Avoid long long in messages to PAM client use int64_t

3 files changed, 16 insertions, 16 deletions

diff --git a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
index 7bfd0f249..1ba6f17f7 100644
--- a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
+++ b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
@@ -507,21 +507,21 @@ static void pam_cache_auth_done(struct pam_auth_req *preq, int ret,
     uint32_t resp_type;
     size_t resp_len;
     uint8_t *resp;
-    long long dummy;
+    int64_t dummy;
 
     switch (ret) {
         case EOK:
             preq->pd->pam_status = PAM_SUCCESS;
 
             resp_type = SSS_PAM_USER_INFO_OFFLINE_AUTH;
-            resp_len = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(long long);
+            resp_len = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(int64_t);
             resp = talloc_size(preq->pd, resp_len);
             if (resp == NULL) {
                 DEBUG(1, ("talloc_size failed, cannot prepare user info.\n"));
             } else {
                 memcpy(resp, &resp_type, sizeof(uint32_t));
-                dummy = (long long) expire_date;
-                memcpy(resp+sizeof(uint32_t), &dummy, sizeof(long long));
+                dummy = (int64_t) expire_date;
+                memcpy(resp+sizeof(uint32_t), &dummy, sizeof(int64_t));
                 ret = pam_add_response(preq->pd, SSS_PAM_USER_INFO, resp_len,
                                        (const uint8_t *) resp);
                 if (ret != EOK) {
@@ -539,14 +539,14 @@ static void pam_cache_auth_done(struct pam_auth_req *preq, int ret,
             preq->pd->pam_status = PAM_PERM_DENIED;
             if (delayed_until >= 0) {
                 resp_type = SSS_PAM_USER_INFO_OFFLINE_AUTH_DELAYED;
-                resp_len = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(long long);
+                resp_len = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(int64_t);
                 resp = talloc_size(preq->pd, resp_len);
                 if (resp == NULL) {
                     DEBUG(1, ("talloc_size failed, cannot prepare user info.\n"));
                 } else {
                     memcpy(resp, &resp_type, sizeof(uint32_t));
-                    dummy = (long long) delayed_until;
-                    memcpy(resp+sizeof(uint32_t), &dummy, sizeof(long long));
+                    dummy = (int64_t) delayed_until;
+                    memcpy(resp+sizeof(uint32_t), &dummy, sizeof(int64_t));
                     ret = pam_add_response(preq->pd, SSS_PAM_USER_INFO, resp_len,
                                            (const uint8_t *) resp);
                     if (ret != EOK) {
diff --git a/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c b/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
index 644073f5b..f7876c220 100644
--- a/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
+++ b/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
@@ -567,19 +567,19 @@ static int user_info_offline_auth(pam_handle_t *pamh, size_t buflen,
                                   uint8_t *buf)
 {
     int ret;
-    long long expire_date;
+    int64_t expire_date;
     struct tm tm;
     char expire_str[128];
     char user_msg[256];
 
     expire_str[0] = '\0';
 
-    if (buflen != sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(long long)) {
+    if (buflen != sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(int64_t)) {
         D(("User info response data has the wrong size"));
         return PAM_BUF_ERR;
     }
 
-    memcpy(&expire_date, buf + sizeof(uint32_t), sizeof(long long));
+    memcpy(&expire_date, buf + sizeof(uint32_t), sizeof(int64_t));
 
     if (expire_date > 0) {
         if (localtime_r((time_t *) &expire_date, &tm) != NULL) {
@@ -690,19 +690,19 @@ static int user_info_offline_auth_delayed(pam_handle_t *pamh, size_t buflen,
                                   uint8_t *buf)
 {
     int ret;
-    long long delayed_until;
+    int64_t delayed_until;
     struct tm tm;
     char delay_str[128];
     char user_msg[256];
 
     delay_str[0] = '\0';
 
-    if (buflen != sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(long long)) {
+    if (buflen != sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(int64_t)) {
         D(("User info response data has the wrong size"));
         return PAM_BUF_ERR;
     }
 
-    memcpy(&delayed_until, buf + sizeof(uint32_t), sizeof(long long));
+    memcpy(&delayed_until, buf + sizeof(uint32_t), sizeof(int64_t));
 
     if (delayed_until <= 0) {
         D(("User info response data has an invalid value"));
diff --git a/src/sss_client/sss_cli.h b/src/sss_client/sss_cli.h
index fcea8e643..f8ccb4f5a 100644
--- a/src/sss_client/sss_cli.h
+++ b/src/sss_client/sss_cli.h
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ enum user_info_type {
                                             * @param Time when the cached
                                             * password will expire in seconds
                                             * since the UNIX Epoch as returned
-                                            * by time(2) as long long. A value
+                                            * by time(2) as int64_t. A value
                                             * of zero indicates that the
                                             * cached password will never
                                             * expire. */
@@ -375,8 +375,8 @@ enum user_info_type {
                                              * @param Time when an
                                              * authentication is allowed again
                                              * in seconds since the UNIX Epoch
-                                             * as returned by time(2) as long
-                                             * long. */
+                                             * as returned by time(2) as
+                                             * int64_t. */
     SSS_PAM_USER_INFO_OFFLINE_CHPASS, /**< * Tell the user that it is not
                                        * possible to change the password while
                                        * the system is offline. This message