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* KEYS: Make request_key() and co fundamentally asynchronousDavid Howells2007-10-171-14/+79
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make request_key() and co fundamentally asynchronous to make it easier for NFS to make use of them. There are now accessor functions that do asynchronous constructions, a wait function to wait for construction to complete, and a completion function for the key type to indicate completion of construction. Note that the construction queue is now gone. Instead, keys under construction are linked in to the appropriate keyring in advance, and that anyone encountering one must wait for it to be complete before they can use it. This is done automatically for userspace. The following auxiliary changes are also made: (1) Key type implementation stuff is split from linux/key.h into linux/key-type.h. (2) AF_RXRPC provides a way to allocate null rxrpc-type keys so that AFS does not need to call key_instantiate_and_link() directly. (3) Adjust the debugging macros so that they're -Wformat checked even if they are disabled, and make it so they can be enabled simply by defining __KDEBUG to be consistent with other code of mine. (3) Documentation. [alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk: keys: missing word in documentation] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Fix a typo in Documentation/keys.txtSatyam Sharma2007-07-311-3/+2
| | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Satyam Sharma <satyam@infradead.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [AF_RXRPC]: Key facility changes for AF_RXRPCDavid Howells2007-04-261-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | Export the keyring key type definition and document its availability. Add alternative types into the key's type_data union to make it more useful. Not all users necessarily want to use it as a list_head (AF_RXRPC doesn't, for example), so make it clear that it can be used in other ways. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* Fix typos in /Documentation : MiscMatt LaPlante2006-11-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | This patch fixes typos in various Documentation txts. The patch addresses some misc words. Signed-off-by: Matt LaPlante <kernel1@cyberdogtech.com> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
* Documentation: remove duplicated wordsPaolo Ornati2006-10-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove many duplicated words under Documentation/ and do other small cleanups. Examples: "and and" --> "and" "in in" --> "in" "the the" --> "the" "the the" --> "to the" ... Signed-off-by: Paolo Ornati <ornati@fastwebnet.it> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
* Fix typos in Documentation/: 'H'-'M'Matt LaPlante2006-10-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | This patch fixes typos in various Documentation txts. The patch addresses some words starting with the letters 'H'-'M'. Signed-off-by: Matt LaPlante <kernel1@cyberdogtech.com> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
* Fix some typos in Documentation/: 'A'Matt LaPlante2006-10-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | This patch fixes typos in various Documentation txts. This patch addresses some words starting with the letter 'A'. Signed-off-by: Matt LaPlante <kernel1@cyberdogtech.com> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Acked-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
* [PATCH] Keys: Allow in-kernel key requestor to pass auxiliary data to upcallerDavid Howells2006-06-291-0/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The proposed NFS key type uses its own method of passing key requests to userspace (upcalling) rather than invoking /sbin/request-key. This is because the responsible userspace daemon should already be running and will be contacted through rpc_pipefs. This patch permits the NFS filesystem to pass auxiliary data to the upcall operation (struct key_type::request_key) so that the upcaller can use a pre-existing communications channel more easily. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-By: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keysMichael LeMay2006-06-261-11/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a /proc/<pid>/attr/keycreate entry that stores the appropriate context for newly-created keys. Modify the selinux_key_alloc hook to make use of the new entry. Update the flask headers to include a new "setkeycreate" permission for processes. Update the flask headers to include a new "create" permission for keys. Use the create permission to restrict which SIDs each task can assign to newly-created keys. Add a new parameter to the security hook "security_key_alloc" to indicate whether it is being invoked by the kernel, or from userspace. If it is being invoked by the kernel, the security hook should never fail. Update the documentation to reflect these changes. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: restrict contents of /proc/keys to Viewable keysMichael LeMay2006-06-261-4/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Restrict /proc/keys such that only those keys to which the current task is granted View permission are presented. The documentation is also updated to reflect these changes. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Fix race between two instantiators of a keyDavid Howells2006-06-221-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a revocation notification method to the key type and calls it whilst the key's semaphore is still write-locked after setting the revocation flag. The patch then uses this to maintain a reference on the task_struct of the process that calls request_key() for as long as the authorisation key remains unrevoked. This fixes a potential race between two processes both of which have assumed the authority to instantiate a key (one may have forked the other for example). The problem is that there's no locking around the check for revocation of the auth key and the use of the task_struct it points to, nor does the auth key keep a reference on the task_struct. Access to the "context" pointer in the auth key must thenceforth be done with the auth key semaphore held. The revocation method is called with the target key semaphore held write-locked and the search of the context process's keyrings is done with the auth key semaphore read-locked. The check for the revocation state of the auth key just prior to searching it is done after the auth key is read-locked for the search. This ensures that the auth key can't be revoked between the check and the search. The revocation notification method is added so that the context task_struct can be released as soon as instantiation happens rather than waiting for the auth key to be destroyed, thus avoiding the unnecessary pinning of the requesting process. