diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/openvpn.8 | 52 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/openvpn/misc.c | 21 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/openvpn/misc.h | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/openvpn/options.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c | 54 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c | 12 |
6 files changed, 146 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/doc/openvpn.8 b/doc/openvpn.8 index fee24d6..da1c0f9 100644 --- a/doc/openvpn.8 +++ b/doc/openvpn.8 @@ -3403,6 +3403,58 @@ the authenticated username as the common name, rather than the common name from the client cert. .\"********************************************************* .TP +.B \-\-compat\-names [no\-remapping] +Until OpenVPN v2.3 the format of the X.509 Subject fields was formatted +like this: +.IP +.B +/C=US/L=Somewhere/CN=John Doe/emailAddress=john@example.com +.IP +In addition the old behavivour was to remap any character other than +alphanumeric, underscore ('_'), dash ('-'), dot ('.'), and slash ('/') to +underscore ('_'). The X.509 Subject string as returned by the +.B tls_id +environmental variable, could additionally contain colon (':') or equal ('='). +.IP +When using the +.B \-\-compat\-names +option, this old formatting and remapping will be re-enabled again. This is +purely implemented for compatibility reasons when using older plug-ins or +scripts which does not handle the new formatting or UTF-8 characters. +.IP +In OpenVPN v2.3 the formatting of these fields changed into a more +standardised format. It now looks like: +.IP +.B +C=US, L=Somewhere, CN=John Doe, emailAddress=john@example.com +.IP +The new default format in OpenVPN v2.3 also does not do the character remapping +which happened earlier. This new format enables proper support for UTF\-8 +characters in the usernames, X.509 Subject fields and Common Name variables and +it complies to the RFC 2253, UTF\-8 String Representation of Distinguished +Names. + +As a backwards compatibility for the removed \-\-no\-name\-remapping feature in +older OpenVPN versions, the +.B no\-remapping +mode flag can be used with the +.B +\-\-compat\-names +option. +When this mode flag is used, the Common Name, Subject, and username strings are +allowed to include any printable character including space, but excluding +control characters such as tab, newline, and carriage-return. It ensures +compatibility with the +.B \-\-no\-name\-remapping +option of OpenVPN versions before v2.3. + +.B Please note: +This option will not be around for a long time. It is only implemented +to make the transition to the new formatting less intrusive. It will be +removed either in OpenVPN v2.4 or v2.5. So please make sure you start +the process to support the new formatting as soon as possible. +.\"********************************************************* +.TP .B \-\-port-share host port [dir] When run in TCP server mode, share the OpenVPN port with another application, such as an HTTPS server. If OpenVPN diff --git a/src/openvpn/misc.c b/src/openvpn/misc.c index 7f72939..d2882d8 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/misc.c +++ b/src/openvpn/misc.c @@ -2120,3 +2120,24 @@ sanitize_control_message(const char *src, struct gc_arena *gc) *dest = '\0'; return ret; } + +/** + * Will set or query for a global compat flag. To modify the compat flags + * the COMPAT_FLAG_SET must be bitwise ORed together with the flag to set. + * If no "operator" flag is given it defaults to COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY, + * which returns the flag state. + * + * @param flag Flag to be set/queried for bitwise ORed with the operator flag + * @return Returns 0 if the flag is not set, otherwise the 'flag' value is returned + */ +bool +compat_flag (unsigned int flag) +{ + static unsigned int compat_flags = 0; + + if (flag & COMPAT_FLAG_SET) + compat_flags |= (flag >> 1); + + return (compat_flags & (flag >> 1)); + +} diff --git a/src/openvpn/misc.h b/src/openvpn/misc.h index d4c8e33..b6da3f4 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/misc.h +++ b/src/openvpn/misc.h @@ -368,4 +368,10 @@ void argv_printf_cat (struct argv *a, const char *format, ...) #endif ; +#define COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY 0 /** compat_flags operator: Query for a flag */ +#define COMPAT_FLAG_SET (1<<0) /** compat_flags operator: Set a compat flag */ +#define COMPAT_NAMES (1<<1) /** compat flag: --compat-names set */ +#define COMPAT_NO_NAME_REMAPPING (1<<2) /** compat flag: --compat-names without char remapping */ +bool compat_flag (unsigned int flag); + #endif diff --git a/src/openvpn/options.c b/src/openvpn/options.c index 05d3523..05a0f54 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/options.c +++ b/src/openvpn/options.c @@ -2130,6 +2130,9 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce (const struct options *options, const struct conne if (options->stale_routes_check_interval) msg (M_USAGE, "--stale-routes-check requires --mode server"); + + if (compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY | COMPAT_NO_NAME_REMAPPING)) + msg (M_USAGE, "--compat-x509-names no-remapping requires --mode server"); } #endif /* P2MP_SERVER */ @@ -5548,6 +5551,13 @@ add_option (struct options *options, VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); options->ssl_flags |= SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL; } + else if (streq (p[0], "compat-names")) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); + compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_SET | COMPAT_NAMES); + if (p[1] && streq (p[1], "no-remapping")) + compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_SET | COMPAT_NO_NAME_REMAPPING); + } else if (streq (p[0], "opt-verify")) { VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL); diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c index 30fb05d..cac46e9 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c @@ -49,6 +49,22 @@ /** Maximum length of common name */ #define TLS_USERNAME_LEN 64 +/** Legal characters in an X509 name with --compat-names */ +#define X509_NAME_CHAR_CLASS (CC_ALNUM|CC_UNDERBAR|CC_DASH|CC_DOT|CC_AT|CC_SLASH|CC_COLON|CC_EQUAL) + +/** Legal characters in a common name with --compat-names */ +#define COMMON_NAME_CHAR_CLASS (CC_ALNUM|CC_UNDERBAR|CC_DASH|CC_DOT|CC_AT|CC_SLASH) + +static