Improve safe alignment buffer handling macros

Make the counter optional so that alignment safe macros can be used also where
there is no counter to update.
Change arguments names so that they are not deceiving (ptr normlly identify a
pointer)
Turn the memcpy substitute into an inline function so that passing a pointer to
rp and checking for it doesn't make the compiler spit lots of warnings.

1 files changed, 15 insertions, 15 deletions

diff --git a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
index 08df59845..234b83898 100644
--- a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
+++ b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
@@ -264,17 +264,17 @@ static struct response *init_response(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx) {
 static errno_t pack_response_packet(struct response *resp, int status, int type,
                                     size_t len, const uint8_t *data)
 {
-    int p=0;
+    size_t p = 0;
 
     if ((3*sizeof(int32_t) + len +1) > resp->max_size) {
         DEBUG(1, ("response message too big.\n"));
         return ENOMEM;
     }
 
-    COPY_INT32_VALUE(&resp->buf[p], status, p);
-    COPY_INT32_VALUE(&resp->buf[p], type, p);
-    COPY_INT32_VALUE(&resp->buf[p], len, p);
-    COPY_MEM(&resp->buf[p], data, p, len);
+    SAFEALIGN_SET_INT32(&resp->buf[p], status, &p);
+    SAFEALIGN_SET_INT32(&resp->buf[p], type, &p);
+    SAFEALIGN_SET_INT32(&resp->buf[p], len, &p);
+    safealign_memcpy(&resp->buf[p], data, len, &p);
 
     resp->size = p;
 
@@ -733,32 +733,32 @@ static errno_t unpack_buffer(uint8_t *buf, size_t size, struct pam_data *pd,
     uint32_t len;
     uint32_t validate;
 
-    COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&pd->cmd, buf + p, p, size);
-    COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&kr->uid, buf + p, p, size);
-    COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&kr->gid, buf + p, p, size);
-    COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&validate, buf + p, p, size);
+    SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&pd->cmd, buf + p, size, &p);
+    SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&kr->uid, buf + p, size, &p);
+    SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&kr->gid, buf + p, size, &p);
+    SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&validate, buf + p, size, &p);
     kr->validate = (validate == 0) ? false : true;
-    COPY_UINT32_CHECK(offline, buf + p, p, size);
+    SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(offline, buf + p, size, &p);
 
-    COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&len, buf + p, p, size);
+    SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&len, buf + p, size, &p);
     if ((p + len ) > size) return EINVAL;
     kr->upn = talloc_strndup(pd, (char *)(buf + p), len);
     if (kr->upn == NULL) return ENOMEM;
     p += len;
 
-    COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&len, buf + p, p, size);
+    SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&len, buf + p, size, &p);
     if ((p + len ) > size) return EINVAL;
     kr->ccname = talloc_strndup(pd, (char *)(buf + p), len);
     if (kr->ccname == NULL) return ENOMEM;
     p += len;
 
-    COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&len, buf + p, p, size);
+    SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&len, buf + p, size, &p);
     if ((p + len ) > size) return EINVAL;
     kr->keytab = talloc_strndup(pd, (char *)(buf + p), len);
     if (kr->keytab == NULL) return ENOMEM;
     p += len;
 
-    COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&len, buf + p, p, size);
+    SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&len, buf + p, size, &p);
     if ((p + len) > size) return EINVAL;
     pd->authtok = (uint8_t *)talloc_strndup(pd, (char *)(buf + p), len);
     if (pd->authtok == NULL) return ENOMEM;
@@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ static errno_t unpack_buffer(uint8_t *buf, size_t size, struct pam_data *pd,
     p += len;
 
     if (pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_CHAUTHTOK) {
-        COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&len, buf + p, p, size);
+        SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32_CHECK(&len, buf + p, size, &p);
 
         if ((p + len) > size) return EINVAL;
         pd->newauthtok = (uint8_t *)talloc_strndup(pd, (char *)(buf + p), len);