From 07d19ba76c2d1e10d042948b3fb7aa359b194280 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: james Date: Wed, 5 Apr 2006 06:01:08 +0000 Subject: Security Vulnerability -- An OpenVPN client connecting to a malicious or compromised server could potentially receive "setenv" configuration directives from the server which could cause arbitrary code execution on the client via a LD_PRELOAD attack. A successful attack appears to require that (a) the client has agreed to allow the server to push configuration directives to it by including "pull" or the macro "client" in its configuration file, (b) the client configuration file uses a scripting directive such as "up" or "down", (c) the client succesfully authenticates the server, (d) the server is malicious or has been compromised and is under the control of the attacker, and (e) the attacker has at least some level of pre-existing control over files on the client (this might be accomplished by having the server respond to a client web request with a specially crafted file). The fix is to disallow "setenv" to be pushed to clients from the server, and to add a new directive "setenv-safe" which is pushable from the server, but which appends "OPENVPN_" to the name of each remotely set environmental variable. git-svn-id: http://svn.openvpn.net/projects/openvpn/branches/BETA21/openvpn@983 e7ae566f-a301-0410-adde-c780ea21d3b5 --- misc.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) (limited to 'misc.c') diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c index b7eaae9..0c45817 100644 --- a/misc.c +++ b/misc.c @@ -869,6 +869,14 @@ setenv_str (struct env_set *es, const char *name, const char *value) setenv_str_ex (es, name, value, CC_NAME, 0, 0, CC_PRINT, 0, 0); } +void +setenv_str_safe (struct env_set *es, const char *name, const char *value) +{ + char buf[64]; + openvpn_snprintf (buf, sizeof(buf), "OPENVPN_%s", name); + setenv_str (es, buf, value); +} + void setenv_del (struct env_set *es, const char *name) { -- cgit