void +string_mod_remap_name (char *str, const unsigned int restrictive_flags) +{ + if (compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY | COMPAT_NAMES) + && !compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY | COMPAT_NO_NAME_REMAPPING)) + string_mod (str, restrictive_flags, 0, '_'); + else + string_mod (str, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); +} + /* * Export the untrusted IP address and port to the environment */ @@ -591,7 +607,7 @@ verify_cert(struct tls_session *session, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, int cert_dep } /* enforce character class restrictions in X509 name */ - string_mod (subject, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); + string_mod_remap_name (subject, X509_NAME_CHAR_CLASS); string_replace_leading (subject, '-', '_'); /* extract the username (default is CN) */ @@ -611,7 +627,7 @@ verify_cert(struct tls_session *session, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, int cert_dep } /* enforce character class restrictions in common name */ - string_mod (common_name, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); + string_mod_remap_name (common_name, COMMON_NAME_CHAR_CLASS); /* warn if cert chain is too deep */ if (cert_depth >= MAX_CERT_DEPTH) @@ -1003,7 +1019,7 @@ verify_user_pass_script (struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass *up * Verify the username and password using a plugin */ static int -verify_user_pass_plugin (struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass *up) +verify_user_pass_plugin (struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass *up, const char *raw_username) { int retval = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ @@ -1012,7 +1028,7 @@ verify_user_pass_plugin (struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass *up if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL) || strlen (up->username)) { /* set username/password in private env space */ - setenv_str (session->opt->es, "username", up->username); + setenv_str (session->opt->es, "username", (raw_username ? raw_username : up->username)); setenv_str (session->opt->es, "password", up->password); /* setenv incoming cert common name for script */ @@ -1036,6 +1052,8 @@ verify_user_pass_plugin (struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass *up #endif setenv_del (session->opt->es, "password"); + if (raw_username) + setenv_str (session->opt->es, "username", up->username); } else { @@ -1056,7 +1074,7 @@ verify_user_pass_plugin (struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass *up #define KMDA_DEF 3 static int -verify_user_pass_management (struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass *up) +verify_user_pass_management (struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass *up, const char *raw_username) { int retval = KMDA_ERROR; struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ @@ -1065,7 +1083,7 @@ verify_user_pass_management (struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL) || strlen (up->username)) { /* set username/password in private env space */ - setenv_str (session->opt->es, "username", up->username); + setenv_str (session->opt->es, "username", (raw_username ? raw_username : up->username)); setenv_str (session->opt->es, "password", up->password); /* setenv incoming cert common name for script */ @@ -1078,6 +1096,8 @@ verify_user_pass_management (struct tls_session *session, const struct user_pass management_notify_client_needing_auth (management, ks->mda_key_id, session->opt->mda_context, session->opt->es); setenv_del (session->opt->es, "password"); + if (raw_username) + setenv_str (session->opt->es, "username", up->username); retval = KMDA_SUCCESS; } @@ -1101,6 +1121,9 @@ verify_user_pass(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi, bool s2 = true; struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ + struct gc_arena gc = gc_new (); + char *raw_username = NULL; + #ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH int man_def_auth = KMDA_UNDEF; @@ -1108,17 +1131,28 @@ verify_user_pass(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi, man_def_auth = KMDA_DEF; #endif + /* + * Preserve the raw username before string_mod remapping, for plugins + * and management clients when in --compat-names mode + */ + if (compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY | COMPAT_NAMES)) + { + ALLOC_ARRAY_CLEAR_GC (raw_username, char, USER_PASS_LEN, &gc); + strcpy (raw_username, up->username); + string_mod (raw_username, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); + } + /* enforce character class restrictions in username/password */ - string_mod (up->username, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); + string_mod_remap_name (up->username, COMMON_NAME_CHAR_CLASS); string_mod (up->password, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); /* call plugin(s) and/or script */ #ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH if (man_def_auth == KMDA_DEF) - man_def_auth = verify_user_pass_management (session, up); + man_def_auth = verify_user_pass_management (session, up, raw_username); #endif if (plugin_defined (session->opt->plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY)) - s1 = verify_user_pass_plugin (session, up); + s1 = verify_user_pass_plugin (session, up, raw_username); if (session->opt->auth_user_pass_verify_script) s2 = verify_user_pass_script (session, up); @@ -1167,6 +1201,8 @@ verify_user_pass(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi, { msg (D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: Auth Username/Password verification failed for peer"); } + + gc_free (&gc); } void diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c index f5dce0d..658f5f3 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c @@ -254,6 +254,18 @@ x509_get_subject (X509 *cert, struct gc_arena *gc) char *subject = NULL; int maxlen = 0; + /* + * Generate the subject string in OpenSSL proprietary format, + * when in --compat-names mode + */ + if (compat_flag (COMPAT_FLAG_QUERY | COMPAT_NAMES)) + { + subject = gc_malloc (256, false, gc); + X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_subject_name (cert), subject, 256); + subject[255] = '\0'; + return subject; + } + subject_bio = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ()); if (subject_bio == NULL) goto err; |