diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'cmd/tpm-v2.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | cmd/tpm-v2.c | 389 |
1 files changed, 389 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/cmd/tpm-v2.c b/cmd/tpm-v2.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..38add4f462 --- /dev/null +++ b/cmd/tpm-v2.c @@ -0,0 +1,389 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2018 Bootlin + * Author: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com> + */ + +#include <common.h> +#include <dm.h> +#include <log.h> +#include <mapmem.h> +#include <tpm-common.h> +#include <tpm-v2.h> +#include "tpm-user-utils.h" + +static int do_tpm2_startup(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, + char * const argv[]) +{ + enum tpm2_startup_types mode; + + if (argc != 2) + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_SU_CLEAR", argv[1])) { + mode = TPM2_SU_CLEAR; + } else if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_SU_STATE", argv[1])) { + mode = TPM2_SU_STATE; + } else { + printf("Couldn't recognize mode string: %s\n", argv[1]); + return CMD_RET_FAILURE; + } + + return report_return_code(tpm2_startup(mode)); +} + +static int do_tpm2_self_test(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, + char * const argv[]) +{ + enum tpm2_yes_no full_test; + + if (argc != 2) + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + if (!strcasecmp("full", argv[1])) { + full_test = TPMI_YES; + } else if (!strcasecmp("continue", argv[1])) { + full_test = TPMI_NO; + } else { + printf("Couldn't recognize test mode: %s\n", argv[1]); + return CMD_RET_FAILURE; + } + + return report_return_code(tpm2_self_test(full_test)); +} + +static int do_tpm2_clear(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, + char * const argv[]) +{ + u32 handle = 0; + const char *pw = (argc < 3) ? NULL : argv[2]; + const ssize_t pw_sz = pw ? strlen(pw) : 0; + + if (argc < 2 || argc > 3) + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + if (pw_sz > TPM2_DIGEST_LEN) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_RH_LOCKOUT", argv[1])) + handle = TPM2_RH_LOCKOUT; + else if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_RH_PLATFORM", argv[1])) + handle = TPM2_RH_PLATFORM; + else + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + return report_return_code(tpm2_clear(handle, pw, pw_sz)); +} + +static int do_tpm2_pcr_extend(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, + char * const argv[]) +{ + struct udevice *dev; + struct tpm_chip_priv *priv; + u32 index = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0); + void *digest = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0), 0); + int ret; + u32 rc; + + if (argc != 3) + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + ret = uclass_first_device_err(UCLASS_TPM, &dev); + if (ret) + return ret; + + priv = dev_get_uclass_priv(dev); + if (!priv) + return -EINVAL; + + if (index >= priv->pcr_count) + return -EINVAL; + + rc = tpm2_pcr_extend(index, digest); + + unmap_sysmem(digest); + + return report_return_code(rc); +} + +static int do_tpm_pcr_read(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, + char * const argv[]) +{ + struct udevice *dev; + struct tpm_chip_priv *priv; + u32 index, rc; + unsigned int updates; + void *data; + int ret; + + if (argc != 3) + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + ret = uclass_first_device_err(UCLASS_TPM, &dev); + if (ret) + return ret; + + priv = dev_get_uclass_priv(dev); + if (!priv) + return -EINVAL; + + index = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0); + if (index >= priv->pcr_count) + return -EINVAL; + + data = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0), 0); + + rc = tpm2_pcr_read(index, priv->pcr_select_min, data, &updates); + if (!rc) { + printf("PCR #%u content (%d known updates):\n", index, updates); + print_byte_string(data, TPM2_DIGEST_LEN); + } + + unmap_sysmem(data); + + return report_return_code(rc); +} + +static int do_tpm_get_capability(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, + char * const argv[]) +{ + u32 capability, property, rc; + u8 *data; + size_t count; + int i, j; + + if (argc != 5) + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + capability = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0); + property = simple_strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0); + data = map_sysmem(simple_strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 0), 0); + count = simple_strtoul(argv[4], NULL, 0); + + rc = tpm2_get_capability(capability, property, data, count); + if (rc) + goto unmap_data; + + printf("Capabilities read from TPM:\n"); + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + printf("Property 0x"); + for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) + printf("%02x", data[(i * 8) + j]); + printf(": 0x"); + for (j = 4; j < 8; j++) + printf("%02x", data[(i * 8) + j]); + printf("\n"); + } + +unmap_data: + unmap_sysmem(data); + + return report_return_code(rc); +} + +static int do_tpm_dam_reset(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, + char *const argv[]) +{ + const char *pw = (argc < 2) ? NULL : argv[1]; + const ssize_t pw_sz = pw ? strlen(pw) : 0; + + if (argc > 2) + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + if (pw_sz > TPM2_DIGEST_LEN) + return -EINVAL; + + return report_return_code(tpm2_dam_reset(pw, pw_sz)); +} + +static int do_tpm_dam_parameters(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, + char *const argv[]) +{ + const char *pw = (argc < 5) ? NULL : argv[4]; + const ssize_t pw_sz = pw ? strlen(pw) : 0; + /* + * No Dictionary Attack Mitigation (DAM) means: + * maxtries = 0xFFFFFFFF, recovery_time = 1, lockout_recovery = 0 + */ + unsigned long int max_tries; + unsigned long int recovery_time; + unsigned long int lockout_recovery; + + if (argc < 4 || argc > 5) + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + if (pw_sz > TPM2_DIGEST_LEN) + return -EINVAL; + + if (strict_strtoul(argv[1], 0, &max_tries)) + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + if (strict_strtoul(argv[2], 0, &recovery_time)) + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + if (strict_strtoul(argv[3], 0, &lockout_recovery)) + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + log(LOGC_NONE, LOGL_INFO, "Changing dictionary attack parameters:\n"); + log(LOGC_NONE, LOGL_INFO, "- maxTries: %lu", max_tries); + log(LOGC_NONE, LOGL_INFO, "- recoveryTime: %lu\n", recovery_time); + log(LOGC_NONE, LOGL_INFO, "- lockoutRecovery: %lu\n", lockout_recovery); + + return report_return_code(tpm2_dam_parameters(pw, pw_sz, max_tries, + recovery_time, + lockout_recovery)); +} + +static int do_tpm_change_auth(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, + char *const argv[]) +{ + u32 handle; + const char *newpw = argv[2]; + const char *oldpw = (argc == 3) ? NULL : argv[3]; + const ssize_t newpw_sz = strlen(newpw); + const ssize_t oldpw_sz = oldpw ? strlen(oldpw) : 0; + + if (argc < 3 || argc > 4) + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + if (newpw_sz > TPM2_DIGEST_LEN || oldpw_sz > TPM2_DIGEST_LEN) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_RH_LOCKOUT", argv[1])) + handle = TPM2_RH_LOCKOUT; + else if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_RH_ENDORSEMENT", argv[1])) + handle = TPM2_RH_ENDORSEMENT; + else if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_RH_OWNER", argv[1])) + handle = TPM2_RH_OWNER; + else if (!strcasecmp("TPM2_RH_PLATFORM", argv[1])) + handle = TPM2_RH_PLATFORM; + else + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + return report_return_code(tpm2_change_auth(handle, newpw, newpw_sz, + oldpw, oldpw_sz)); +} + +static int do_tpm_pcr_setauthpolicy(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, + char * const argv[]) +{ + u32 index = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0); + char *key = argv[2]; + const char *pw = (argc < 4) ? NULL : argv[3]; + const ssize_t pw_sz = pw ? strlen(pw) : 0; + + if (strlen(key) != TPM2_DIGEST_LEN) + return -EINVAL; + + if (argc < 3 || argc > 4) + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + return report_return_code(tpm2_pcr_setauthpolicy(pw, pw_sz, index, + key)); +} + +static int do_tpm_pcr_setauthvalue(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, + int argc, char * const argv[]) +{ + u32 index = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 0); + char *key = argv[2]; + const ssize_t key_sz = strlen(key); + const char *pw = (argc < 4) ? NULL : argv[3]; + const