/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */ /* * kdc/kdc_authdata.c * * Copyright (C) 2007 Apple Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. * * Export of this software from the United States of America may * require a specific license from the United States Government. * It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating * export to obtain such a license before exporting. * * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior * permission. Furthermore if you modify this software you must label * your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a * fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software. * M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express * or implied warranty. * * AuthorizationData routines for the KDC. */ #include "k5-int.h" #include "kdc_util.h" #include "extern.h" #include #include "adm_proto.h" #include #include #include #if TARGET_OS_MAC static const char *objdirs[] = { KRB5_AUTHDATA_PLUGIN_BUNDLE_DIR, LIBDIR "/krb5/plugins/authdata", NULL }; /* should be a list */ #else static const char *objdirs[] = { LIBDIR "/krb5/plugins/authdata", NULL }; #endif /* MIT Kerberos 1.6 (V0) authdata plugin callback */ typedef krb5_error_code (*authdata_proc_0)( krb5_context, krb5_db_entry *client, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_enc_tkt_part * enc_tkt_reply); /* MIT Kerberos 1.8 (V2) authdata plugin callback */ typedef krb5_error_code (*authdata_proc_2)( krb5_context, unsigned int flags, krb5_db_entry *client, krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *client_key, krb5_keyblock *server_key, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_const_principal for_user_princ, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_request, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply); typedef krb5_error_code (*init_proc)(krb5_context, void **); typedef void (*fini_proc)(krb5_context, void *); static krb5_error_code handle_request_authdata( krb5_context context, unsigned int flags, krb5_db_entry *client, krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *client_key, krb5_keyblock *server_key, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_const_principal for_user_princ, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_request, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply); static krb5_error_code handle_tgt_authdata( krb5_context context, unsigned int flags, krb5_db_entry *client, krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *client_key, krb5_keyblock *server_key, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_const_principal for_user_princ, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_request, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply); static krb5_error_code handle_kdb_authdata(krb5_context context, unsigned int flags, krb5_db_entry *client, krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *client_key, krb5_keyblock *server_key, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_const_principal for_user_princ, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_request, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply); static krb5_error_code handle_signedpath_authdata(krb5_context context, unsigned int flags, krb5_db_entry *client, krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *client_key, krb5_keyblock *server_key, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_const_principal for_user_princ, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_request, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply); typedef struct _krb5_authdata_systems { const char *name; #define AUTHDATA_SYSTEM_UNKNOWN -1 #define AUTHDATA_SYSTEM_V0 0 #define AUTHDATA_SYSTEM_V2 2 int type; #define AUTHDATA_FLAG_CRITICAL 0x1 #define AUTHDATA_FLAG_PRE_PLUGIN 0x2 #define AUTHDATA_FLAG_ANONYMOUS 0x4 /* Use plugin even for anonymous tickets */ int flags; void *plugin_context; init_proc init; fini_proc fini; union { authdata_proc_2 v2; authdata_proc_0 v0; } handle_authdata; } krb5_authdata_systems; static krb5_authdata_systems static_authdata_systems[] = { { /* Propagate client-submitted authdata */ "tgs_req", AUTHDATA_SYSTEM_V2, AUTHDATA_FLAG_CRITICAL | AUTHDATA_FLAG_PRE_PLUGIN | AUTHDATA_FLAG_ANONYMOUS, NULL, NULL, NULL, { handle_request_authdata } }, { /* Propagate TGT authdata */ "tgt", AUTHDATA_SYSTEM_V2, AUTHDATA_FLAG_CRITICAL | AUTHDATA_FLAG_ANONYMOUS, NULL, NULL, NULL, { handle_tgt_authdata } }, { /* Verify and issue KDB issued authdata */ "kdb", AUTHDATA_SYSTEM_V2, AUTHDATA_FLAG_CRITICAL, NULL, NULL, NULL, { handle_kdb_authdata } }, { /* Verify and issue signed delegation path */ "signedpath", AUTHDATA_SYSTEM_V2, AUTHDATA_FLAG_CRITICAL, NULL, NULL, NULL, { handle_signedpath_authdata } } }; static krb5_authdata_systems *authdata_systems; static int n_authdata_systems; static struct plugin_dir_handle authdata_plugins; /* Load both v0 and v2 authdata plugins */ krb5_error_code load_authdata_plugins(krb5_context context) { void **authdata_plugins_ftables_v0 = NULL; void **authdata_plugins_ftables_v2 = NULL; size_t module_count; size_t i, k; init_proc server_init_proc = NULL; krb5_error_code code; /* Attempt to load all of the authdata plugins we can find. */ PLUGIN_DIR_INIT(&authdata_plugins); if (PLUGIN_DIR_OPEN(&authdata_plugins) == 0) { if (krb5int_open_plugin_dirs(objdirs, NULL, &authdata_plugins, &context->err) != 0) { return KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE; } } /* Get the method tables provided by the loaded plugins. */ authdata_plugins_ftables_v0 = NULL; authdata_plugins_ftables_v2 = NULL; n_authdata_systems = 0; if (krb5int_get_plugin_dir_data(&authdata_plugins, "authdata_server_2", &authdata_plugins_ftables_v2, &context->err) != 0 || krb5int_get_plugin_dir_data(&authdata_plugins, "authdata_server_0", &authdata_plugins_ftables_v0, &context->err) != 0) { code = KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE; goto cleanup; } /* Count the valid modules. */ module_count = 0; if (authdata_plugins_ftables_v2 != NULL) { struct krb5plugin_authdata_server_ftable_v2 *ftable; for (i = 0; authdata_plugins_ftables_v2[i] != NULL; i++) { ftable = authdata_plugins_ftables_v2[i]; if (ftable->authdata_proc != NULL) module_count++; } } if (authdata_plugins_ftables_v0 != NULL) { struct krb5plugin_authdata_server_ftable_v0 *ftable; for (i = 0; authdata_plugins_ftables_v0[i] != NULL; i++) { ftable = authdata_plugins_ftables_v0[i]; if (ftable->authdata_proc != NULL) module_count++; } } module_count += sizeof(static_authdata_systems) / sizeof(static_authdata_systems[0]); /* Build the complete list of supported authdata options, and * leave room for a terminator entry. */ authdata_systems = calloc(module_count + 1, sizeof(krb5_authdata_systems)); if (authdata_systems == NULL) { code = ENOMEM; goto cleanup; } k = 0; /* * Special case to ensure that handle_request_authdata is * first in the list, to make unenc_authdata available to * plugins. */ for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(static_authdata_systems) / sizeof(static_authdata_systems[0])); i++) { if ((static_authdata_systems[i].flags & AUTHDATA_FLAG_PRE_PLUGIN) == 0) continue; assert(static_authdata_systems[i].init == NULL); authdata_systems[k++] = static_authdata_systems[i]; } /* Add dynamically loaded V2 plugins */ if (authdata_plugins_ftables_v2 != NULL) { struct krb5plugin_authdata_server_ftable_v2 *ftable; for (i = 0; authdata_plugins_ftables_v2[i] != NULL; i++) { krb5_error_code initerr; void *pctx = NULL; ftable = authdata_plugins_ftables_v2[i]; if ((ftable->authdata_proc == NULL)) { continue; } server_init_proc = ftable->init_proc; if ((server_init_proc != NULL) && ((initerr = (*server_init_proc)(context, &pctx)) != 0)) { const char *emsg; emsg = krb5_get_error_message(context, initerr); krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, "authdata %s failed to initialize: %s", ftable->name, emsg); krb5_free_error_message(context, emsg); memset(&authdata_systems[k], 0, sizeof(authdata_systems[k])); continue; } authdata_systems[k].name = ftable->name; authdata_systems[k].type = AUTHDATA_SYSTEM_V2; authdata_systems[k].init = server_init_proc; authdata_systems[k].fini = ftable->fini_proc; authdata_systems[k].handle_authdata.v2 = ftable->authdata_proc; authdata_systems[k].plugin_context = pctx; k++; } } /* Add dynamically loaded V0 plugins */ if (authdata_plugins_ftables_v0 != NULL) { struct krb5plugin_authdata_server_ftable_v0 *ftable; for (i = 0; authdata_plugins_ftables_v0[i] != NULL; i++) { krb5_error_code initerr; void *pctx = NULL; ftable = authdata_plugins_ftables_v0[i]; if ((ftable->authdata_proc == NULL)) { continue; } server_init_proc = ftable->init_proc; if ((server_init_proc != NULL) && ((initerr = (*server_init_proc)(context, &pctx)) != 0)) { const char *emsg; emsg = krb5_get_error_message(context, initerr); krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_ERR, "authdata %s failed to initialize: %s", ftable->name, emsg); krb5_free_error_message(context, emsg); memset(&authdata_systems[k], 0, sizeof(authdata_systems[k])); continue; } authdata_systems[k].name = ftable->name; authdata_systems[k].type = AUTHDATA_SYSTEM_V0; authdata_systems[k].init = server_init_proc; authdata_systems[k].fini = ftable->fini_proc; authdata_systems[k].handle_authdata.v0 = ftable->authdata_proc; authdata_systems[k].plugin_context = pctx; k++; } } for (i = 0; i < sizeof(static_authdata_systems) / sizeof(static_authdata_systems[0]); i++) { if (static_authdata_systems[i].flags & AUTHDATA_FLAG_PRE_PLUGIN) continue; assert(static_authdata_systems[i].init == NULL); authdata_systems[k++] = static_authdata_systems[i]; } n_authdata_systems = k; /* Add the end-of-list marker. */ authdata_systems[k].name = "[end]"; authdata_systems[k].type = AUTHDATA_SYSTEM_UNKNOWN; code = 0; cleanup: if (authdata_plugins_ftables_v2 != NULL) krb5int_free_plugin_dir_data(authdata_plugins_ftables_v2); if (authdata_plugins_ftables_v0 != NULL) krb5int_free_plugin_dir_data(authdata_plugins_ftables_v0); return code; } krb5_error_code unload_authdata_plugins(krb5_context context) { int i; if (authdata_systems != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < n_authdata_systems; i++) { if (authdata_systems[i].fini != NULL) { (*authdata_systems[i].fini)(context, authdata_systems[i].plugin_context); } memset(&authdata_systems[i], 0, sizeof(authdata_systems[i])); } free(authdata_systems); authdata_systems = NULL; n_authdata_systems = 0; krb5int_close_plugin_dirs(&authdata_plugins); } return 0; } /* * Returns TRUE if authdata should be filtered when copying from * untrusted authdata. */ static krb5_boolean is_kdc_issued_authdatum (krb5_context context, krb5_authdata *authdata, krb5_authdatatype desired_type) { krb5_boolean ret = FALSE; krb5_authdatatype ad_type; unsigned int i, count = 0; krb5_authdatatype *ad_types = NULL; if (authdata->ad_type == KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT) { if (krb5int_get_authdata_containee_types(context, authdata, &count, &ad_types) != 0) goto cleanup; } else { ad_type = authdata->ad_type; count = 1; ad_types = &ad_type; } for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { switch (ad_types[i]) { case KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET: case KRB5_AUTHDATA_KDC_ISSUED: case KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC: ret = desired_type ? (desired_type == ad_types[i]) : TRUE; break; default: ret = FALSE; break; } if (ret) break; } cleanup: if (authdata->ad_type == KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT && ad_types != NULL) free(ad_types); return ret; } static krb5_boolean has_kdc_issued_authdata (krb5_context context, krb5_authdata **authdata, krb5_authdatatype desired_type) { int i; krb5_boolean ret = FALSE; if (authdata != NULL) { for (i = 0; authdata[i] != NULL; i++) { if (is_kdc_issued_authdatum(context, authdata[i], desired_type)) { ret = TRUE; break; } } } return ret; } static krb5_boolean has_mandatory_for_kdc_authdata (krb5_context context, krb5_authdata **authdata) { int i; krb5_boolean ret = FALSE; if (authdata != NULL) { for (i = 0; authdata[i] != NULL; i++) { if (authdata[i]->ad_type == KRB5_AUTHDATA_MANDATORY_FOR_KDC) { ret = TRUE; break; } } } return ret; } /* * Merge authdata. * * If copy is FALSE, in_authdata is invalid on successful return. * If ignore_kdc_issued is TRUE, KDC-issued authdata is not copied. */ static krb5_error_code merge_authdata (krb5_context context, krb5_authdata **in_authdata, krb5_authdata ***out_authdata, krb5_boolean copy, krb5_boolean ignore_kdc_issued) { size_t i, j, nadata = 0; krb5_authdata **authdata = *out_authdata; if (in_authdata == NULL || in_authdata[0] == NULL) return 0; if (authdata != NULL) { for (nadata = 0; authdata[nadata] != NULL; nadata++) ; } for (i = 0; in_authdata[i] != NULL; i++) ; if (authdata == NULL) { authdata = (krb5_authdata **)calloc(i + 1, sizeof(krb5_authdata *)); } else { authdata = (krb5_authdata **)realloc(authdata, ((nadata + i + 1) * sizeof(krb5_authdata *))); } if (authdata == NULL) return ENOMEM; if (copy) { krb5_error_code code; krb5_authdata **tmp; code = krb5_copy_authdata(context, in_authdata, &tmp); if (code != 0) return code; in_authdata = tmp; } for (i = 0, j = 0; in_authdata[i] != NULL; i++) { if (ignore_kdc_issued && is_kdc_issued_authdatum(context, in_authdata[i], 0)) { free(in_authdata[i]->contents); free(in_authdata[i]); } else authdata[nadata + j++] = in_authdata[i]; } authdata[nadata + j] = NULL; free(in_authdata); if (authdata[0] == NULL) { free(authdata); authdata = NULL; } *out_authdata = authdata; return 0; } /* Handle copying TGS-REQ authorization data into reply */ static krb5_error_code handle_request_authdata (krb5_context context, unsigned int flags, krb5_db_entry *client, krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *client_key, krb5_keyblock *server_key, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_const_principal for_user_princ, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_request, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply) { krb5_error_code code; krb5_data scratch; if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ || request->authorization_data.ciphertext.data == NULL) return 0; assert(enc_tkt_request != NULL); scratch.length = request->authorization_data.ciphertext.length; scratch.data = malloc(scratch.length); if (scratch.data == NULL) return ENOMEM; /* * RFC 4120 requires authdata in the TGS body to be encrypted in * the subkey with usage 5 if a subkey is present, and in the TGS * session key with key usage 4 if it is not. Prior to krb5 1.7, * we got this wrong, always decrypting the authorization data * with the TGS session key and usage 4. For the sake of * conservatism, try the decryption the old way (wrong if * client_key is a subkey) first, and then try again the right way * (in the case where client_key is a subkey) if the first way * fails. */ code = krb5_c_decrypt(context, enc_tkt_request->session, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AD_SESSKEY, 0, &request->authorization_data, &scratch); if (code != 0) code = krb5_c_decrypt(context, client_key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_TGS_REQ_AD_SUBKEY, 0, &request->authorization_data, &scratch); if (code != 0) { free(scratch.data); return code; } /* scratch now has the authorization data, so we decode it, and make * it available to subsequent authdata plugins */ code = decode_krb5_authdata(&scratch, &request->unenc_authdata); if (code != 0) { free(scratch.data); return code; } free(scratch.data); if (has_mandatory_for_kdc_authdata(context, request->unenc_authdata)) return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; code = merge_authdata(context, request->unenc_authdata, &enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data, TRUE, /* copy */ TRUE); /* ignore_kdc_issued */ return code; } /* Handle copying TGT authorization data into reply */ static krb5_error_code handle_tgt_authdata (krb5_context context, unsigned int flags, krb5_db_entry *client, krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *client_key, krb5_keyblock *server_key, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_const_principal for_user_princ, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_request, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply) { if (request->msg_type != KRB5_TGS_REQ) return 0; if (has_mandatory_for_kdc_authdata(context, enc_tkt_request->authorization_data)) return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY; return merge_authdata(context, enc_tkt_request->authorization_data, &enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data, TRUE, /* copy */ TRUE); /* ignore_kdc_issued */ } /* Handle backend-managed authorization data */ static krb5_error_code handle_kdb_authdata (krb5_context context, unsigned int flags, krb5_db_entry *client, krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *client_key, krb5_keyblock *server_key, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_const_principal for_user_princ, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_request, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply) { krb5_error_code code; krb5_authdata **tgt_authdata, **db_authdata = NULL; krb5_boolean tgs_req = (request->msg_type == KRB5_TGS_REQ); krb5_const_principal actual_client; /* * Check whether KDC issued authorization data should be included. * A server can explicitly disable the inclusion of authorization * data by setting the KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED flag on its * principal entry. Otherwise authorization data will be included * if it was present in the TGT, the client is from another realm * or protocol transition/constrained delegation was used, or, in * the AS-REQ case, if the pre-auth data indicated the PAC should * be present. */ if (tgs_req) { assert(enc_tkt_request != NULL); if (isflagset(server->attributes, KRB5_KDB_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED)) return 0; if (enc_tkt_request->authorization_data == NULL && !isflagset(flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CROSS_REALM | KRB5_KDB_FLAGS_S4U)) return 0; assert(enc_tkt_reply->times.authtime == enc_tkt_request->times.authtime); } else { if (!isflagset(flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_INCLUDE_PAC)) return 0; } /* * We have this special case for protocol transition, because for * cross-realm protocol transition the ticket reply client will * not be changed until the final hop. */ if (isflagset(flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_PROTOCOL_TRANSITION)) actual_client = for_user_princ; else actual_client = enc_tkt_reply->client; tgt_authdata = tgs_req ? enc_tkt_request->authorization_data : NULL; code = krb5_db_sign_authdata(context, flags, actual_client, client, server, krbtgt, client_key, server_key, krbtgt_key, enc_tkt_reply->session, enc_tkt_reply->times.authtime, tgt_authdata, &db_authdata); if (code == 0) { code = merge_authdata(context, db_authdata, &enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data, FALSE, /* !copy */ FALSE); /* !ignore_kdc_issued */ if (code != 0) krb5_free_authdata(context, db_authdata); } else if (code == KRB5_PLUGIN_OP_NOTSUPP) code = 0; return code; } krb5_error_code handle_authdata (krb5_context context, unsigned int flags, krb5_db_entry *client, krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *client_key, krb5_keyblock *server_key, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_const_principal for_user_princ, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_request, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply) { krb5_error_code code = 0; int i; for (i = 0; i < n_authdata_systems; i++) { const krb5_authdata_systems *asys = &authdata_systems[i]; if (isflagset(enc_tkt_reply->flags, TKT_FLG_ANONYMOUS) && !isflagset(asys->flags, AUTHDATA_FLAG_ANONYMOUS)) continue; switch (asys->type) { case AUTHDATA_SYSTEM_V0: /* V0 was only in AS-REQ code path */ if (request->msg_type != KRB5_AS_REQ) continue; code = (*asys->handle_authdata.v0)(context, client, req_pkt, request, enc_tkt_reply); break; case AUTHDATA_SYSTEM_V2: code = (*asys->handle_authdata.v2)(context, flags, client, server, krbtgt, client_key, server_key, krbtgt_key, req_pkt, request, for_user_princ, enc_tkt_request, enc_tkt_reply); break; default: code = 0; break; } if (code != 0) { const char *emsg; emsg = krb5_get_error_message (context, code); krb5_klog_syslog (LOG_INFO, "authdata (%s) handling failure: %s", asys->name, emsg); krb5_free_error_message (context, emsg); if (asys->flags & AUTHDATA_FLAG_CRITICAL) break; } } return code; } static krb5_error_code make_ad_signedpath_data(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal client, krb5_timestamp authtime, krb5_principal *deleg_path, krb5_pa_data **method_data, krb5_authdata **authdata, krb5_data **data) { krb5_ad_signedpath_data sp_data; krb5_authdata **sign_authdata = NULL; int i, j; krb5_error_code code; memset(&sp_data, 0, sizeof(sp_data)); if (authdata != NULL) { for (i = 0; authdata[i] != NULL; i++) ; } else i = 0; if (i != 0) { sign_authdata = k5alloc((i + 1) * sizeof(krb5_authdata *), &code); if (sign_authdata == NULL) return code; for (i = 0, j = 0; authdata[i] != NULL; i++) { if (is_kdc_issued_authdatum(context, authdata[i], KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET)) continue; sign_authdata[j++] = authdata[i]; } sign_authdata[j] = NULL; } sp_data.client = (krb5_principal)client; sp_data.authtime = authtime; sp_data.delegated = deleg_path; sp_data.method_data = method_data; sp_data.authorization_data = sign_authdata; code = encode_krb5_ad_signedpath_data(&sp_data, data); if (sign_authdata != NULL) free(sign_authdata); return code; } static krb5_error_code verify_ad_signedpath_checksum(krb5_context context, const krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_part, krb5_principal *deleg_path, krb5_pa_data **method_data, krb5_checksum *cksum, krb5_boolean *valid) { krb5_error_code code; krb5_data *data; *valid = FALSE; if (!krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum(cksum->checksum_type)) return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM; code = make_ad_signedpath_data(context, enc_tkt_part->client, enc_tkt_part->times.authtime, deleg_path, method_data, enc_tkt_part->authorization_data, &data); if (code != 0) return code; code = krb5_c_verify_checksum(context, krbtgt_key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AD_SIGNEDPATH, data, cksum, valid); krb5_free_data(context, data); return code; } static krb5_error_code verify_ad_signedpath(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_part, krb5_principal **pdelegated, krb5_boolean *path_is_signed) { krb5_error_code code; krb5_ad_signedpath *sp = NULL; krb5_authdata **sp_authdata = NULL; krb5_data enc_sp; *pdelegated = NULL; *path_is_signed = FALSE; code = krb5int_find_authdata(context, enc_tkt_part->authorization_data, NULL, KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET, &sp_authdata); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; if (sp_authdata == NULL || sp_authdata[0]->ad_type != KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET || sp_authdata[1] != NULL) goto cleanup; enc_sp.data = (char *)sp_authdata[0]->contents; enc_sp.length = sp_authdata[0]->length; code = decode_krb5_ad_signedpath(&enc_sp, &sp); if (code != 0) { /* Treat an invalid signedpath authdata element as a missing one, since * we believe MS is using the same number for something else. */ code = 0; goto cleanup; } code = verify_ad_signedpath_checksum(context, krbtgt, krbtgt_key, enc_tkt_part, sp->delegated, sp->method_data, &sp->checksum, path_is_signed); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; if (*path_is_signed) { *pdelegated = sp->delegated; sp->delegated = NULL; } cleanup: krb5_free_ad_signedpath(context, sp); krb5_free_authdata(context, sp_authdata); return code; } static krb5_error_code make_ad_signedpath_checksum(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal for_user_princ, const krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_part, krb5_principal *deleg_path, krb5_pa_data **method_data, krb5_checksum *cksum) { krb5_error_code code; krb5_data *data; krb5_cksumtype cksumtype; krb5_const_principal client; if (for_user_princ != NULL) client = for_user_princ; else client = enc_tkt_part->client; code = make_ad_signedpath_data(context, client, enc_tkt_part->times.authtime, deleg_path, method_data, enc_tkt_part->authorization_data, &data); if (code != 0) return code; code = krb5int_c_mandatory_cksumtype(context, krbtgt_key->enctype, &cksumtype); if (code != 0) { krb5_free_data(context, data); return code; } if (!krb5_c_is_keyed_cksum(cksumtype)) { krb5_free_data(context, data); return KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM; } code = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, cksumtype, krbtgt_key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AD_SIGNEDPATH, data, cksum); krb5_free_data(context, data); return code; } static krb5_error_code make_ad_signedpath(krb5_context context, krb5_const_principal for_user_princ, krb5_principal server, const krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_principal *deleg_path, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply) { krb5_error_code code; krb5_ad_signedpath sp; int i; krb5_data *data = NULL; krb5_authdata ad_datum, *ad_data[2]; krb5_authdata **if_relevant = NULL; memset(&sp, 0, sizeof(sp)); sp.enctype = krbtgt_key->enctype; if (deleg_path != NULL) { for (i = 0; deleg_path[i] != NULL; i++) ; } else i = 0; sp.delegated = k5alloc((i + (server ? 