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] selinux: add hooks for key subsystemMichael LeMay2006-06-221-0/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce SELinux hooks to support the access key retention subsystem within the kernel. Incorporate new flask headers from a modified version of the SELinux reference policy, with support for the new security class representing retained keys. Extend the "key_alloc" security hook with a task parameter representing the intended ownership context for the key being allocated. Attach security information to root's default keyrings within the SELinux initialization routine. Has passed David's testsuite. Signed-off-by: Michael LeMay <mdlemay@epoch.ncsc.mil> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keysDavid Howells2006-01-081-0/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make it possible for a running process (such as gssapid) to be able to instantiate a key, as was requested by Trond Myklebust for NFS4. The patch makes the following changes: (1) A new, optional key type method has been added. This permits a key type to intercept requests at the point /sbin/request-key is about to be spawned and do something else with them - passing them over the rpc_pipefs files or netlink sockets for instance. The uninstantiated key, the authorisation key and the intended operation name are passed to the method. (2) The callout_info is no longer passed as an argument to /sbin/request-key to prevent unauthorised viewing of this data using ps or by looking in /proc/pid/cmdline. This means that the old /sbin/request-key program will not work with the patched kernel as it will expect to see an extra argument that is no longer there. A revised keyutils package will be made available tomorrow. (3) The callout_info is now attached to the authorisation key. Reading this key will retrieve the information. (4) A new field has been added to the task_struct. This holds the authorisation key currently active for a thread. Searches now look here for the caller's set of keys rather than looking for an auth key in the lowest level of the session keyring. This permits a thread to be servicing multiple requests at once and to switch between them. Note that this is per-thread, not per-process, and so is usable in multithreaded programs. The setting of this field is inherited across fork and exec. (5) A new keyctl function (KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY) has been added that permits a thread to assume the authority to deal with an uninstantiated key. Assumption is only permitted if the authorisation key associated with the uninstantiated key is somewhere in the thread's keyrings. This function can also clear the assumption. (6) A new magic key specifier has been added to refer to the currently assumed authorisation key (KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY). (7) Instantiation will only proceed if the appropriate authorisation key is assumed first. The assumed authorisation key is discarded if instantiation is successful. (8) key_validate() is moved from the file of request_key functions to the file of permissions functions. (9) The documentation is updated. From: <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> Build fix. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: Discard duplicate keys from a keyring on linkDavid Howells2006-01-081-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Cause any links within a keyring to keys that match a key to be linked into that keyring to be discarded as a link to the new key is added. The match is contingent on the type and description strings being the same. This permits requests, adds and searches to displace negative, expired, revoked and dead keys easily. After some discussion it was concluded that duplicate valid keys should probably be discarded also as they would otherwise hide the new key. Since request_key() is intended to be the primary method by which keys are added to a keyring, duplicate valid keys wouldn't be an issue there as that function would return an existing match in preference to creating a new key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: Permit key expiry time to be setDavid Howells2006-01-081-1/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | Add a new keyctl function that allows the expiry time to be set on a key or removed from a key, provided the caller has attribute modification access. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no> Cc: Alexander Zangerl <az@bond.edu.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Remove key duplicationDavid Howells2006-01-061-18/+0
| | | | | | | | | Remove the key duplication stuff since there's nothing that uses it, no way to get at it and it's awkward to deal with for LSM purposes. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Add LSM hooks for key management [try #3]David Howells2005-10-301-9/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The attached patch adds LSM hooks for key management facilities. The notable changes are: (1) The key struct now supports a security pointer for the use of security modules. This will permit key labelling and restrictions on which programs may access a key. (2) Security modules get a chance to note (or abort) the allocation of a key. (3) The key permission checking can now be enhanced by the security modules; the permissions check consults LSM if all other checks bear out. (4) The key permissions checking functions now return an error code rather than a boolean value. (5) An extra permission has been added to govern the modification of attributes (UID, GID, permissions). Note that there isn't an LSM hook specifically for each keyctl() operation, but rather the permissions hook allows control of individual operations based on the permission request bits. Key management access control through LSM is enabled by automatically if both CONFIG_KEYS and CONFIG_SECURITY are enabled. This should be applied on top of the patch ensubjected: [PATCH] Keys: Possessor permissions should be additive Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Add request-key process documentationDavid Howells2005-10-081-7/+11