ssize_t pw_sz = pw ? strlen(pw) : 0; + + if (strlen(key) != TPM2_DIGEST_LEN) + return -EINVAL; + + if (argc < 3 || argc > 4) + return CMD_RET_USAGE; + + return report_return_code(tpm2_pcr_setauthvalue(pw, pw_sz, index, + key, key_sz)); +} + +static cmd_tbl_t tpm2_commands[] = { + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(info, 0, 1, do_tpm_info, "", ""), + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(init, 0, 1, do_tpm_init, "", ""), + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(startup, 0, 1, do_tpm2_startup, "", ""), + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(self_test, 0, 1, do_tpm2_self_test, "", ""), + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(clear, 0, 1, do_tpm2_clear, "", ""), + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(pcr_extend, 0, 1, do_tpm2_pcr_extend, "", ""), + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(pcr_read, 0, 1, do_tpm_pcr_read, "", ""), + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(get_capability, 0, 1, do_tpm_get_capability, "", ""), + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(dam_reset, 0, 1, do_tpm_dam_reset, "", ""), + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(dam_parameters, 0, 1, do_tpm_dam_parameters, "", ""), + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(change_auth, 0, 1, do_tpm_change_auth, "", ""), + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(pcr_setauthpolicy, 0, 1, + do_tpm_pcr_setauthpolicy, "", ""), + U_BOOT_CMD_MKENT(pcr_setauthvalue, 0, 1, + do_tpm_pcr_setauthvalue, "", ""), +}; + +cmd_tbl_t *get_tpm_commands(unsigned int *size) +{ + *size = ARRAY_SIZE(tpm2_commands); + + return tpm2_commands; +} + +U_BOOT_CMD(tpm, CONFIG_SYS_MAXARGS, 1, do_tpm, "Issue a TPMv2.x command", +"<command> [<arguments>]\n" +"\n" +"info\n" +" Show information about the TPM.\n" +"init\n" +" Initialize the software stack. Always the first command to issue.\n" +"startup <mode>\n" +" Issue a TPM2_Startup command.\n" +" <mode> is one of:\n" +" * TPM2_SU_CLEAR (reset state)\n" +" * TPM2_SU_STATE (preserved state)\n" +"self_test <type>\n" +" Test the TPM capabilities.\n" +" <type> is one of:\n" +" * full (perform all tests)\n" +" * continue (only check untested tests)\n" +"clear <hierarchy>\n" +" Issue a TPM2_Clear command.\n" +" <hierarchy> is one of:\n" +" * TPM2_RH_LOCKOUT\n" +" * TPM2_RH_PLATFORM\n" +"pcr_extend <pcr> <digest_addr>\n" +" Extend PCR #<pcr> with digest at <digest_addr>.\n" +" <pcr>: index of the PCR\n" +" <digest_addr>: address of a 32-byte SHA256 digest\n" +"pcr_read <pcr> <digest_addr>\n" +" Read PCR #<pcr> to memory address <digest_addr>.\n" +" <pcr>: index of the PCR\n" +" <digest_addr>: address to store the a 32-byte SHA256 digest\n" +"get_capability <capability> <property> <addr> <count>\n" +" Read and display <count> entries indexed by <capability>/<property>.\n" +" Values are 4 bytes long and are written at <addr>.\n" +" <capability>: capability\n" +" <property>: property\n" +" <addr>: address to store <count> entries of 4 bytes\n" +" <count>: number of entries to retrieve\n" +"dam_reset [<password>]\n" +" If the TPM is not in a LOCKOUT state, reset the internal error counter.\n" +" <password>: optional password\n" +"dam_parameters <max_tries> <recovery_time> <lockout_recovery> [<password>]\n" +" If the TPM is not in a LOCKOUT state, set the DAM parameters\n" +" <maxTries>: maximum number of failures before lockout,\n" +" 0 means always locking\n" +" <recoveryTime>: time before decrement of the error counter,\n" +" 0 means no lockout\n" +" <lockoutRecovery>: time of a lockout (before the next try),\n" +" 0 means a reboot is needed\n" +" <password>: optional password of the LOCKOUT hierarchy\n" +"change_auth <hierarchy> <new_pw> [<old_pw>]\n" +" <hierarchy>: the hierarchy\n" +" <new_pw>: new password for <hierarchy>\n" +" <old_pw>: optional previous password of <hierarchy>\n" +"pcr_setauthpolicy|pcr_setauthvalue <pcr> <key> [<password>]\n" +" Change the <key> to access PCR #<pcr>.\n" +" hierarchy and may be empty.\n" +" /!\\WARNING: untested function, use at your own risks !\n" +" <pcr>: index of the PCR\n" +" <key>: secret to protect the access of PCR #<pcr>\n" +" <password>: optional password of the PLATFORM hierarchy\n" +); |