1 : 0) + 1) * sizeof(krb5_principal), &code); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; /* Combine existing and new transited services, if any */ if (deleg_path != NULL) memcpy(sp.delegated, deleg_path, i * sizeof(krb5_principal)); if (server != NULL) sp.delegated[i++] = server; sp.delegated[i] = NULL; sp.method_data = NULL; code = make_ad_signedpath_checksum(context, for_user_princ, krbtgt, krbtgt_key, enc_tkt_reply, sp.delegated, sp.method_data, &sp.checksum); if (code != 0) { if (code == KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_INAPP_CKSUM) { /* * In the hopefully unlikely case the TGS key enctype * has an unkeyed mandatory checksum type, do not fail * so we do not prevent the KDC from servicing requests. */ code = 0; } goto cleanup; } code = encode_krb5_ad_signedpath(&sp, &data); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; ad_datum.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_SIGNTICKET; ad_datum.contents = (krb5_octet *)data->data; ad_datum.length = data->length; ad_data[0] = &ad_datum; ad_data[1] = NULL; code = krb5_encode_authdata_container(context, KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT, ad_data, &if_relevant); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; code = merge_authdata(context, if_relevant, &enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data, FALSE, /* !copy */ FALSE); /* !ignore_kdc_issued */ if (code != 0) goto cleanup; if_relevant = NULL; /* merge_authdata() freed */ cleanup: if (sp.delegated != NULL) free(sp.delegated); krb5_free_authdata(context, if_relevant); krb5_free_data(context, data); krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &sp.checksum); krb5_free_pa_data(context, sp.method_data); return code; } static void free_deleg_path(krb5_context context, krb5_principal *deleg_path) { if (deleg_path != NULL) { int i; for (i = 0; deleg_path[i] != NULL; i++) krb5_free_principal(context, deleg_path[i]); free(deleg_path); } } /* * Returns TRUE if the Windows 2000 PAC is the only element in the * supplied authorization data. */ static krb5_boolean only_pac_p(krb5_context context, krb5_authdata **authdata) { return has_kdc_issued_authdata(context, authdata, KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC) && (authdata[1] == NULL); } static krb5_error_code handle_signedpath_authdata (krb5_context context, unsigned int flags, krb5_db_entry *client, krb5_db_entry *server, krb5_db_entry *krbtgt, krb5_keyblock *client_key, krb5_keyblock *server_key, krb5_keyblock *krbtgt_key, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request, krb5_const_principal for_user_princ, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_request, krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply) { krb5_error_code code = 0; krb5_principal *deleg_path = NULL; krb5_boolean signed_path = FALSE; krb5_boolean s4u2proxy; s4u2proxy = isflagset(flags, KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION); /* * The Windows PAC fulfils the same role as the signed path * if it is the only authorization data element. */ if (request->msg_type == KRB5_TGS_REQ && !only_pac_p(context, enc_tkt_request->authorization_data)) { code = verify_ad_signedpath(context, krbtgt, krbtgt_key, enc_tkt_request, &deleg_path, &signed_path); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; if (s4u2proxy && signed_path == FALSE) { code = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION; goto cleanup; } } /* No point in including signedpath authdata for a cross-realm TGT, since * it will be presented to a different KDC. */ if (!is_cross_tgs_principal(server->princ) && !only_pac_p(context, enc_tkt_reply->authorization_data)) { code = make_ad_signedpath(context, for_user_princ, s4u2proxy ? client->princ : NULL, krbtgt, krbtgt_key, deleg_path, enc_tkt_reply); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; } cleanup: free_deleg_path(context, deleg_path); return code; }