| | | | | | | | | The attached patch adds documentation for the process by which request-key works, including how it permits helper processes to gain access to the requestor's keyrings. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Add possessor permissions to keys [try #3]David Howells2005-09-281-19/+55
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The attached patch adds extra permission grants to keys for the possessor of a key in addition to the owner, group and other permissions bits. This makes SUID binaries easier to support without going as far as labelling keys and key targets using the LSM facilities. This patch adds a second "pointer type" to key structures (struct key_ref *) that can have the bottom bit of the address set to indicate the possession of a key. This is propagated through searches from the keyring to the discovered key. It has been made a separate type so that the compiler can spot attempts to dereference a potentially incorrect pointer. The "possession" attribute can't be attached to a key structure directly as it's not an intrinsic property of a key. Pointers to keys have been replaced with struct key_ref *'s wherever possession information needs to be passed through. This does assume that the bottom bit of the pointer will always be zero on return from kmem_cache_alloc(). The key reference type has been made into a typedef so that at least it can be located in the sources, even though it's basically a pointer to an undefined type. I've also renamed the accessor functions to be more useful, and all reference variables should now end in "_ref". Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation keyDavid Howells2005-06-241-0/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The attached patch makes the following changes: (1) There's a new special key type called ".request_key_auth". This is an authorisation key for when one process requests a key and another process is started to construct it. This type of key cannot be created by the user; nor can it be requested by kernel services. Authorisation keys hold two references: (a) Each refers to a key being constructed. When the key being constructed is instantiated the authorisation key is revoked, rendering it of no further use. (b) The "authorising process". This is either: (i) the process that called request_key(), or: (ii) if the process that called request_key() itself had an authorisation key in its session keyring, then the authorising process referred to by that authorisation key will also be referred to by the new authorisation key. This means that the process that initiated a chain of key requests will authorise the lot of them, and will, by default, wind up with the keys obtained from them in its keyrings. (2) request_key() creates an authorisation key which is then passed to /sbin/request-key in as part of a new session keyring. (3) When request_key() is searching for a key to hand back to the caller, if it comes across an authorisation key in the session keyring of the calling process, it will also search the keyrings of the process specified therein and it will use the specified process's credentials (fsuid, fsgid, groups) to do that rather than the calling process's credentials. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to find keys belonging to the authorising process. (4) A key can be read, even if the process executing KEYCTL_READ doesn't have direct read or search permission if that key is contained within the keyrings of a process specified by an authorisation key found within the calling process's session keyring, and is searchable using the credentials of the authorising process. This allows a process started by /sbin/request-key to read keys belonging to the authorising process. (5) The magic KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING key IDs when passed to KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE or KEYCTL_NEGATE will specify a keyring of the authorising process, rather than the process doing the instantiation. (6) One of the process keyrings can be nominated as the default to which request_key() should attach new keys if not otherwise specified. This is done with KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING and one of the KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_* constants. The current setting can also be read using this call. (7) request_key() is partially interruptible. If it is waiting for another process to finish constructing a key, it can be interrupted. This permits a request-key cycle to be broken without recourse to rebooting. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-Off-By: Benoit Boissinot <benoit.boissinot@ens-lyon.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [PATCH] keys: Discard key spinlock and use RCU for key payloadDavid Howells2005-06-241-113/+172
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The attached patch changes the key implementation in a number of ways: (1) It removes the spinlock from the key structure. (2) The key flags are now accessed using atomic bitops instead of write-locking the key spinlock and using C bitwise operators. The three instantiation flags are dealt with with the construction semaphore held during the request_key/instantiate/negate sequence, thus rendering the spinlock superfluous. The key flags are also now bit numbers not bit masks. (3) The key payload is now accessed using RCU. This permits the recursive keyring search algorithm to be simplified greatly since no locks need be taken other than the usual RCU preemption disablement. Searching now does not require any locks or semaphores to be held; merely that the starting keyring be pinned. (4) The keyring payload now includes an RCU head so that it can be disposed of by call_rcu(). This requires that the payload be copied on unlink to prevent introducing races in copy-down vs search-up. (5) The user key payload is now a structure with the data following it. It includes an RCU head like the keyring payload and for the same reason. It also contains a data length because the data length in the key may be changed on another CPU whilst an RCU protected read is in progress on the payload. This would then see the supposed RCU payload and the on-key data length getting out of sync. I'm tempted to drop the key's datalen entirely, except that it's used in conjunction with quota management and so is a little tricky to get rid of. (6) Update the keys documentation. Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds2005-04-161-0/+869
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!