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Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <dazo@users.sourceforge.net>
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On FreeBSD the endian.h file is located in sys/endian.h.
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <dazo@users.sourceforge.net>
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The initial implementation of the SHA512 hashing functions was tightly
connected to glibc. This patch changes those few functions which is
glibc to more portable functions.
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <dazo@users.sourceforge.net>
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This could cause eurephia to use a faulty hashing rounds value.
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <dazo@users.sourceforge.net>
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Do a mlock() call on all buffers used by the password hashing algorithms,
to make sure these data segments never will be written to swap.
Signed-off-by: David Sommerseth <dazo@users.sourceforge.net>
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This error caused eurephia_pwd_crypt() to fail, especially when salt length
was requested to be longer. The solution was to retrieve the salt length
before allocating memory for it.
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This also improves debugging as well, if debug logging is enabled and log level is >= 40.
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Make them work without the need of defining BENCHMARK during compilation
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Due to the current implementation of SHA512 salts, it could be
experienced as if the application hung on wrong passwords. This is
because the rounds count for the passwords are scrambled, with values
based on the given password. When a wrong password is given, this will
also result in getting a wrong salt length and hash rounds for the
following hash calculation.
Due to this, the extracted rounds value from the salt string could
return some really high number of rounds on wrong
passwords (possibly the max value if integer). And this is why the
"hang" is experienced.
To avoid this, a check is added to make sure the rounds is not
unreasonably much higher than the configured max rounds values. If the
descrambled rounds number from the salt exceeds max rounds * 1.5, the
password (most probaly) is wrong. In this case we do a sleep() to slow
down bruteforce attacks and return NULL.
The drawback is if the maxrounds later on is changed to a value which
hits this scenario:
passwordsalt_rounds > maxrounds_cfg * 1.5
In this case these old passwords will be invalidated by that
configuration change. This is considered to be a feature and not a bug.
The reason for mulitiplying by 1.5, is to allow a little room for a
degrading the max rounds setting. By adjusting the max rounds up again,
these passwords will be valid again.
Added also a sleep() when wrong username is attempted.
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Made sure we only include needed include files and checked that
the copyright headers are equal and correct
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This to make it clearer that passwdhash(...) is not good for password
hashing, but suitable when you need a quick hashing algorithm.
The eurephia_quick_hash(...) are now used for password caching hashing,
and is still suitable here since the salt used for the passwords are in
memory only and never written to disk, as they are supposed to be
temporary hashes.
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This new function, eurephia_pwd_crypt(...) implements a modified SHA512
hashing algorithm based on the SHA512 crypt implementation proposed by
Ulrich Drepper for glibc.
The original implementation adds support for variable hashing rounds.
The eurephia version implements dynamic hashing rounds, controlled by
minimum and maximum rounds set in the configuration. If not set, it
will minimum use 5000 rounds and maximum 7500 rounds. The amount of
rounds is supposed to be random.
In addition to this, the salt information is now encoded into a hex
value. In this value the salt length and the hash rounds are defined.
This hex value is then encoded (quasi crypt) based on a modulus of the
sum of the characters in the password + the password length. So if you
give the wrong password, you will also get the wrong salt length and the
wrong number of hashing rounds used.
The default salt length is also increased to 32 bytes (256 bit)
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hashing algorithms
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Moved all OpenVPN plug-in related things into ./plugins, including firewall
Moved all shared code into ./common and moved the generic part of the
database files into ./database
Updated all CMakeLists.txt files and created a new one for the root directory
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