1000 Subject: Audit: Final renamings and cleanup Rename the se_str and se_rule audit fields elements to lsm_str and lsm_rule to avoid confusion. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish Acked-by: James Morris --- kernel/auditfilter.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++------ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) (limited to 'kernel') diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 7c69cb5e44f..28fef6bf853 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e) if (e->rule.fields) for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; - kfree(f->se_str); - security_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule); + kfree(f->lsm_str); + security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule); } kfree(e->rule.fields); kfree(e->rule.filterkey); @@ -554,8 +554,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, f->op = data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; f->type = data->fields[i]; f->val = data->values[i]; - f->se_str = NULL; - f->se_rule = NULL; + f->lsm_str = NULL; + f->lsm_rule = NULL; switch(f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: case AUDIT_UID: @@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, entry->rule.buflen += f->val; err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, - (void **)&f->se_rule); + (void **)&f->lsm_rule); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (err == -EINVAL) { @@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, kfree(str); goto exit_free; } else - f->se_str = str; + f->lsm_str = str; break; case AUDIT_WATCH: str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); @@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: data->buflen += data->values[i] = - audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str); + audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->lsm_str); break; case AUDIT_WATCH: data->buflen += data->values[i] = @@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b) case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: - if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str)) + if (strcmp(a->fields[i].lsm_str, b->fields[i].lsm_str)) return 1; break; case AUDIT_WATCH: @@ -862,28 +862,28 @@ out: return new; } -/* Duplicate LSM field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be +/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be * re-initialized. */ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df, struct audit_field *sf) { int ret = 0; - char *se_str; + char *lsm_str; - /* our own copy of se_str */ - se_str = kstrdup(sf->se_str, GFP_KERNEL); - if (unlikely(!se_str)) + /* our own copy of lsm_str */ + lsm_str = kstrdup(sf->lsm_str, GFP_KERNEL); + if (unlikely(!lsm_str)) return -ENOMEM; - df->se_str = se_str; + df->lsm_str = lsm_str; - /* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */ - ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str, - (void **)&df->se_rule); + /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ + ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, + (void **)&df->lsm_rule); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (ret == -EINVAL) { printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is " - "invalid\n", df->se_str); + "invalid\n", df->lsm_str); ret = 0; } @@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old, new->tree = old->tree; memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount); - /* deep copy this information, updating the se_rule fields, because + /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */ for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) { switch (new->fields[i].type) { @@ -1762,7 +1762,7 @@ unlock_and_return: return result; } -/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules. +/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules. * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index c0700535e5c..56e56ed594a 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -527,14 +527,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, match for now to avoid losing information that may be wanted. An error message will also be logged upon error */ - if (f->se_rule) { + if (f->lsm_rule) { if (need_sid) { security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); need_sid = 0; } result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, f->op, - f->se_rule, + f->lsm_rule, ctx); } break; @@ -545,18 +545,18 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR also applies here */ - if (f->se_rule) { + if (f->lsm_rule) { /* Find files that match */ if (name) { result = security_audit_rule_match( name->osid, f->type, f->op, - f->se_rule, ctx); + f->lsm_rule, ctx); } else if (ctx) { for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { if (security_audit_rule_match( ctx->names[j].osid, f->type, f->op, - f->se_rule, ctx)) { + f->lsm_rule, ctx)) { ++result; break; } @@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, aux = aux->next) { if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) { struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; - if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) { + if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, ctx)) { ++result; break; } -- cgit