.\" Copyright (c) 1983 Regents of the University of California. .\" All rights reserved. The Berkeley software License Agreement .\" specifies the terms and conditions for redistribution. .\" .\" @(#)rlogind.8c 6.3 (Berkeley) 5/24/86 .\" .TH KRLOGIND 8C "Kerberos Version 5.0" "MIT Project Athena" .SH NAME krlogind \- remote login server .SH SYNOPSIS .B /etc/rlogind [ .B \-kr54cpPe ] .SH DESCRIPTION .I Krlogind is the server for the .IR rlogin (1C) program. The server is based on rlogind(8C) but uses kerberos authentication. .PP The .I krlogind server is invoked by \fIinetd(8c)\fP when it receives a connection on the port indicated in /etc/inetd.conf. A typical /etc/inetd.conf configuration line for \fIkrlogind\fP might be: klogin stream tcp nowait root /krb5/sbin/krlogind krlogind -e5c When a service request is received, the following protocol is initiated: .IP 1) Check authentication. .IP 2) Check authorization via the access-control files \fI.k5login\fP, \fI.klogin\fP and \fI.rhosts\fP in the user's home directory. .IP 3) Prompt for password if any checks fail and the \fI-p\fP option was supplied. .PP If the authentication succeeds, login the user by calling the accompanying login.krb5 or /bin/login, according to the definition of DO_NOT_USE_K_LOGIN. .PP The configuration of \fIkrlogind\fP is done by command line arguments passed by inetd. The options are: .IP \fB\-5\fP 10 Allow Kerberos5 authentication with the \fI.k5login\fP access control file to be trusted. If this authentication system is used by the client and the authorization check is passed, then the user is allowed to log in. .IP \fB\-4\fP Allow Kerberos4 authentication with the \fI.klogin\fP access control file to be trusted. If this authentication system is used by the client and the authorization check is passed, then the user is allowed to log in. .IP \fB\-k\fP Allow Kerberos5 and Kerberos4 as acceptable authentication mechanisms. This is the same as including \fB\-4\fP and \fB\-5\fP. .IP \fB\-r\fP Trust the remote hostname as an authentication system using the \fI.rhosts\fP authorization list. This option may be desupported in future version of klogind. .IP \fB\-p\fP If all other authorization checks fail, prompt the user for a password If this option is not included, access is denied without successful authentication and authorization using one of the previous mechanisms. .IP \fB\-P\fP Prompt the user for a password. If the -P option is passed, then the password is verified in addition to all other checks. .IP \fB\-e\fP Create an encrypted session. .IP \fB\-c\fP Require Kerberos5 clients to present a cryptographic checksum of initial connection information like the name of the user that the client is trying to access in the initial authenticator. This checksum provides additionl security by preventing an attacker from changing the initial connection information. To benefit from this security, only Kerberos5 should be trusted; Kerberos4 and rhosts authentication do not include this checksum. If this option is specified, older Kerberos5 clients that do not send a checksum in the authenticator will not be able to authenticate to this server. This option is mutually exclusive with the \fB-i\fP option. If neither the \fB-c\fP or \fB-i\fP options are specified,then checksums are validated if presented. Since it is difficult to remove a checksum from an authenticator without making the authenticator invalid, this default mode is almost as significant of a security improvement as \fB-c\fP if new clients are used. It has the additional advantage of backwards compatability with some clients. Unfortunately, clients before Kerberos V5, Beta5, generate invalid checksums; if these clients are used, the \fB-i\fP option must be used. .IP \fB\-i\fP Ignore authenticator checksums if provided. This option ignore authenticator checksusm presented by current Kerberos clients to protect initial connection information; it is the opposite of \fB-c\fP. This option is provided because some older clients--particularly clients predating the release of Kerberos V5 Beta5 (May 1995)--present bogus checksums that prevent Kerberos authentication from succeeding in the default mode. .PP If the ~/.rhosts check is to be used, then the program verifies that the client is connecting from a privileged port, before allowing login. .PP The parent of the login process manipulates the master side of the pseduo terminal, operating as an intermediary between the login process and the client instance of the .I rlogin(1C) program. In normal operation, the packet protocol described in .IR pty (4) is invoked to provide ^S/^Q type facilities and propagate interrupt signals to the remote programs. The login process propagates the client terminal's baud rate and terminal type, as found in the environment variable, ``TERM''; see .IR environ (7). The screen or window size of the terminal is requested from the client, and window size changes from the client are propagated to the pseudo terminal. .PP .I Krlogind supports three options which are used for testing purposes: .IP \fB\-S\ srvtab\fP 10 Set the \fIsrvtab\fP file to use. .IP \fB\-M\ realm\fP Set the Kerberos realm to use. .IP \fB\-L\ login\fP Set the login program to use. This option only has an effect if DO_NOT_USE_K_LOGIN was not defined when .I krlogind was compiled. .SH DIAGNOSTICS All diagnostic messages are returned on the connection associated with the .BR stderr , after which any network connections are closed. An error is indicated by a leading byte with a value of 1. .PP .B ``Try again.'' .br A .I fork by the server failed. .PP .B ``/bin/sh: ...'' .br The user's login shell could not be started. .SH SEE ALSO rlogind(8C), rlogin(1C) .SH BUGS A more extensible protocol should be used.